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Thomas E. Gilbert, B. A., Momingside College
M. A., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Lawrence Foster
John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theory has been subject
to criticism- by philosophers, partly because of its alleged
inability to account for intuitively compelling principles
of justice. It is argued that Mill has been seriously mis-
interpreted and that a careful analysis of (primarily) On
Liberty
;
and U_ci_l
j
. t ar ian i s
m
results in an interpretation of
his theory which avoids these objections. A utilitarian
theory is developed which is based on this interpretation
and which, it is argued, Mill could have accented.
After an account of familiar objections to utilitari-
anism concerning distributive justice, it is demonstrated
that Mill's argument in Util itarianism for a "qualitative
pleasure distinction" is plagued with difficulty and that,
even if successful, appeal ~co qualitative distinctions among
pleasures for determining the morality of actions would re-
sult in additional problems for utilitarian theory concern-
ing distributive justice. These additional problems are
avoided by demonstrating that Mill did not regard his
IV
argument for a qualitative pleasure distinction as an argu-
ment for a necessary consideration--in addition to quantity
--for determining the morality of actions; rather, that he is
more plausibly interpreted as having considered qualitative
pleasure distinctions only in a prudential context--for ap-
peal to in determining the prudential rightness and wrong-
ness of actions. Consequently, contrary to what has often
been supposed, Mill's argument for a qualitative pleasure
distinction cannot be regarded, as a major departure from a
utilitarian theory like Bentham's.
Next, it is demonstrated that Mill, as an empiricist,
ma.de a distinction between what is called "metaphysical” and
"non-metaphysical" rightness; recognition of this distinction,
along with additional considerations, makes it obvious that
Mill’s utilitarian theory is committed to a theory of intrin-
sic value which holds that "happiness" has intrinsic value,
where the substantive content of happiness is to be regarded
as unknown. Consequently, Mill (unlike Bentham) does not re-
gard 'pleasure' as equivalent to 'happiness,' and so sub-
scribes to a eudaemonistic
,
not a hedonistic, utilitarian
theory. A principle of utility is developed which corres-
ponds to each kind of rightness; it is then aruged that jus-
tice can plausibly be associated only with the principle based
on non-metaphysical rightness; that the theory should be re-
jected or accepted only by considering justice in accordance
v
with this nrinciDle and that Mill's theory has erroneously
bean rejected because only the other principle of utility-
based on metaphysical rightness—has been considered.
!o explicate this new (non-metaphysical) principle of
utility, it is argued that Mill regarded 'unjust actions' as
violations of rights' and associated our moral obligation to
be just with the two necessary conditions for happiness—the
righ u bo life and the right to liberty.
With the principle of utility fully explained, it is
shovrn how the utilitarian theory which has been develoned
can account for intuitively acceptable principles of dis-
tributive justice. A non-utilitarian theory of social jus-
tice propounded by William K. Frankena is shown to be deriv-
able from the utilitarian theory v/hich has been developed,
and attention is focused on the objections and "Canons of
Diotributive Justice" in Nicholas Reseller' s Distributive
Justice
. Finally, it is argued that David Lyons' concept of
"fair procedures" (from his Forms and Limits of Utilitarian-
i_sm) is contrary to his claim—a principle of distributive
justice that can be derived from our utilitarian theory, and
employed to resolve additional problems concerned with dis-
tributive justice.
A brief addendum explains how the theory can function
as either an act- or a rule-utilitarian theory.
vi
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CHAPTER I
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AS A PROBLEM FOR UTILITARIANISM
Section I
Some Traditional Problems and Their Cause
Historically, most critics of utilitarianism have
alleged that one of its major defects is an inability to
account for intuitively acceptable principles of justice.
Among the various kinds of justice, the principles of dis-
tributive justice have been central to this claim. As it
will be maintained that the source of any difficulty re-
garding distributive justice is inherent in "classical**
formulations of the principle of utility, it is desirable
to begin by explaining what is meant by categorizing a
formulation of the principle of utility in this way.
A principle of utility is "classical” if it is formu-
lated as either a hedonistic or an ideal principle. Thus,
the formulation of the principle is such that the utility
of an action is determined by its production of some in-
trinsic good(s), where the latter is something substantive
which always serves as the criterion for determining whether
an action is right, wrong, or obligatory. As a hedonistic
principle, only pleasure (happiness) is regarded as intrin-
sically good? as an ideal principle, there is more than one
intrinsic good (perhaps including pleasure). In the former,
then, pleasure is always appealed to for determining the
2utility of any action; in the latter, whatever intrinsic
goods are appealed to are determined by the particular ideal
theory employed and are the same for each case of determin-
ing the utility of any action.
A "classical " formulation of the principle of utility
may be an act- or rule-utilitarian principle. Thus, for ex-
ample, as an act-utilitarian principle of obligation, it
might be formulated as follows; "An action ought to be done
if and only if (among all alternative actions which the agent
is capable of choosing) it maximizes the total amount of in-
trinsic good of those persons affected by the action, count-
ing each person as one and no person as more than one (i.e.,
insofar as it maximizes 'the greatest good of the greatest
number*)." And as a rule-utilitarian principle: "An action
ought to be done if and only if prescribed by a utilitarian
rule, a rule being a utilitarian rule if and only if acting
in accordance with it in all those situations in which it
applies tends to maximize the overall good of those to whom
it applies, counting each person as one and no person as
more than one (again, *the greatest good of the greatest
number®)." Discounting difficulties which, for instance,
might be thought to stem from a consideration of the dis-
tinction between an act being a prima facie or an absolute
obligation, in addition to neglecting numerous variations
of both formulations of the principle, this somewhat gen-
eral characterization will suffice.
3It is because utilitarians have maintained that jus-
tice is encompassed by principles of obligation similar to
these which has caused much of the criticism of the theory.
^
Thus, distributive justice has been held to be a problem for
both act- and rule-utilitarianism. Brandt, for example,
says of act-utilitarianism, MThe act-utilitarian thesis is
in conflict with the fact that we have certain obligations
connected with social and economic justice ... .On this ques-
tion, however, the act-utilitarian must say that any dis-
tribution is equally satisfactory, as long as the total
^ee John Stuart Mill, "Utilitarianism,” The Collected
Works of John Stuart Mill . Vol. X, Essays On Ethics. Reli -
gion and Society
,
Ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of
Totonto Press, 1969 ), Chapter V, pp. 240-259. Also, Richard
B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), pp. 395-6. For example, it is
clear that Mill thought that, because of their long-term
effects, just actions must be regarded as obligatory. In
distinguishing "justice” from "the other obligations of
morality," he speaks of the former as those "duties of per-
fact obligations ... in virtue of which a correlative right
resides in some person or persons" (p. 247, "Utilitarian-
ism”). Rights, of course, are justified in terms of their
utility—see, for example, p, 10 of On Liberty (ed. Alburey
Castell,'New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947) and p. 250
of "Utilitarianism"—and so we would have something like
this: "Something is established by utilitarian theory as
a right if, and only if, establishing it as a right is more
productive of the general happiness than not doing so."
Consequently, Mill might say, roughly, that "an action is
just if, and only if, it is in accordance with the rights
of those affected by the action." The relationship between
rights and justice is actually more complicated than this.
It is the purpose of Chapter II in what follows to formu-
late a principle of utility which can account for justice,
of Chapter III to explicate a part of Mill's theory of
rights, and of Chapter IV to demonstrate how his utilitarian
theory can account for distributive justice.
4amount of joy is undiminished .
”
2
And with regard to rule-
utilitarianism, he states, "The point of primary difficulty
for the rule-utilitarian appears to be the implications of
his theory for the distribution of welfare. The rule-utili-
tarian, we recall, approves of any rule for distributing
welfare so long as it does not bring about less welfare
than some alternative rule."-^
Stating the problem somewhat more concisely, John
Hospers asserts:
...a possible conflict arises between the utili-tarian ideal-even that of rule-utilitarianism—
ana the requirements of justice. For the acts
ilitarianism and the rules in rule—
utilitarianism have one end in mind: the pro-duction^of the largest possible amount (quantity )
S®od_. But does not justice require
sometning additional that is not taken into ac-
count thus far at all, namely an equal distribu-
tion of that intrinsic good?^
Hospers later turns to the question as to whether there are
occasions on which equality is not enough to guarantee jus-
tice, and goes on to consider what he regards as "the most
important strand in the concept of justice," the question of
justice and deserts (rewards and punishments). He emphasizes
that there are times when a distribution is to be regarded as
2
Brandt, p. 389 .
^Brandt, p. 403.
4John Hospers, Human Conduct: An Introduction to the
Problems of Ethics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
Inc., 1961), pp. 424-25
.
5unjust
,
not because there are unequal allotments but because
they are not given in accordance with what is deserved .-5
Hospers* reference to deserts calls attention to an
important point--viz.
, that distributive justice conceived
as narrowly egalitarian is insufficient—that legitimate
claims must be accounted for by any theory of distributive
justice which purports to be satisfactory. Thus, the claim
made by many defendants of the principle of utility (includ-
ing Mill) that it does provide for the distribution of good
insofar as it is always to be understood as formulated in
terms of "the greatest good for the greatest number*' is
thought to be inadequate as a defense, even if successful;
for the only principle of distributive justice that could
be accounted for by such a qualification would be egali-
tarian. As it turns out, however, even on this latter point
it has been asserted that the principle is ambiguous.
Thus, in regard to "the greatest number" part of the
phrase, Bentham's insistence that each person was to count
for one and only for one might be thought to insure utili-
tarian theory as egalitarian. But, although it seems clear
that we are to consider everyone's happiness in determining
the total quantity of intrinsic good for a given action, it
is not at all apparent what we are to do when faced with a
choice between two actions, one of which will result in a
5Hospers, p. 429.
6greater total quantity of happiness via an unequal dis-
tribution and another which, though it will result in an
equal distribution, will produce a lesser quantity of total
happiness. As it is claimed that neither Bentham nor Mill
provided explicit directions as to which action we are to
choose m such a situation, it seems reasonable to conclude
that their qualification, ’’for the greatest number,” was
merely meant to insure that every person affected by the
prospective action be included in calculations of the final
quantity of happiness. 6
Rescher attempts to elucidate the problem by insist-
ing that the principle of utility is a two-factor cri-
terion. ”
Suppose that some three particular persons,
Messrs. A, B, and C, can be given the utility
shares (a), (b), and (c) resnectivelv, in ac-
cordance with either Scheme I or Scheme II:
Scheme I Scheme II
3 units 2 units
3 2
3 6
Which scheme represents the superior mode of
distribution? Scheme II yields "the greatest
good”: it distributes ten units as compared
with nine of its rival. Scheme I yields a
greater advantage in goods for M the greatest
number”: two persons gain by its adoption and
only one loses. The example brings out the
fact that the principle of utility is a two -
factor criterion ("greater good,” "greater
number”), and that these two factors can in
given cases work against one another. There
is thus nothing in the principle of utility
to help us in making—let alone in dictating
Share
(a r~
(t>)
(c)
6Hospers
,
pp. 425-26.
7a particular outcome of--a choice between Scheme I
and Scheme II. The principle unqualified is pat-
ently incomplete as an effective means for deciding
between alternative distributions of a good.
7
Although Rescher's general point is merely that the principle
of utility is unable to choose between alternative distribu-
tions in at least some cases, if we assume (as I think
gRescher does) that only one of the schemes in the example
is just, this point— if justified—must be regarded as a
serious criticism of the theory.
At this point, then, the underlying problem is that
there may be conflicts between the principle of utility
formulated (as it traditionally has been) in terns of some
particular conception of happiness as the only intrinsically
good end and those principles of distribution which we re-
o
gard as intuitively acceptable. As evidenced above, this
conflict apparently arises in spite of any claims that
Bentham and Mill meant to insure that the principle pro-
vided for distribution in at least the egalitarian sense;
"^Nicholas Rescher, Distributive Justice (New York;
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), p. 25 .
o
I presume that Rescher' s preference is Scheme I,
though he" is not explicit about it. However, even if we
assume that both distribution schemes in the example. are
equally just, given the supposed difficulty Rescher is
concerned to point out here, it would not be difficult to
imagine just and unjust distribution schemes. which the
principle of utility would be unable to distinguish.
^pp. 5 r 6* & 7 .
8and although it has been suggested that something like
Brandt's theory of "universalistic impersonal pluralism"^
might guarantee tfiis aspect of justice for utilitarian
theory by counting "equality of welfare" as an intrinsic
good, tnis proposal (and others like it) must be rejected as
unsatisfactory, for reasons to be advanced below. Further,
if along with Hospers it is admitted that there are other
acceptable principles of distributive justice which attempt
to take into account legitimate claims (based on merit, need,
productivity, etc,), it seems even more obvious (though it
won't be argued for here) that classical formulations of the
principle of utility cannot be made to square with them in
all those instances in which it seems intuitively evident
that it should. It has not, then, been unfairly alleged that
the principle of utility, as classically formulated, is com-
patible with any distribution so long as the quantity of in-
trinsic good which results is at a maximum. It is time to
consider the cause of this conflict and eventually to con-
11
sider a way of avoiding it.
J-uBrandt, pp. 355. 356, 395-6. 500.
11There are, of course, many other significant objec-
tions raised against utilitarianism which are based on claims
of conflict with principles of distributive justice, e.g,,
the objections found in numerous articles by John Rawls and
his book A Theory of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1971) • However, the purpose of this sec-
tion required that we consider only a few in order to point
out that utilitarian theory is subject to these . difficulties
because they are inherent in classical formulations of the
principle of utility. In point of fact, these few can be
9As previously noted, the general cause of the conflict
is evident; it must be admitted that so long as the principle
of utility is formulated in terms of "absolute intrinsic
value," in the manner in which it traditionally has been, the
conflict between it and the principle(s) of distributive jus-
tice is unavoidable and inevitable. Therefore, so long as
is agreed that incompatibility with intuitively accept-
able principles provides sufficient reason for rejecting an
ethical theory (there are, of course, many other conflicts
between utilitarian theory and other intuitively acceptable
notions which are not concerned with distributive justice),
it appears that the rejection of utilitarianism is necessi-
I O
tated for the reasons advanced above.
regarded as sufficient grounds for rejection of classical
formulations of the theory. Other objections (e.g., Rawls'),
as well as some of the above, v/ill be dealt with in more
detail in a subsequent chapter.
12
It is to be noted that reference to "intuitively
acceptable principles" here and elsewhere is not to be con-
strued as evidence of a commitment to a particular episte-
mological theory as to how we come to know or regard certain
ethical propositions as true. On the contrary, it is merely
used as a convenient expression for the purpose of recogniz-
ing that there are some ethical propositions—among them
principles of distributive justice—with which many philos-
ophers have maintained that any acceptable moral theory
should not be incompatible. As the latter claims are merely
assumed to be reasonable requirements of acceptable moral
theories, for the purpose of eventually demonstrating the ac-
ceptability of a version of utilitarianism in this regard,
any epistemological issues are to be regarded as superfluous
to the major concern of the dissertation.
10
Section II
The Qualitative Pleasure Distinction-
Source of a New Problem
There are, in addition, other problems which have
P-^-^oaed classical formulations of the theory which bear di-
rectly or indirectly on the problem of distributive justice.
One of the historically more important and most discussed
merits consideration—the problem of qualitative differences
among pleasures. With respect to this problem it will be
demonstrated in Sub-section II-A that a qualitative ranking
of pleasures is an unlikely possibility. In Sub-section II-B
the much more significant point will be established that, con-
trary to what seems generally to have been supposed by phi-
losophers, even if a qualitative hierarchy were possible, its
use would not only not represent an improvement of the theory
but would, instead, result in additional theoretical diffi-
culties regarding distributive justice.
Sub-section II-A: Mill's problematic argument for the
qualitative pleasure distinction
. Bentham regarded all plea-
sures as qualitatively indistinct. Thus, in saying,
By utility is meant that property in any object,
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage,
pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the
present case comes to the same thing) or (what
again comes to the same thing) to prevent the
happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappi-
ness to the party whose interest is considered, ^
^Jeremy Bentham, "An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation," Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham ,
ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (London: University of
London, The Athlone Press, 1970), p. 12.
11
he had in mind a concept of utility that was susceptible to
quantitative determination by way of his "hedonistic calcu-
lus
.
"
In addition to all the familiar objections raised con-
cerning the practical (perhaps theoretical) difficulties in-
volved in attempting to subject pleasures and pains to quanti-
tative measurement, it was this severe limitation on the con-
cept of utility which resulted in one of the presumably more
damaging criticisms to be leveled against utilitarianism. It
was the assertion that utilitarianism was a "pig philosophy"
(and all this involves) which prompted Mill to respond early
in the second chapter of "Utilitarianism" with the assurance
that "qualitative differences" must also be considered in any
consideration of utilities:
It is quite compatible with the principle of
utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds
of pleasure are more desirable and more valu-
able than others. It would be absurd that,
while, in estimating all other things, quality
is considered as v/ell as quantity, the estima-
tion of pleasures should be supposed to depend
on quantity alone.
l
2
^
Though it seems apparent that a merely quantitative
approach to pleasures and pains is insufficient, the insis-
tence that qualitative distinctions are to be accommodated
as well is also riddled with seemingly unresolvable diffi-
culties. On the one hand, there is the problem of the method
for deciding which pleasures are of the highest quality. If
^M.ill, "Utilitarianism," p. 211.
12
solved, it would be possible to list pleasures in a descend-
ing order of quality, such that those higher on the list are
qualitatively superior to those which are lower. Such a rank-
ing can oe referred to as a ’’qualitative hierarchy*' of plea-
sures.
Mill's proposal for setting up such a "hierarchy" is
set forth in 'Utilitarianism:
”
Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or
almost all who have experience of both give a de-
cided preference, irrespective of any feeling of
moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more
desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those
who are completely acquainted with both, placed so
far above the other that they prefer it, even though
knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of°
discontent, and would not resign it for any quan-
tity of the other pleasure which their nature is
capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the
preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so
far outweighing quantity as to render it, in com-
parison, of small account. 15
Based on this passage and the context in which it ap-
pears in "Utilitarianism," Mill's reasoning can be made ex-
plicit by the following deductive argument :
^
~^Mill
,
"Utilitarianism," p. 211.
^ What follows in the discussion of this passage is
only what I regard as a plausible account of how Mill would
have argued had he intended to establish a qualitative hier-
archy of pleasures
,
and an account of the serious difficul-
ties encountered in doing so. As I later argue, in Section I
of the next chapter, to suppose that setting up such a hier-
archy is what Mill had in mind is to accept a false inter-
pretation of his work. My position in this regard was dis-
cussed with and corroborated by Professor Ann Brentlinger,
a member of the philosophy department of the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst.
13
(1) If all or almost all competent judges give a decided
preference to a pleasure, then it is more desirable
(i*e.» of greater intrinsic worth) than one to which
they do not give a decided preference.
(2) Given any range of kinds of pleasures, all or most all
competent judges will agree upon a qualitative hierarchy
in which, generally, intellectual pleasures are decidedly
preferred to sensual pleasures.
(3) Therefore, on the basis of (1) and (2), the general cate-
gory of intellectual pleasures is intrinsically better
than that of sensual pleasures.
If we interpret the passage in this way, both premisses
are objectionable. It is plausible to interpret Mill as in-
tending that the consequent of premise (1) is to be read,
"then it is certain that it is more desirable
...
M If so,
then, if Mill did not regard competent judges as infallible
authorities (there is good reason to believe this, as seen
below) it is clearly possible on at least some occasions
for the antecedent of (1) to be true and the consequent false.
In this case, the argument, although valid, is unsound. To
state this somewhat differently, premise (1) is not known to
be true on the general ground that it constitutes an appeal
to authority. Although this would not be a justifiable
17
The reference is to what follows in the rest of this
paragraph, and to the discussion of infallibility in this
work, pp. 17»and 93 -96 .
14
objection if Mill held that every competent judge was an in-
fallible authority, it seems clear that he did not subscribe
to the position since he conceded that it may be the case
that only ’’most'1 of those who qualify as competent judges
may be in agreement, in which case some competent judges are
1 Q
mistaken.
However, even if (1) is true, 19 premise (2) is regard-
ed by Mill either as a necessary analytic truth or as em-
pirically true. If held as a necessary truth, the argument
is circular; if held as empirically true, there is no good
reason for asserting that (2) is known to be true and the
argument, although valid, is unsound.
18
This implies that Mill was not subscribing to anideal observer" theory, in which part of what it means tobe an "ideal observer" is to have infallible knowledge. It
might also be noted—though it won’t be argued—that Mill
may have allowed premise (1) to be replaced by a definition,
mus, where X and Y are variables which range over pleasures
and the predicate is the relational predicate, "has more in-
trinsic worth than," *X has more intrinsic worth than Y'=df
*X is preferred to Y by a majority of competent judges.
'
Again, it can be objected that an appeal to authority (in
the above sense)
. is unacceptable as a method for defining
predicates of this kind. One might also regard this as a
paradigm. instance of what G. E. Moore would have called a
"naturalistic fallacy," bearing in mind that this has been
subjected to a great deal of criticism, and should not be
appealed to without further argument. It is only to be
noted that, if Moore’s point is defensible, this constitutes
an additional reason for rejecting the definition.
•^Premise (1) has a greater chance of being true if
its consequent is weakened to read, "then it is probable
that it is more desirable." As an empiricist who held that
general empirical propositions cannot be completely con-
firmed, it is perhaps more fair to attribute this reading
to Mill.
15
It seems most reasonable to interpret Mill as intend-
ing (2) as empirically true. If so, he may have meant by
•competent judge' something like (definition Dp 'anyone
having experienced both sensual and intellectual pleasures
who is equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both.'
Yet, there is some reason to believe that he must have in-
tended (2) to be regarded as analytically true, in which case
by 'competent judge,' he was operating with something like
(definition D
2 ) 'anyone having experienced both sensual and
intellectual pleasures who is equally capable of appreciating
and enjoying both, and who gives decided preference to the
latter.
'
Evidence that (2) is to be regarded as analytically
true is found in "Utilitarianism. " For example, anyone who
has experienced both sensual and intellectual pleasures, but
who chooses sensual over intellectual pleasures, can always
be accounted for by Mill as no longer being capable of appre-
ciating and enjoying both, because of having lost the 'bapaci-
ty for the nobler feelings."
It may be further objected, that many who begin
with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, asthey advance in years sink into indolence and self-
ishness. But I do not believe that those who under-
go this very common change, voluntarily choose thelower description of pleasures in preference to the
higher. I believe that before they devote them-
• selves exclusively to the one, they have already
become incapable^ of . the other. Capacity for the
nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender
16
plant, easily killed, not only by hostile in-fin-ences, but by mere want of sustenance
....
20
There is evidence, then, to suggest that Mill has de-
veloped a theory such that no evidence will be allowed to
count against it. Such a theory is held as a necessary truth;
if 30
' Mil1 iS PresuPP° sing what he is trying to prove and so
has no need for an appeal to majority decision. Consideration
of another passage from "Utilitarianism” renders the point
more convincing. Here, regarding the general qualitative
distinction between sensual and intellectual pleasures, he
clearly seems to be explaining away any dissidents (among
tnose satisfying D
1 )
as men who are not "equally acquainted
with' or not "equally capable of appreciating and enjoying"
both.
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who
are equally acquainted with, and equally capable
of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most
marked preference to the manner of existence which
employs their higher faculties,
. .no intelligent
human^ being would consent to be a fool, no in-
structed person would be an ignoramus, no person
of feeling and conscience would be selfish and
case, even though they should be persuaded that
the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satis-
lied with his lot than they are with theirs. 21
This passage clearly indicates that, for Mill, any
competent judge must satisfy the two conditions, "equally
acquainted with' 1 and "equally capable of appreciating and
20
21
Mill,
Mill,
"Utilitarianism," pp. 212-13.
"Utilitarianism," p. 211.
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enjoying" both intellectual and sensual pleasures, in addi-
tion, "it is an unquestionable fact" that those who satisfy
both these conditions "do give a most marked preference to
the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties"
(
1
* 6 *
’
t0 intellectual plesures) and so satisfy a third con-
dition. The "unquestionable fact" that those who satisfy the
first two conditions also satisfy the third looks suspiciously
like the assertion of a necessary relation. This, in addition
to his readiness to explain away (as an incompetent judge)
anyone who apparently satisfies the first two conditions but
not the xhird (as noted previously), lends much support to the
hypothesis that Mill was operating with definition D
£ and so
considered premise (2) as analytically true.
In any event, the acceptance of D
2
would represent a
question-begging procedure and must be rejected. Instead,
premise (2) can only plausibly be regarded as an empirical
proposition. In this case, however, it is not known to be
true, so the argument is unsound. Without substantial em-
pirical data, Mill's position is mere conjecture. Without
this kind of evidence, it is not at all obvious that those
who have experienced both sensual and intellectual pleasures
(competent judges by would, in fact, generally prefer the
laxter; i.e., it is not at all obvious, contrary to Mill's
claim, that premise (2) would not turn out to be empirically
false. There is, in addition, a further difficulty.
18
It is always possible that, for some reason, the judg-
ment of competent judges (D.^ may become impaired. To en-
gage the imagination for a moment, it is always possible (for
example) for a mad scientist or planetary aliens to affect un-
suspecting minds through drugs or the sinister employment of
psychic laws. In possible cases such as these, that which is
by hypothesis presently preferred by all or most competent
judges may change from the general category of intellectual
pleasures to the general category of sensual pleasures. Con-
sequently, if (2) is to be read ’’all or most competent judges
.‘i_lji'r3-ys agree, .
. ,
” it is not known to be true and the ar-
gument is unsound. It is most plausible to suppose that this
is the reading Mill had in mind. If (2) is read "all or most
competent judges -presently agree...,” then the argument is un-
interesting (even if (2) is true), given that which Mill was
trying to prove, and that he was attempting to construct a
qualitative hierarchy of pleasures. Assuming the truth of
premise (1),“ we would have to conclude that the intrinsic
worth of pleasures may change from time to time? that is, we
would have to allow that any presumed present superiority of
intellectual over sensual pleasures may change at some time
in the future.
However, it appears that the most damaging blow to
22
In fact, given the previous supposition that Mill's
competent judges are not infallible, it is possible that they
are presently deluded; this, then, constitutes an additional
reason for rejecting premise (1).
19
will s argument results from the fact that he appeals to
a majority decision among competent judges as an accept-
able means for setting up his qualitative hierarchy:
On a question which is the best worth having of
two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence
is the most grateful to the feelings, apart fromits moral attributes and from its consequences,
the judgment of those who are qualified by know-ledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the
majority among them, must be admitted as final. 2 3
This means that what Mill really seems to have in mind is
not premise (2), which refers to all or most competent
judges, but a much weaker premise, which we can refer to
as (2*) and which can now be substituted for (2) in the
argument above:
(
2
'
)
Given any range of kinds of pleasures, the ma-
jority of competent judges will agree upon a quali-
tative hierarchy in which, generally, intellectual
pleasures are decidedly preferred to sensual plea-
2b
sures
.
This latter decision procedure, which Mill himself
resorted to (after realizing the unlikelihood of unanimity
or near unanimity of preference, no doubt) is unacceptable
for one compelling reason— it is too weak to support the con'
elusion that "the general category of intellectual pleasures
is intrinsically better than that of sensual pleasures."
^Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 213.
2bPremise (1) should also be replaced by premise (I 1 ),
which reads "If the majority of competent judges...."
20
Appeal to majority decision means that one is obliged to ac-
cept decisions made by one or very few more than half of the
competent judges consulted. In cases like this, in which the
majority is small, this represents inductive evidence too weak
for confirming final judgments about the intrinsic worth of
pleasures. For example, it is theoretically possible that the
majority of competent judges could be sensualists in a 5155 to
4 9?5 VOte on a 'borderline case regarding a sensual and a non-
sensual pleasure. This does not seem at all to be a suffici-
ent reason why anyone should consider the one as better than
the other. 25 Mill would probably not abide by such a deci-
sion wi oh regard to particular pleasures either. However,
if one rejects the evidence as too weak for supporting judg-
ments about the quality of particular pleasures, there ap-
pears to be no additional reason for accepting evidence like
this as sufficient for confirming a more general conclusion
with respect to the quality of the general categories of in-
tellectual and sensual pleasures.
It now appears that the conclusion that "the general
category of intellectual pleasures is intrinsically better
than that of sensual pleasures" should not be accepted on
the basis of (2 6 ). Of course, as indicated in the example
in the previous paragraph, the same conclusion is applicable
25
* — —
The rejection of premise (1*) follows for the same
reason. In addition, previous arguments for rejecting prem-
ise (1) are also applicable to (1').
21
to any decisions made by a majority of competent judges with
respect to particular pleasures in either of the general
ca'cegories of intellectual or sensual pleasures.
It has previously been argued that an appeal to au-
thority is unacceptable as a method for making judgments
about the intrinsic worth of pleasures. However, even if it
were acceptable, without unanimous or near unanimous agree-
ment concerning the position of pleasures on a qualitative
hierarchy, it would seem to be much more reasonable either
to suspend judgment or to devise some other method for decid-
ing. And if Mill would not have accepted decisions made by
small majorities, it should be noted that to suspend judg-
ment would be to maintain that those pleasures being consid-
ered are to be regarded as qualitatively indistinct. Con-
sequently, agreeing to a suspension of judgment in those
cases in which there is not unanimous or near unanimous agree-
ment could possibly result in the conclusion that even a gen-
eral qualitative difference between intellectual and sensual
pleasures cannot be established, thereby rendering impossible
the attempt to establish a qualitative hierarchy of even gen-
eral dimensions.
If, as has been argued, subscribing to Mill’s posi-
tion-appeal to majority decision--is unacceptable; if, that
is, mere majority decisions should be regarded as insubstan-
tial grounds for accepting conclusions regarding differences
in intrinsic value; and if other methods for establishing
22
these differences are unknown, we are left with the conclu-
sion that the problem of setting up a qualitative hierarchy
appears to be insurmountable
,
Before concluding this subsection, one more problem
in this area warrants some attention. It is not clear
whether Mill wanted to set up a qualitative hierarchy for
particular pleasures or whether he merely meant to dis-
tinguish between the general categories of intellectual
and sensual pleasures. 26 However, if he did intend to as-
sign a qualitative ranking to particular pleasures and if
the notion of competent judges is defined by D
1 rather than
D2' Mill's insistence that we consult competent judges
could result in something like the following possible situ-
ation. With respect to a certain pleasure, 25% of the com-
pe uen
o judges agree that it should occupy a certain place
high in the qualitative hierarchy, 25°% agree on a lower
ranking somewhere above the middle, 25% agree on the middle
and 25%, on a place somewhere below the middle. Suspension
2 5
I
#
think, however, there is reason to suppose thatMill was interested in ranking particular pleasures and notju^t dis tinguishing between the general categories of in-tellectual and sensual pleasures. For example, he clearly
seems to be. referring. to particular pleasures when he says,
"On a question which is the best worth having of two olea-
sures
. .
. the judgment of those who are qualified by know-
ledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority
among them must be admitted as final." Also in the same
paragraph, when arguing that the same method must be used
for quantitative determinations, he speaks of particular
pleasures and pains. "What means are there of determining
which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two
pleasurable sensations e except the general suffrage of those
who are familiar with both?" (Utilitarianism," p. 213).
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of judgment in this case would not result in any decision
as to where the pleasure should be placed, and the serious
problem that results in a situation like this is one of con-
flicting qualitative hierarchies
,
27
This is most undesir-
able, for v/e are left with an intolerable situation in which
the only recourse (enabling us to decide among alternative
hierarchies) would seem to be an appeal to the principle of
utility. Here, however, we are left with the problem with
which we began viz
. ,
how to decide which kinds of plea-
sures are intrinsically better than others, so that we have
a principle that can be appealed to for determining the mo-
rality Oi actions. Clearly, if one were to argue that one
ranking is to be preferred to another on the basis of what
the various pleasures in the list lead to (e.g., to argue
tha c the qualitatively superior pleasures are those associ-
ated with what is better, such as the intellect or benefi-
cient feelings toward one's fellow man), this would be to
suggest abandonment of utilitarianism in its hedonistic
(monistic) form and to urge, instead, the adoption of a
variety of idealism. Before turning to a brief considera-
tion of the latter, however, we must note the theoretical
2?This problem would arise every time there was not a
majority agreement as to where a particular pleasure should
be ranked. However, it would also arise when only a small
majority was in agreement; if (as has been argued) appeal to
mere majority decision is unacceptable as a method for estab-
lishing qualitative pleasure distinctions. Consequently, as
noted above, even the attempt to establish a general quali-
tative distinction between intellectual and sensual plea-
sures could result in conflicting qualitative hierarchies if
50% or only a small majority preferred one to the other.
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problems incurred if a qualitative hierarchy were plausible
and something appealed to when determining the morality of
actions .
^
Su p section II-Bt theoretical objections to the ana/H -
tat ive pleasure^is^ction from the standpoint of
~f~Ve Although it has been shown that the proposal
to establish a qualitative hierarchy of pleasures is, for the
most part, untenable, if it were successfully established,
it
by
of
. 4-u
Bef
°r® completely abandoning this topic, however,
r TrlnZenJiOI}ln^ ?he S01?ewh^ enigmatic objection madeG. E. k°ore (Principia Ethic a /Cambridge: The UniversitvPress, 19687, p. 78) "that Mill's admissions as to qualitypleasure are either inconsistent with his hedonism, or elseafford^no other ground for it than would be given by mere
° f pl
?
a
?^
re ‘" But rather than consider this in any
~°r a Simi
-
1-ar charge of inconsistency by Henry Sidgwick
th
'
G of E^bics T^oston: Beacon Press, 19607
p * t 1S only necessary to note in passing that if this
objection were spelled out and carefully examined, it might
constitute another problem for the move from "quantity" toquality, and one which, even if found to be unwarranted,
would still leave us with the problems noted above. It is,however
,
worth noting a recent and interesting article bvErnest Sosa. ( "Mill ’ s Utilitarianism," Mill's Utilitarianism :Text and Criticism, ed. James M. Smith and Ernest Sosa /Be 1-
mont, .Calif . : V/adsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 196^7 pp. 154-172) in which he claims to have successfully defended" Mill
against ^this objection. He claims that Mill never really
left. off talking about quantity when he turned to a consid-
eration of supposed qualitative differences between pleasuresbut merely meant by the latter distinction that differences
of degree (degrees of quantity) become real differences in
kind.^ "...the passage under scrutiny is quite in harmony
with tne interpretation of qualitative pleasure differences
as basically differences in degree" (Sosa, p. 162), This is
an interesting and quite possibly a plausible argument, but
it seems apparent that, granting Sosa’s interpretation, we
are once again left with the problem of attempting to deter-
mine how to decide v/hen "differences in degree" are to be
taken as constituting "qualitative pleasure differences."
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the most serious problem would be the theoretical difficulties
which would result from appealing to it as part of the pro-
cess of determining the morality of actions. 2° As a result.
Mill's alleged insistence on an appeal to a qualitative di-
mension of pleasures, in addition to quantity, cannot be re-
garded as constituting a desirable amendment to a theory like
Bentham's or as a necessary condition for its acceptability.
Theoretical difficulties become apparent when we con-
sider something like the following possibility* One is
faced with a choice between Acts A and B, both of which (let
us suppose) would result in the same quantity of pleasure
produced, but where the consequence of choosing A will be
tha*u 100 people will have some kind of intellectual pleasure
whereas the consequence of effecting B will be that a dif-
ferent group of 100 people will have the same amount of
sensual pleasure. Consulting a qualitative hierarchy which
differentiates, at least generally, between intellectual
and sensual pleasures and which ranks the former as intrin-
sically superior to the latter, one would be compelled by
an act-utilitarian theory to choose A.^°
29yThe "morality of actions" referred to is the morality
of other-regarding, non-prudential actions.
30The theory employed here is an act-utilitarian the-
ory of the kind that can be attributed to Mill. I am pur-
posely avoiding becoming involved at this point with the
claim made by J. 0. Urmson ("The Interpretation of the Moral
Philosophy of J. S. Mill," Philosophical Quarterly, 3*/l952%
pp. 33—39 ) that Mill was, in actuality, a rule-utilitarian.
As implied in Section I of this chapter, I am confident that
26
The outcome could be the same if the group affected
by A consisted of only a few while the total number of those
m tne other group was a good deal higher, so long as the
quantity of total pleasure produced by either action re-
mained the same
.
31 The example can be changed somewhat if
we remember that Mill can perhaps plausibly be interpreted
as saying that qualitative considerations may sometimes
override quantitative considerations
5
32
consequently, that
consulting a qualitative hierarchy may sometimes require
that one choose that act among the alternatives which pro-
duces the least (or not the greatest) amount of pleasure.
Thus, in the same example, if B produced 1000 units of
pleasure and A produced only 900, it might still turn out
to be the case that A should be chosen (especially so, we
the same problems regarding distributive justice arise for
classical rule-utilitarian formulations as well.
31The outcome could be the same, that is, if it's pos-
sible that on some occasions the superior quality of a plea-
sure produced by an action can override an action affecting
a larger number of people which produces the same quantity
of overall pleasure but pleasure of an inferior qualitv.
Adhering rigidly to a qualitative hierarchy when the quan-
tity of overall pleasure produced is the same, in this case
would seem to have the undesirable result that the number of
those affected by alternative actions is not a significant
consideration. This, however, is a major difficulty which
I do not wish to consider further at this time. It is only
important to note that it does seem to pose a serious dif-
ficulty for appeal to a qualitative hierarchy under these
conditions
.
32Mill, "Utilitarianism,
" pp. 210, 211, 213 , and (in
particular) 214.
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might imagine
,
if the kind of sensual pleasure B produced
could be categorized as one of a sadistic nature), in any
of these cases, the result of consulting the qualitative
Hierarchy is that the act which produces the intellectual
pleasure is the one that must be chosen.
It is not at all difficult to realize that the require-
ment that one consult a qualitative hierarchy sometimes ne-
cessitates decisions (like those above) which involve a seri-
ous kind of injustice to those whose pleasure preferences
are rejected. This is particularly evident if we remember
that the qualitative hierarchy was developed after consult-
ing, as competent judges, those "who are equally acquainted
with and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both”
sensual and intellectual pleasures. Because it is a safe
assumption that there are few capable of qualifying, the
final decision as to what kinds of pleasures are to be given
decided preference in the hierarchy is up to only a few, with
ohe result that the desires of the great majority of people
are passed over in deference to the preferences of a minority.
Even those who qualify as competent judges but are not part
of the majority decision with regard to a particular pleasure
must have their preferences rejected in situations similar
to those described above.
In the example in which A and B produce the same quan-
tity of pleasure or in which B produces only slightly more
pleasure than A, A is selected as the right action on the
28
ground that A's consequences would have been the preference
of competent judges. The pleasure preferences of those who
would have experienced pleasure if B had been chosen were
neglected in establishing the qualitative hierarchy that was
appealed to in this situation and are consequently neglected
m This instance of its application. As will become more
apparent in that which follows, this constitutes a serious
kind of injustice.
It should be noted that it is not being claimed that
qualitative considerations always override quantitative con-
siderations. Thus, in the above example, if A will produce
900 units of pleasure, but B will produce 5 ,000, it seems
obvious that, ce teris paribus
, B should be the action chosen,
even though it produces the qualitatively inferior pleasure.
It is only important to note that there are situations (like
those constructed above) in which A is chosen only because
it ranks qualitatively higher than B, and that these pos-
sibilities are sufficient to demonstrate the problem.
In order to appreciate the problem involved in these
examples
„
it must oe noted that Mill correctly acknowledged
that some people, for one reason or another, are not capable
of enjoying or appreciating the higher kinds of (intellectual)
pleasures
:
Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures
a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by
hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance;
and in the majority of young persons it speedily
dies away if the occupations to v/hich their
29
position m life has devoted them, are not favor-
Moi
e
i
t0 kJ®P}nS. that higher capacity in exercise.
f
Ln los
f ^heir intellectual tastes, because theyhave not time or opportunity for indulging them;
and xhey addict themselves to inferior pleasures,
not oecause they deliberately prefer them, butbecause they are either the only ones to whichthey have access, or the only ones which they are
any longer capable of enjoying. 33
If one also recognizes something that Mill did not acknowl-
edge explicitly—that there are many who have little or no
capacity for the higher kinds of pleasures, and so cannot
be categorized as having had their capacity for them stifled
it is evident that there are very many for whom it could
not be right to force on them something which they are in-
capable of using in any way for their own benefit and which
may, in fact, make them miserable
,
3in
,
" p 213.-^Mill, "Utilitarian!!
34A1though there is nothing in ’Utilitarianism" to sug-
gest^ explicit adherence by Mill to the position that there'
are innate differences in capacity for pleasures and that
there are many who have little or no capacity for the higher
kinds of pleasures, there is a passage in Mill's On Liberty
(p. 63) which constitutes sufficient evidence for confuting
anyone's contention that he did not accept it; "If it were
only that people have diversities of taste, that is reason
enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model
. . . .The same things which are helps to one person towards
the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to
another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement to
one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in
their best order, while to another it is a distracting bur-
then, which suspends or crushes all internal life. Such are
the differences among human beings in their sources of plea-
sure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the operation on
them of different physical and moral agencies, that unless
there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life,
they neither obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow
to the mental, moral, and aesthetic stature of which their
nature is capable."
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Yet this is what we must do, on occasion, if we are re-
quired as moral agents to consult a qualitative hierarchy for
determining the rightness or wrongness of other-regarding
actions. One might imagine, for example, acquiring control
of television broadcasting and contemplating a choice between
a kind of programming which appealed to the so-called higher
faculties and another which left it pretty much as it is, al-
though either choice would produce the same overall quantity
of pleasure. As a utilitarian, who had a qualitative as
well as quantitative dimension of pleasures to consider, one
would be required to choose that which would produce the
qualitatively superior pleasures, to the great dismay of
those who (through no fault of their own, perhaps) would
now find Television viewing completely beyond their capacity
for enjoyment
. That those who have little or no potential
for enjoying the higher pleasures should be passed over, in
preference to those v/ho do, constitutes an obvious kind of
distrioutive injustice
;
36
and, insofar as any ethical theory
sanctions such actions, it is objectionable
.
36
35
.
Noj only is i’t not egalitarian, but it takes no rec-ognition
^01 . merit , desert and other non-egalitarian prin-
ciples oi distributive justice. The example can be made even
more problematic if we suppose that the group which has itspleasure preferences neglected is much larger than the other.
The term 'pleasure preference' has been frequently
employed in this subsection and will be subsequently. At
this point it is desirable to explain what is meant by it.
By. 'pleasure preference 6 is meant 'a desire for a pleasure
which is such that no substitute would result in any satis-
faction or aoatement of that desire or is such that any sub-
stitute would result in a greater degree of dissatisfaction
31
Without arguing the point further, it appears evident
that the kinds of injustices which are perpetrated through
considering quantities of pleasures only, are multiplied
v;hen the requirement is added that a qualitative hierarchy
be appealed to also, that adding this results in an even
greater affront to our moral sense regarding distributive
justice. Thus, a principle of utility which demands appeal
to a qualitative hierarchy is an ethical principle which has
built into it even greater distributive injustices than one
like Bentham's which requires quantitative consideration of
pleasures only. For, on occasions of choice like the above,
those who (for whatever reason) do not desire and/or are
not capable of enjoying the intrinsically superior (intel-
lectual) pleasures are passed over in decisions regarding
pleasure distributions or their sources.
To conclude this discussion, if the views Mill ex-
pressed in "Utilitarianism*' on the qualitative differences
than that of merely. having the unfulfilled desire
.
9 The firstdisjunct of the definition could be satisfied under at least
t/,Yo conditions: (a) The individual having the pleasure pre-ference does not have and could not acquire the capacity forthe enjoyment of substitute pleasures, or (b) is of such a
slaoe oi mind that, even though he ordinarily has the ca-
P*.cit^ for enjoyment of substitute pleasures, he does not inthis case. The second disjunct could be satisfied if either(aj or (b) above is satisfied and the individual's state of
mind is also such that any substitute would serve to engen-der a greater state of dissatisfaction than that resulting
from the unfulfilled desire. (The latter would occur, for
example, if the individual becomes piqued at having his de-
sire overlooked in favor of someone else's for no justifi-
able reason he is able to discern.
)
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among pleasures were intended to encourage the development
of a qualitative hierarchy which was to be consulted when
determining the morality of actions, and so taken as repre-
senting an amendment to Bentham’s principle of utility, it
is now obvious that it would be an amendment which would
only make the principle more theoretically objectionable
from the standpoint of distributive justice. So that even
if Mill’s previously considered argument concerning a quali-
tative hierarchy is sound, there are good theoretical reasons
for not acting on its conclusion, that "the general category
of intellectual pleasures is intrinsically better than that
of sensual pleasures
.
”37
Section III
Ideal Utilitarian Theories
--implausible Alternatives
Mention was previously made that an ideal or nlural-
istic form of utilitarianism, which allows that there are
more intrinsic goods than pleasure to consider in calcu-
lating the effects 01 actions, might fare somewhat better
v/i th respec fc *>o these difficulties than the monistic type
jus u considered. Tnere is, for example, something like
Brandt f s suggestion that the utilitarian would be all right
if only... he could count just one or two impersonal states
37There is much evidence— some already noted--which
shows that Mill was not advocating an amendment to Bentham's
theory. This will be discussed later.
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of affairs as having intrinsic worth-say, for one thing,
an equal distribution of welfare.” 38 Referred to above as
"universalistic impersonal pluralism,” and later developed
by Brandt into what he calls
"extended-rule-utilitarianism, ••
this represents one approach for resolving the conflict be-
tween the principle of utility and at least the egalitarian
aspect of distributive justice. However, there are several
reasons for disregarding this kind of approach as an accept-
able possibility. A brief enumeration will suffice:
(1) Presumably, one who advocates an ideal form of
utilitarianism has in mind a limit to the kinds of things
that are to be regarded as intrinsically good, and so must
have available some criteria for deciding what should be
so classified and what not. However, once the door is
opened in the manner suggested by Brandt, one is faced
vith precisely ^his problem-deciding upon criteria to em-
ploy in deciding what is to quality as an intrinsic good.
Brando himself is aware of the difficulty. Thus, he says,
"Some philosophers will probably think that we must 'extend*
extended rule-utilitarianism much more if it is to be plausi-
ble, They will say that otherwise we would be committed to
many more exceptions to the rule of keeping promises and so
forth, than are in fact justified—and this is possible," 3 ^
38Brandt, p. 404,
3
^Brandt, p. 405.
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The problem, then, is that if something like "equal
distribution of welfare" can qualify as an intrinsic good,
why not "promise-keeping" as well; and, if these, why not
. . . ; and eventually it becomes difficult to imagine what
sorts of restrictions might be devised in order to insure
the elimination of many things which could only very hesi-
tatingly be regarded as intrinsically good (if at all).
There is, therefore, the danger (contrary to the wishes of
uhe ideal-utilitarian) of ending up, so to speak, with a
quite bloated world of intrinsic goods.
However, if intrinsic goods other than pleasure are
limited to only equal distribution of welfare (as seems to
have been Brandt's intention), then although this avoids the
problem utilitarian theory has with reference to the require-
ment distributive justice poses for egalitarianism, we seem
to De left with the more difficult problems unresolved
—
squaring the principle of utility with those principles
which require distribution with reference to legitimate
claims or merit.
(2) If both quantitative and qualitative differences
are to be considered with regard to pleasure, the problems
already noted are immeasurably increased if we are required
to apply these distinctions to other intrinsic goods as well.
This would be especially true of something like knowledge
and promise-keeping (if, indeed, one can speak sensibly
about qualitative differences among acts of promise-keeping),
35
though perhaps not much less so for Brandt's suggestion,
equal distribution of welfare. In brief, all of the prob-
lems already noted above, with pleasure as the only intrin-
sic good
,
remain; in addition, we would now have innumerable
others
.
( 3 ) It is possible to imagine situations in which
conflicts might arise among intrinsic goods. For example,
one might oe forced to choose between two actions, one which
will produce 100 units of intrinsic good 'A but none of B
and another which will result in the opposite. If, then,
the actions are not both right (i.e., one of the two acts
is a duty), it is apparent that, in order to determine which
should be chosen, something like an intrinsic good hierarchy
would have to be appealed to. As it appears inevitable that
determination of the latter would be at least as problematic
as that already noted with respect to Mill's desire to for-
mulate a "qualitative hierarchy" of pleasures, this consti-
tutes a further reason for searching for a better solution
than that offered by the ideal utilitarian approach.
( 4 ) Finally, as will later be argued, it is not at
all apparent that utilitarianism must entail a theory of in-
trinsic value at all—at least, not the kind which, during
most of the history of the theory, has been thought to be
essential. It is this discovery which will eventually pro-
vide the key to solving the problems distributive justice
ha.s been thought to pose for utilitarianism.
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Having completed a brief review of the problems that
utilitarianism is supposedly susceptible to with respect to
distributive justice (as well as some others), the general
approach for resolution of these difficulties in the next
chapter will be to demonstrate that classical formulations
of the principle of utility have been the result of some
serious misconceptions. A convenient historical vehicle
for discussing and correcting these misconceptions is found
m the work of John Stuart Mill. With reference particu-
larly to "Utilitarianism" and On Liberty
, it will ha pointed
out that he has been seriously misinterpreted with regard to
many aspects of the utilitarian theory that has been attrib-
uted to him; in addition, it will become evident that the
corrected theory provides the theoretical framework for a
new formulation of the principle of utility which results
in no serious inconsistencies with intuitively acceptable
principles of justice.
CHAPTER II
MISCONCEPTIONS OF MILL'S UTILITARIAN THEORY
Section I
The Quantitative and Qualitative Hierarchy Misconception
Bentham s follower, John Stuart Mill, was so con-
cerned that certain kinds of pleasure should come
out as better than others that he supplemented
Benuham s list of criteria with another one, that
of quality.
1
John Stuart Mill, partly in reaction, sought tointroduce quality as well as quantity into the
evaluation of pleasures; but, if one does this,
it is hard to see how the utilitarian standard is
to be stated and Mill never did make this clear. 2
It is true that Mill's ethical theory is superior to
Ben sham's, though not in the way that has often been sup-
posed to count, as its greatest advantage; i.e., not because
Mill was urging the establishment and use of a qualitative
hierarchy as a necessary condition for determining the mo-
rality oj. actions. Consequently, those who have subscribed
to something like the above positions, and have meant there-
by to interpret Mill as intending that the qualitative di-
mension of pleasures was something to be considered in addi-
tion (supplemental) to the quantitative dimension, must be
Hospers, p. 58 .
2 .William K. Frankena, Ethics (New York: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963), pp. 29-30.
3 ?
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judged as having failed to give Mill's work an accurate and
careful reading.
As can be determined by a brief consideration of "Utili-
tarianism" and On, Liberty, Mill's theory is not susceptible
to either the practical difficulties or the theoretical ob-
jections previously noted as arising with respect to such
a hierarchy, for his discussion of qualitative pleasure dif-
ferences in Chapter II of "Utilitarianism" has been seriously
misinterpreted in this regard.
It is really rather astonishing that this problematic
position has seriously been attributed to Mill, for there
seems to be sufficient evidence in "Utilitarianism" alone
to cause a substantial degree of doubt, if not to dispel it
completely. One is compelled to sympathize with Urmson's
observations
:
...the theories of . some great philosophers of the
past are studied with the most patient and accurate
scholarship, while those of others are so burlesqued
and travestied by critics and commentators that it
is hard to believe that their works are ever seri-
ously read with a sympathetic interest, or even that
they are read at all. Amongst those who suffer most
in this way John Stuart Mill is an outstanding ex-
ample. 3
In brief, the assumption that the discussion of a quali-
tative dimension of pleasures in Chapter II of "Utilitarian-
ism" was intended by Mill as a desirable emendation to Ben-
tham's principle of utility represents a serious misconception
3Urmson, P- 33 .
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of Mill's theory, and,- as already pointed out, gives rise
to additional problems. In the attempt to clarify Mill's
position in this regard, it will be the purpose of this
section to demonstrate three points in the subsequent sub-
sections I-A, I-B, and I-C
, respectively:
(A) There is evidence to support the hypothesis that
Mill regarded the hierarchies that would result from quan-
titative and qualitative considerations as extensionally
equivalent. In point of fact, there is evidence sufficient
to conclude that he meant to show, from the standpoint of
qualitative considerations, that Bentham's principle is
not susceptible to objection. Thus, Mill intended his dis-
cussion of quality as an explanation and not as an amend-
ment to Bentham's principle of utility, with the conse-
quence that Mill's theory is not burdened with the addi-
tional theoretical objections resulting from the require-
ment to consult a qualitative hierarchy.
(B) If a quantitative hierarchy is extensionally
equivalent to a qualitative hierarchy, those theoretical
difficulties which necessitate the rejection of an appeal
to the latter for determining the morality of actions must
also necessitate the rejection of an appeal to the former.
Moreover, even if a quantitative hierarchy of pleasures is
assumed (or would turn out) to be not extensionally equiva-
lent to a qualitative hierarchy, there remain theoretical
difficulties which provide sufficient grounds for also
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rejecting an appeal to it.
(C) There is some evidence in "Utilitarianism” and
overwhelming evidence in On Liberty to support the conclu-
sion that a significant difference between Bentham's theory
and Mill's is that whereas Benthamites thought it necessary
to consult something like a quantitative hierarchy, Mill did
not regard an appeal to either a qualitative or a quantita-
tive hierarchy as a necessary or sufficient condition for de
termining the morality of actions. As a consequence, Mill's
utilitarian theory can eventually be shown to avoid all of
the theoretical difficulties each hierarchy is subject to.
Moreover, it is evident that his discussion of qualitative
pleasure differences, in Chapter II of "Utilitarianism,”
was not intended to refer to moral rightness at all, but
rather to prudential rightness.
Sub-section I-A: The extensional equivalence of quan-
titative and qualitative hierarchies
. There is good evidenc
in "Utilitarianism" and overwhelming evidence in On Liberty
to support the hypothesis that it was not a part of Mill’s
intentions that a qualitative hierarchy of pleasures was to
be consulted as something in addition to quantitative con-
siderations when determining the morality of actions. Rather
from the passage in which he begins the substance of his dis
cussion of quality, it is apparent that what he is maintain-
ing is that reference to either quantitative or qualitative
considerations will result in identical listings; i.e., in
conxemporary terminology, a quantitative or a qualitative
hierarchy of pleasures will turn out to be extensionally
equivalent. If so, one contemplating the morality of actions
can choose between judging the consequences of alternatives
from tne standpoint of the overall quantity of pleasures
produced or from the standpoint of their quality, in either
case, the results will be the same (i.e., the same action
will be chosen as right
tween a "higher" and a "
results in the former's
quantity.
)
and, where there is a choice be-
lower" pleasure, if appeal to quality
being our duty, so will an appeal to
As Mill says, in the passage referred to,
It must be admitted.
.
.that utilitarian writers ingeneral have placedthe superiority of mental overbodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency,
safety, uncostliness, etc,, of the former--that is,in their circumstantial advantages rather than in
their intrinsic nature. And on' all these points
utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they
might nave taken the other, and, as it may be called,
higher
.
ground
,
with entire consistency. It is quite
compatible with the principle of utility to recognize
the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more de-
sirable and more valuable than others. It would be
absurd that, while in estimating all other things
quality is considered as well as quantity, the esti-
mation of pleasure should be supposed to deoend on
quantity alone.
4
suffice it to say that the most plausible interpreta-
tion of this passage results in only one conclusion. With
reference to quantitative criteria only, "Utilitarians have
4
Mill, "Utilitarianism,
"
p. 211.
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fully proved their case" concerning "the superiority of
mental over bodily pleasures" but that they might also have
arrived at the same conclusions had they "taken the other
and, as it may be called, higher ground" (since "it is
quite compatible with the principle of utility...") must be
taken as rather good evidence for dispensing with the inter-
pretation which has too long been attributed to Mill. Con-
sequently, the last sentence of the passage, although seem-
ing to suggest that quality of pleasures must be considered
m addition to their quantity, is most plausibly interpreted
m une context of that which precedes it as meaning that
either approach could be used to arrive at the same result;
i.e., whether the resulting hierarchies are regarded as in-
dicating only a general distinction between intellectual
and sensual pleasures or more specific rankings between par-
ticular pleasures
,
both quantitative and qualitative hier-
archies would turn out to be identical.
This interpretation of the passage might be objected
to on the grounds that the reference in the early part of
the passage to "permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc."
is not to be interpreted as a reference to quantitative
aspects oo. pleasures; that it is far from obvious that Mill
meant these to be simply quantitative considerations.-^ To
5Presumably, if this is so, the objection regards this
as constituting evidence that the passage is not to be in-
terpreted as asserting that utilitarians can prove their case
equally well with quantitative considerations alone.
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tms objection there are two replies. First, it is clear
that Mill is contrasting the use of these criteria with other
criteria and, if what he is contrasting them with are not
qualitative criteria, it is difficult to imagine what the
contrast might plausibly be; in this case, then, the refer-
ences to ‘'permanency
. . . etc
.
" must be quantitative. More-
over, permanency,' 'safety' and 'uncostliness' are clearly
analogous to three of the "circumstances" Bentham thought it
necessary to consider in calculating quantities of pleasures;
vi_z.
, 'duration,' 'fecundity,' and 'purity,' respectively
.
^
It seems likely that Mill had these quantitative criteria
of Bentham 's in mind when employing the terms "permanency
. . . etc .
"
There is good reason, then, to believe that Mill can-
not justly be accused of having complicated utilitarian
theory by insisting on the problematic addition of a sup-
plementary qualitative hierarchy; for once again it seems
clear that his only intention here was to argue that the
employment of either a quantitative or a qualitative hier-
archy for judging the consequences of actions will result
in identical decisions regarding the morality of actions.
Thus, it is much more plausible to suppose that he v/as
merely trying to demonstrate that what has been referred to
6
For definitions of these terms see Bentham, "An in-
troduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,"
Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham
, pp. 38-39*
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by some as "long-term hedonism" is going to turn out to be
superior to "short-term hedonism" from either a quantitative
or a qualitative standpoint; i.e., that something like Ben-
tham's principle of utility does not at all commit one to
maintaining (what its critics have erroneously supposed) that
so-called "lower pleasures" must be given preference to "high
er pleasures,” but that, in fact, the opposite is the case.
If this new interpretation is the correct one, we now
have an adequate response in hand for something like the fol-
lowing critical summary:
To . say that the "higher” pleasures, in addition tobeing more long-lived, more certain, more pure, were
^
by a qualitative principle seemed toBenthamites like so much excess baggage--a way of
unnecessarily complicating and obscuring the originalhedonistic position. For if the first barrel of°cri~tena. (Bentham's) already hit the mark by showing
certain sources of pleasure to be preferable to
others, why the need to employ the second barrel,
Mill's qualitative principle ?
<
We can interpret Mill's response at this point as be-
ing xhat there is no "need to employ the second barrel" if
the first has already been used because appealing to either
one is a sufficient condition for determining the morality
of actions. The difference between Bentham and Mill high-
lighted in the above is based on the erroneous supposition
that both were regarded by Mill as necessary but neither as
sufficient by itself to arrive at correct moral judgments
about actions.
7
'Hospers, p. 59.
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Sup^section I-Bi Theoretical objections to a
taxiv e hierarchy. At the beginning of this discussion it
was pointed out that the use of a qualitative hierarchy,
once established, would result in some serious violations
of our intuitions regarding distributive justice; and so
it was thought desirable to rid ourselves, if possible, of
the supposed necessity to use it. In having presumably
done so, however, it is evident at this point that we are
in precisely the same position of theoretical difficulty
with which we began. For now, according to the present
position, we have a choice between appealing to one or the
other of extensionally equivalent quantitative and quali-
tative hierarchies, both of which (by hypothesis) rank ’’in-
tellectual pleasures” as superior to ’’sensual pleasures.”
Consequently, from the standpoint of quantitative consider-
ations also, if "intellectual pleasures” are ranked as su-
perior to "sensual pleasures,” independently of any addi-
tional considerations as to (for example) the preferences
of those who will be subjected to them (and there is no known
qualification concerning the latter in Bertram's theory), ex-
actly the same theoretical difficulties will present them-
selves.
That the same situation obtains can be readily ob-
served if one imagines a quantitative hierarchy of kinds of
pleasures which is arranged so that pleasures are listed in
a descending order of desirability, such that those higher
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the list are judged quantitatively superior to those which
are lower and m which the arrangement of pleasures exactly
duplicates that of the aforementioned qualitative hierarchy,
as in the latter, intellectual pleasures, as a general cate-
gory, are higher on the list than sensual pleasures. In ac-
cordance with the alleged requirement to consult such a hier-
archy in all instances in which one is attempting to decide
the morality of actions, this quantitative hierarchy is di-
rectly appealed to and serves as the only basis upon which
such decisions are made.
To cake an obvious example, if one has a choice be-
tween two other-regarding actions, A and B, each of which
will affect the same person or group of people and such that
A will produce, say, three intellectual pleasures but no
sensual pleasures; whereas B will produce three sensual but
no intellectual pleasures; A must be chosen as the right
action if one appeals to the quantitative hierarchy. That
ohe decision to choose A would give rise to an injustice
becomes evident if one supposes that the pleasure prefer-
ences oi those affected are directed toward the sensual
8pleasures. The problem arises because, once again, we are
8 T , .It is important to realize that if there is to be a
consideration of the pleasure preferences of those affectedby actions undergoing moral scrutiny, we are no longer re-
stricted to qualitative or quantitative hierarchies°estab-
lished by competent judges; rather, we are dealing with a
different Kind of utilitarian theory from any that has been
considered up to this point and one which does, in fact, come
close to what I shall later argue is the one that Mill was
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placed in the position of being required by the theory to
ignore pleasure preferences; once again, then, situations
can arise which constitute an affront to our moral intuitions
with re- ard oo justice. In addition, given what is meant
by pleasure preferences, another absurd result from con-
sulting a quantitative hierarchy in this case is that we do
not even maximize the quantity of pleasure produced.
It is apparent that an appeal to an established quan-
titative hierarchy of pleasures is, for the same reasons,
as absurd as an appeal to a qualitative hierarchy, in fact,
if the purpose of such a hierarchy is to maximize the quan-
tity of pleasure, it is even more absurd. Moreover, in addi-
tion to the difficulty evidenced in the example, the quan-
titative hierarchy is subject to the same problems (previ-
ously noted) regarding an appeal to competent judges; for
Mill required that one consult competent judges here as well:
And there needs be the less hesitation to acceptthis judgment respecting the quality of pleasures,
since uhere is no. other tribunal to be referred toeven on^the question of quantity. What means a^ethere oi determining which is the acutest of twopains, or the intensest of two pleasurable
committed to. However, it is also worth noting that in order
uSlng a hedonic calculus, as Bentham supposed
we should, it seems necessary that there be a quantitativehierarcny of the kind described to appeal to. As is now ob-
vious, such a requirement must lead to the conclusion thatBen main s theory is unacceptable; but, without such a hier-
archy, to appeal to, it seems reasonable to conclude that ahedonic calculus is, from a practical standpoint, useless.
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sensations, except the general suffrage of thosewno are familiar with both?9 ° n
In summary, if the qualitative hierarchy Mill had in
mind was intended to he extensionally equivalent to the
quantitative hierarchy which he thought the application of
Bentham' s theory would have resulted in (as has been shown,
there is good reason to suppose this to be the case), we are
lext, substantially, with Bentham' s theory. However, the
latter is unacceptable for it is susceptible to all the
original objections concerning distributive justice in
addition to the others we have demonstrated that the theory
would also incur. 10 Since these original objections can be
raised against Bentham 's theory independently of any hier-
archy of pleasures (quantitative or qualitative) they con-
stitute sufficient reason for its rejection. If in addi-
tion, however, a quantitative hierarchy is set up and ap-
pealed to, Bentham 's theory becomes subject to the additional
o
,?i
lly "Utilitarianism," p. 213 . The account of thesedm iculties regarding competent judges is found on pp. 12-
See, for example, Rescher's objection, p. 6. it
should be noted that even if Benthamites did not intend that
a quantitative hierarchy be set up and appealed to, as we
have supposed to have been what they had in mind, but that
the moral worth of actions was to be calculated different-
ly
,
any quantitative calculation of consequences still would
supposedly^ be susceptible to the kinds of objections regard-
's distrioutive justice which Reseller and others have
raided. Thus, we are still left v/ith the original theoreti-
cal objections to the theory which, also, can only be re-
solved by the kind of utilitarian theory which—as will soon
be argued—Mill had in mind.
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theoretical objections noted above; and this would be the
result whether or not it were extensionally equivalent to
a qualitative hierarchy; in either case, it is obvious that
the same kind of injustices could result.
Only by turning to a consideration of the difference
between Mill's theory and Bentham's can these objectionable
features be resolved. Once made clear, it is this differ-
ence which results in the theoretical framework which will
enaole utilitarianism to account for principles of justice.
Sub-section I-C: Mill's
-position with respect to
hi erarchie
s
. Simply stated, the basic difference between
Mill and Bentham is this: whereas Bentham may have thought
that it was necessary to consult a quantitative hierarchy,
^
Mill did not think that an appeal to either a qualitative
or a quantitative hierarchy was a sufficient or even a nec-
essary condition for determining the morality of actions.
In point of fact, the sections of '’Utilitarianism’' previ-
ously discussed were intended by Mill, not with reference
to moral rightness at all but rather to prudential right-
ness. They had to do only with recommendations as to how
we should live that part of our lives which significantly
affects only ourselves (self-regarding actions) and had
nothing to do with that part of our conduct v/hich does
"^Whether Bentham actually did require this is not cer-
tain and has not been argued for. However, the practical
efficacy of his hedonic calculus seems to require that he
should have even if he didn't (as pointed out in the foot-
note on pp. 46-47).
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significantly affect others (other-regarding actions). 12
Though there is some evidence for this interpretation in
Utilitarianism,” the primary source is On Liberty .
Tne examination of On Liberty
, to which we will now
tum* will be used to demonstrate two points: (1) Regres-
sing a bit, it will be pointed out that there is conclusive
evidence in On^Liberty for the hypothesis, already consid-
ered, that Mill could not have intended, in determining the
morality of actions, that one construct and appeal to a
qualitative hierarchy which was not extensionally equivalent
to a quantitative hierarchy of pleasures. (2) The hypothe-
sis will be confirmed regarding the difference between Ben-
thain and Mill, that, assuming the extensional equivalence of
a qualitative and quantitative hierarchy, Mill could not have
intended that an appeal to either was a necessary and/or suf-
ficient condition for determining the morality of actions. 1 -^
.
That is, it had nothing to do with other—regarding
actions other than to point out and emphasize that the self-
regarding sphere oi actions is in no way to be dealt with as
TT it were part of the other; i.e,, we are not to impose our
will on others regarding how they should conduct themselves
prudentially
.
13This is, of course, contrary to what was stated pre-
viously, that given the extensional equivalence of a quali-
tative and quantitative hierarchy, an appeal to either would
be a sufficient condition for determining the morality of ac-
tions
.
( p. 43 )
.
It is not contradictory, however, since in the
past instance we were operating with the presupposition that
appeal to some kind of a pleasure hierarchy was being urged
by Mill, whereas it is the purpose of the present discussion
to dispose of this as a faulty presupposition to attribute
to him.
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It was pointed out previously that if one is required
to consult a qualitative hierarchy which is not extension-
ally equivalent to the results of quantitative calculations, 14
something like the following could occur: Given two actions,
A and B, each affecting different groups of people, if the
group affected by A prefers intellectual pleasures and the
group affected by B prefers sensual pleasures; and if we
suppose that A and B do, in fact, produce the same quantity
of intellectual and sensual pleasures, respectively, consult-
ing the qualitative hierarchy would require that one choose
action A. Similarly, if one is dealing with just one person
or group of people and has a choice between two actions, A
and B, each of which produces the same quantity of pleasure,
but A will result in the production of a pleasure higher on
the qualitative hierarchy than B, A is the action that must
be chosen, even though the person or all the members of the
The reference here is to the examples on pp. 25-2 7,where no mention is made of a quantitative hierarchy. Forpresent purposes, however, since the references in (1) and(2) of the previous paragraph are to a quantitative hier-
archy (because we have recently supposed that the results
0i quantitative calculations could be a quantitative hier-
archy)
,
we can unproblematically replace "the results of
quantitative calculations" with "a quantitative hierarchy."
For the present example, this means that the pleasures pro-
duced by A and B have the same ranking on the quantitative
hierarchy, though a different ranking on the qualitative
hierarchy (since, by hypothesis, the two hierarchies are
not extensionally equivalent). Also note that in (1) and
(2) above, "a quantitative hierarchy" can be read "the re-
sults of quantitative calculations" in order to encompass
those previous examples (Sub-section II-B, pp. 24-32) in
which no mention was made of a quantitative hierarchy.
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group affected prefer B. 15
It is important to note that in both cases the plea-
sure preferences of others are imposed, for in both cases
the qualitative hierarchy (the preference schema of com-
petent judges) is used to decide which kind of pleasure is
go be produced. In the first case, they are imposed by dis-
criminating against one group's preferences in favor of
another's; in the second case, by ignoring those of every-
one affected. However, where satisfaction of the pleasure
preferences would be self-regarding, 1 ^ the decisions exem-
plified in these examples could not have been sanctioned by
Hill. That tnis is the case can readily be demonstrated by
a brief reference to the position defended in On Liberty.
15This last example does not conform to the notion ofpleasure preferences previously defined, in that strict ad-herence to it would preclude an individual or all the mem-
bers of one group from having pleasure preferences which
could be satisfied equally well (quantitatively) by a sub-
stixute. However, the example is included because it will
shortly be used to argue that it could also be unjust in a
situation like this to consult a qualitative hierarchy; i.e.,
when the alternative actions Dsing considered each produce
the same quantity of pleasure.
16By 'self-regarding' is meant merely what Mill had in
mind when he used the term: viz
.
,
whatever actions men choose
which are such that they directly affect only the agent or,
if they affect others, do so with their free, voluntary, and
undeceived consent. Such actions should be able to be per-
formed ^"without hindrance, either physical or moral, from
their fellow. men, so long as it is at their own risk and
peril” ( On Liberty , p. 55 )* All other actions are other-
regarding.
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Before doing so, however, it is necessary to elaborate on the
examples in an attempt to explain specifically why they are
tneorexically objectionable from the standpoint of Mill's
utilitarian theory; i.e., to show why Mill would have rejected
consulting a qualitative hierarchy in situations like these.
That the examples are theoretically objectionable in
light of Mill's utilitarian theory can be brought out as
follows: As choices for a moral agent, both A and B are
clearly other-regarding actions. But the resulting actions
of those affected by his choosing either A or B will by
hypothesis turn out to be self
-regarding actions—that is,
snould A be chosen, the actions by those affected to obtain
and enjoy the intellectual pleasures produced by effecting
A ( one actions chosen to satisfy their pleasure preferences)
v/ould be self-regarding actions; similarly, should B be
chosen, ^he actions by those affected to obtain and enjoy
the sensual pleasures produced by effecting B would also be
"Regarding actions. The moral agent must choose either
A or B because choosing neither--an act of omission—is not
a viable option for him as a utilitarian, since not to act
v/ould result in no one's pleasure preferences being satis-
fied, with the result that happiness v/ould not be maximized.
In the first example, the injustice arises in the fol-
lowing manner: Although A and B are other-regarding actions
for the agent, his choosing either A or B will affect an
area of self-regarding actions for those who will be affected
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by his choice. According to Mill (as will be demonstrated
shortly), one should not interfere with self-regarding ac-
tions since, from the standpoint of moral rightness and
wrongness—as opposed to prudential rightness and wrongness
°ne ° e^ regarding action is as good as another and, if
possible, should not be interfered with. However, the moral
agent »s appeal to a qualitative hierarchy and his choosing
and effecting A is an action which will unjustifiably inter-
fere with the pleasure preferences of those who would prefer
the eifects produced by B. This is objectionable, for if
both A and B are identical choices quantitatively, and the
actions of those affected to obtain whatever results from
the agent's choosing either A or B will be self-regarding,
it is apparent given Mill's position—that A and B are
equally right actions. Therefore, one would be acting un-
justly if, in such a situation, he did not act impartially
but regarded the action which will produce the intellectual
pleasures as nis duty after appealing to a qualitative hier-
archy of pleasures.
The problem is somewhat different, though no less prob-
j-emaoic
,
in the second example. A and B are again actions
which would, by hypothesis, result in only self-regarding
actions by those affected by the agent's choice and would
result in the same quantity of pleasure produced; only in this
case the same person or group of persons is affected by the
agent's choosing either A or B. Assuming that B is preferred
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by those affected hut that A is executed by the agent after
appealing to a qualitative hierarchy, on the assumption that
whenever possible, self-regard ing actions are not to be in-
terfered with, the execution of A is a morally wrong action.
It remains now to explicate Mill's position and to show that
17
he would have rejected an appeal to a qualitative hierarchy
for determining the morality of actions, on the ground that
doing so would often interfere unjustly with self-regarding
actions.
It is absolutely clear, in the first chapter of On
Liberty, that the satisfaction of self-regarding pleasure
preferences should not be interfered with; thus one, with
the power and opportunity to do so, could never be justified
in (and in fact could be held morally blameworthy for) mak-
ing decisions like those exemplified in the situations de-
scribed above. Though the requirement that one appeal to a
qualitative hierarchy when the alternatives for the agent
are other-regarding actions would require, at times, that
such decisions be made, the supposition that Mill insisted
that we consult such a hierarchy in determining the morality
of actions is seriously inconsistent with the principle
17That the execution of A is unjust, as well as morally
wrong, is_ not so clear. However, as it will later be demon-'
strated that Mill regarded the satisfaction of self-regard-
ing pleasure preferences as rights justified by the principle
of utility and that violations of rights were regarded by
him as unjust, the execution of A is also an unjust action
according to Mill.
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stated in the first part of On Liberty and which it is the
purpose of the rest of that essay to defend:
-LO uu P-revenx narm to others.A n 4-U • -» His own good,
io justify that the conduct from which it is de-
sired to deter him, must he calculated to produceevil to someone else. The only part of the con-duct of anyone,
_
for v/hich he is amenable to soci-
ety, is that which concerns others. In the partwmch merely concerns himself, this independence
lo
» tight, absolute. Over himself, over his
o./n body and mind, the individual is sovereign,
A few pages further on, in speaking about what com
prises the "appropriate region of human liberty," Mill
Secondly the principle requires liberty of tastes
an
-
u.Pursuit s » of framing the plan of our life to
suit our own character; of doing as we like, sub-ject to such consequences as may follow; withoutimpediment j.rom our fellow creatures, so long as
v/hat we do does not harm them, even though they
should tnink our conduct foolish, perverse, or
wrong
.
And later, on the same page, he adds, "Each is the proner
1
8
Mill, On Liberty
, pp. 9-10.
says
;
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guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and
spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each
other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compel-
ling each to live as seems good to the rest." 1^
Numerous similar statements can be found throughout
the essay (particularly in the third chapter), but these are
sufficient to establish the conclusion that Mill could not
have sanctioned decisions like those in the above examples;
on moral grounds, he could not have regarded it as at all
objectionable that some would prefer sensual to intellectual
pleasures, so long as obtaining them would involve only self-
regarding actions (or non-harmful other-regarding actions).
As m the examples illustrated above, this means that one
m tne position of making decisions concerning public policy
(e.g., a legislator) could be held blameworthy for making
decisions affecting the self-regarding sphere of those
affected by appealing to a qualitative hierarchy.
All of this further substantiates the conclusion, pre-
viously stated, that Mill could not have been urging the es-
tablishment and use of a qualitative hierarchy in the way
that has previously been supposed, as something that must
be appealed to for determining the moral rightness or wrong-
ness of actions; for to do so could often result in wrongly
interfering in the area of self-regarding actions, some-
thing clearly rejected by Mill in On Liberty
. If this
19 .
Mill, On Liberty
, pp. 12-13.
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interpretation is correct, he was not arguing for the estab-
lishment and use of such a hierarchy which he viewed as an
amendment to Bentham's theory. Rather, it seems clear that
his purpose was merely one of explication, to point out that
preferring the so-called higher pleasures was compatibl
e
with a theory like Bentham's and, like sensual pleasures,
could not be objected to as long as the actions which satis-
fied them could be categorized as self-regarding or other-
regarding but non-harmful.
Although Mill would allow that one can justifiably
level prudential objections against self-regarding actions
meant to satisfy particular pleasure preferences, the only
justifiable moral objections one can raise concerning any-
one's pleasure preferences must be on the grounds that the
actions engaged in to satisfy them are other-regarding and
harmful. In other words, the only kind of legitimate ob-
jection, according to Mill, must be based on the source
of pleasures (be they sensual or intellectual). The satis-
faction of sadistic desires by causing pain to others, the
punishing of an innocent man to appease the public (the
old scapegoat problem) and certain instances of voluntary
and involuntary euthanasia (standard examples employed by
critics as objectionable kinds of action sometimes judged
right by utilitarian theory) are all examples of objection-
able sources and, consequently, of objectionable pleasure
preferences
.
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It is to be noted, however, that cases of harming
people for the sole purpose of satisfying pleasure prefer-
ence^ (as m situations like these) are really to be cate-
gorized as instances of injustice
.
20
But since it is the
purpose of another chapter to demonstrate why utilitarian
theory does not allow this and how it is able to avoid
objections stemming from considerations of justice, it
need only be realized that this constitutes the only moral
objection to particular pleasure preferences and that it
comprises a wholly different area of consideration. To
complete this section, it only remains to explain briefly
why the position found in On Liberty also commits Mill to
the rejection of an appeal to a quantitative hierarchy.
If the qualitative hierarchy Mill had in mind is (as
he seems to have thought) extensionally equivalent to the
kind of quantitative hierarchy Benthamites claim to have
been urging, it can readily be demonstrated that Mill would
hold that an appeal to the latter must be rejected for the
same reasons which we saw necessitated the rejection of an
appeal to a qualitative hierarchy to which a quantitative
hierarchy is not extensionally equivalent; i.e., consulting
a quantitative hierarchy which ranks intellectual pleasures
as quantitatively superior to sensual pleasures will also
result in decisions which would unjustifiably infringe in
20
That these exemplify instances of injustice seems
clear; should there be any doubt, however, this is explained
in a subsequent chapter.
the area of self-regarding acti
suffice
.
ons. A single example will
6 0
Consider the following: A governor of a state has
a decision to make regarding money which has been given by
the federal government for the state's use with "no strings
attached. For various reasons, the choices for the use of
The money turn out to be two: using the money to create
a symphony orchestra in a culturally deprived area of the
state, or using it to establish the first radio station in
tne same area which would be broadcasting mostly rock and
other popular music. The governor’s choices are other-re-
garding? an act of omission is not an alternative open to
him as a utilitarian in this case; the people whose plea-
sure preferences will be affected are different for each
alternative, though the numbers affected are the same for
each; the actions of those who utilize whatever results
from either of the governor’s choices will be self-regard-
ing, and their pleasure preferences are such that the radio
station would produce slightly more pleasure than the symphony
orchestra. If the governor does not know that the radio
station would produce more pleasure than the symphony or-
chestra and believes that consulting the quantitative hier-
archy (which is extensionally equivalent to the qualitative
hierarchy previously referred to) is what he ought to do in
order to arrive at a decision, he is bound to choose to
appropriate the money for the orchestra. Yet it is obvious
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that, according to Mill, he would be using his power and op-
portunity to interfere unjustifiably with self
-regarding ac-
tions. ror if, as noted previously, when the quantity of
pleasure produced by either action would be the same, it would
be unjust to choose as one's obligation that which would re-
sult in intellectual self-regard ing actions rather than
sensual self-regarding actions for those affected (since
both present an equal claim), it would obviously be unjust
m a similar situation to choose the intellectual over the
sensual when the quantity of pleasure resulting from the
former would be less than that resulting from choosing the
latter. In addition, of course, the fact that the quantity
of pleasure would not be maximized in this case constitutes
a further utilitarian objection against this decision, as-
suming that maximizing the amount of pleasure is required
of a utilitarian. Because of the latter, consulting an ex-
tensionally equivalent quantitative hierarchy in a situa-
tion such as this is—and can be— even more objectionable
tnan consulting a qualitative hierarchy in the examples
previously considered
.
21
21_
Professor Robert Ackermann of the philosophy depart-
ment of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst has sug-gested, regarding this example, that the governor, by inter-fering with self-regarding actions, must commit an injustice
no matter how he chooses to spend the money. Moreover, this
seems to him to support the more general claim that there
are unsolvable ethical problems for utilitarianism; specif-
ically, that Mill's utilitarian account ("as only a 'con-
sumer account,
' in that it suggests that we can be privately
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f other hand, what is being claimed is that
an. injustice arises merely because one group does not re-ceive what it desires, whereas the other one does--eventhough every attempt was made to acknowledge the equal
rignts involved in making the choice--then this is a con-sequence the theory. cannot avoid. However, I think the
conclusion
-chat an injustice occurs, no matter what is
chosen, is unreasonable. To the contrary, I claim that the
random-selection
.
procedure (v/hich is defensible on utili-tarian grounds) is a means of avoiding injustices in situa-
•?n^. lke th9Se and j furthermore, that it is defensible onintuitive grounds, since it is closely in accord v/ith v/hatintuition prescribes that we should do in such situations.
Neither intuition nor a desire to maximize the general hap-piness could sanction doing nothing in this instance and
choosing by appealing to a fair procedure seems to be the
only plausible alternative.
As a result of having procedures like these available,
l think the general claim above is false as well. Although
63
At tnis point, it is most important to realize, in
addition, that an injustice would also result if whatever
hierarchy was appealed to ranked, for some reason, sensual
over intellectual pleasures. Consequently, according to
Mill, one’s duty in the area of self-regarding actions can-
not be decided by an appeal to any kind of hierarchy with-
out the possibility of resulting injustice. Moreover, it
is now apparent that, from the standpoint of quantitative
considerations, no appeal to any kind of pleasure hierarchy
can be relied upon to determine which action will produce
the greatest quantity of pleasure, because no kinds of
pleasures are consistently
— on all occasions
—
quantitatively
superior to others.
It now follows trivially that, if appealing to any
kind of pleasure hierarchy is objectionable, appeal to a
quantitative hierarchy which is not extensionally equivalent
to a qualitative hierarchy is also theoretically objection-
able, and ohis takes care of the last alternative regarding
appeal to quantitative and qualitative considerations; i.e.,
an appeal to quantity, the results of which are not extension-
ally equivalent to the results of an appeal to quality.
classical interpretations of Mill's theory may have had thisdifficulty, the theory attributed to him here provides ex-
plicit directions as to what should be done whenever indi-
vidual interests conflict, and justifies these procedures by
arguing that
. employing them results in maximization of the
general happiness (again, refer to the section on "fair pro-
cedures, pp. 243-61; also refer to the corollary to the prin-
ciple of obligation on p. 174).
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Specifically why Mill rejects an appeal to the latter for
determining the morality of actions will be explained more
fully in Section III.
That Mill could not have been advocating appeal to
either a quantitative or a qualitative hierarchy in de-
termining the morality of actions is also evidenced in
a passage in "Utilitarianism" just prior to his discus-
sion of qualitative pleasure differences. In a discus-
sion of some of the more basic misunderstandings of the
theory, he says:
Having caught up the word utilitarian, whileknowing nothing
. whatever about it but its
sound, they habitually express by it the re-jection, or the neglect, of pleasure in some
one of its forms; of beauty, of ornament, or
of amusement. Nor is the term thus ignorantly
misapplied solely in disparagement, but occa-
sionally
. in compliment; as though it implied
superiority to frivolity and the mere plea-
sures of the moment. And this perverted
use is the only one in which the word is
popularly known.... 22
Had Mill thought that one was obligated to choose
the higher pleasures on those occasions in which certeris
jqaribus^, it was possible to do so (as we have seen, this
would have to be the case if either or both quantitative
and qualitative hierarchies were appealed to)
,
it would
be Irue to say that the theory "implied superiority to
frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment." The fact
22 .
Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 209 .
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tha^ he took this statement to represent a misinterpreta-
tion Ox the tneory can he taken as evidence that Mill's
thinking regarding kinds of pleasures and the application
of the principle of utility was much more liberal than—
far dlfferent from—what has previously been supposed. The
correct account of his position in this regard will be de-
veloped in the third and last section of this chapter.
In conclusion, if we have shown that Mill's discus-
sion in "Utilitarianism" of qualitative differences among
pleasures could not have been intended as describing a
necessary or sufficient condition for determining the mo-
rality of actions and that he must also have rejected a
quantitative hierarchy (equivalent or non-equivalent) of
the kind we have supposed that the Benthamites had in
mind, the only plausible interpretation of those pas-
sages in his essay, in which he speaks of qualitative
pleasure differences, is that he intended them to refer to
prudential rightness—as recommendations in the area of
self-regarding actions. We might then say, as does Mill,
in a passage previously referred to, "These are good rea-
sons for remonstrating with him, or entreating him, but
not for compelling him, or visiting v/ith any evil in case
he do otherwise
.
23 .
Mill
,
On Liberty
, p. 9.
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Before considering in more detail the utilitarian theory
Hill had in mind, it is necessary to turn our attention to
another aspect of utilitarianism in general, which has served
as a source of much confusion concerning its account of jus-
tice and thus its plausibility as an acceptable ethical
theory.
Section II
The Metaphysics of Right Action for Utilitarianism
and the Problem of Justice
It is generally agreed that utilitarianism is aproposal about which acts are right or wrong. Un-fortunately, it is also widely held—although thisis a mat ber of dispute— that these terms are usedin several senses. Hence, in order to state the
utilitarian thesis clearly, we must identify which
sense of these words (if there is more than one)
v/e have in mind.^
There is a convenient and rather precise distinction
that can be made within utilitarian theory between judg-
ments about actions and judgments about agents. In this
section, it will be argued that it is basically a confusion
of what might be called right action in a metaphysical
sense, according to utilitarianism, and what the agent is
justified by the theory to do without reprehension which has
often resulted in the unwarranted conclusion that the prin-
ciple of utility offends our moral intuitions with respect
24 .
Richard B. Brandt, "Toward a Credible Form of Utili-
tarianism," in Morality and the Language of Conduct
,
ed.
Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1965), p. 110 .
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juofcxce. Once this distinction is clearly understood, it
will be demonstrated that questions of justice can be dealt
with m a category distinct from questions of metaphysical
rightness, with the result that the offense to moral intui-
tion can be shown to have rested on a confusion of the two.
Correspondingly, it will be the purpose of Sub-section II-A
to develop the position of a utilitarian theory of right ac-
tion, similar to Mill’s, with respect to the problem of the
"right to life and Sub-section II-B will demonstrate how,
m this case, the distinction between the theory’s position
on acts and agents can be employed to avoid a rejection of
the theory based on the claim that it is not compatible
with accepted principles of justice.
Sub-section II-A: Th e right to life and a utilitarian
c onception of objective rightness
. The distinction is often
made in utilitarian theory between the objective and the sub-
jective righ tness o_l acuions; i.e,
,
between an action’s be-
ing right, in fact, and an agent's judgment as to its right-
ness. This allows for differentiation between moral judg-
ments about actions and moral judgments about agents. As
a consequence, it; is often possible to regard agents as
olameless for having
. chosen to perform what is, in fact, an
?5For example, textual support for this distinction
between the evaluation of acts and agents is found as a part
Ox Mill’s theory in "Utilitarianism," pp. 219-221.
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objectively wrong action, so long as prior to doing so they
have done everything that can reasonably be required to de-
termine its objective rightness. Conversely, it is also
possible to hold them morally blameworthy to some extent
because they did not do everything that can reasonably be
required to determine objective rightness, even though
choosing to perform an action which, in fact, is objec-
tively right.
Concerning this distinction, Brandt says:
It is this sense of these terms—the sense in whichduty (etc.) depends on what the facts really are
and not on what the agent thinks about them—which
1 am terming the ’’objective sense." I shall con-
strue utilitarianism as a proposal about which acts
are right or wrong in this objective sense. 26
However, if one carefully considers this notion of ob-
jectively right action for utilitarianism, one is struck by
what results in what would be claimed are some glaring in-
compatibilities with moral intuition; such that, from the
standpoint of objective rightness, utilitarianism appears
to be unacceptable. That which follows is an attempt to
demonstrate this by developing a utilitarian position27 with
respect to a principle held by many to be self-evident— the
Brandt, "Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism."
P. 113.
27One might also refer to this consideration of objec-
tive rightness as the theory's "metaphysical position" with
regard to right and v/rong actions; thus saying, for example,
that an act is right, in a metaphysical sense, according" to
utilitarian theory if and only if Henceforth, this way
of speaking will be freely employed.
6 9
principle of the sanctity of life,^®
Those who subscribe to a sanctity of life theory usu-
ally mean by it that life has intrinsic value; that it is
among other things something worth preserving for its own
sake; consequently, that death has intrinsic disvalue and
is worth avoiding for its own sake. However, the usual
utilitarian position is depicted by Mill's assertion in the
fourth chapter of "Utilitarianism:’* "The utilitarian doc-
trine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing
desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable
28
, ,
Much of what follows, up to p.79 was taken or adao-ted from material worked out jointly by myself and a col-"league, George Bowles, as part of an unpublished paper,
t ono^"
1^ar ^an ^Sm anc* "k*10 Right to Life," completed in March,
relevant Pages referred to in that paper are 1-6
and 13-J-5. As stated in a footnote on the first page ofthat paper,
.
The utilitarianism set down and applied is of
our own devising. We owe obvious debts to J. S. Mill andG.^E. Moore.’* Consequently, although the utilitarian theory
rei erred to in the next few pages is similar in most re-
spects to Mill's (numerous references to Mill are noted inme text and footnotes), there are some important differences.
For example, the principles on p.71 may not have been wholly
acceptable to Mill. Also the concept of ' self-regard ing
action* does not make use of Mill's distinction in On Libertybetween the 'direct* and 'indirect' effects of actions (
e
.g.',
see Lhe footnote on p.52); thus, for example, whereas Mill
would have argued that some actions which are means to the
happiness or unhappiness of others are self-regarding when
they do not directly affect them, this was thought to be a
problematic distinction and so was not employed
. It should
be noted that the divergences from Mill are not really sig-
nificant
. with
. respect to the general point being made in this
sub-section, in that the point being made with this theory
can unproblematically be made with one more closely approxi-
mating Mill's, as well. In fact, it is appropriate not to
refer specifically to Mill's theory in this section, since
it seems safe to say that the general problem dealt with
is characteristic of most--if not all--utilitarian theories.
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as means to that end." 2? Consequently, since it is possible
to have life and not be happy, life is not identical with
happiness and cannot be regarded by utilitarianism as de-
siraDle as an end. The theory does regard life as desir-
able, however, but only as a necessary condition for a
state of temporal happiness; i.e., life is valued as a
means, since one cannot be temporally happy without it.
From the same passage it follows, mutatis mutandis
.
that unhappiness is undesirable and the only thing unde-
sirable as an end, all other things being undesirable as
means to that end. Again, since it is possible to have life
and yet be unhappy, death is not identical with unhappiness
and so cannot be undesirable for its own sake. However,
because death is the absence of life, and since life is de-
sirable as a means to happiness, death is undesirable as a
means to happiness.
It is clear, then, that this version of utilitarianism
cannot support a sanctity of life theory which holds that
life is desirable and death undesirable for its own sake.
Both are desirable and undesirable, respectively, but con-
tingent upon their respective relation to happiness and
unhappiness. The consequences of this position, some of
which appear as affronts to intuition, can be made clear by
considering three questions with reference to the theory:
2
^Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 23^.
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Under what conditions ought an agent be free to deprive a
victim of life? under what conditions is it right for him
to kill? Under what conditions is it obligatory for him to
kill?
The general principles which this version of utili-
tarianism supplies to answer these questions are as follows : 30
P
i An act of killing ought to be a free act in just
these two cases:
(a) Self-regarding acts of killing: If the kill-
ing affects only the agent, then the agent
ought to be free to kill the victim if and
only if he kills the victim intentionally
.
3b
(In order for an agent to be free to perform
a self-regarding act of killing, it is not
necessary for that act to be prudentially
right
.
)
(b) Other-regarding acts of killing: If the kill-
ing affects sentient beings other than or in
30
M .._ f
' I
y,
has b9en stated that this theory is similar to
Although there is evidence to support the contentionthat Mill was a rule-utilitarian (see footnote 30
,
pt> 4 25-26 ofthis paper, regarding Urmson, "The Interpretation of* the MoralPhilosophy of J. S. Mill"), the principles that follow with
respect, to killing are developed as act-utilitarian principles.
If one interprets Mill as an act-utilitarian, it seems un-~
problematic to assert (though it won't be argued) that he
would, for the most part, have subscribed to them.
31
A being is affected by an act if and only if he is
made happier or unhappier by that act than he would have been
otherwise
.
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addition to the agent, then the agent ought
to be free to kill the victim if and only if
either to do so is morally right or the
victim freely consents to the killing.
P
2 An act of killing i s right
, if and only if,
(a) it is an intentional act; and
(b) there is no alternative act which the agent
could perform which is a means to less unhap-
piness or greater happiness to whoever is
afj. ected by that or by any alternative act
which the agent could perform. (It is pos-
sible bhat one or more alternative acts are
right.)
P
3
An act of killing is obligatory, if and only if,
(a) it is a right act; and
(b) there is no alternative act which the agent
could perform which is a means to equal un-
happmess or equal happiness to whoever is
affected by the act or by any alternative act
which the agent could perform.
In the interest of clarity, it is necessary to add some
explanatory comments. concerning these principles.
Firsx, it is desirable to provide a brief explanation
of some of the terms used in the principles. By a 'free act*
is meant one with which there is no interference. Rightness
and wrongness are to be understood as prudential concepts
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when They apply to self-regarding actions, but as moral con-
cepts when they apply to other-regarding actions.
Ix is neither desirable nor necessary to become in-
volved here with the intricacies of intentionality
; it is
included without sufficient explanation as what seems a
necessary condition to be imposed by all three principles,
so as to insure that actions cannot be categorized as pru-
dential or moral unless executed by an agent having some
intention(s) with respect to them. If not, of course, it
is not possible to avoid admitting that animals and even
events of nature can qualify as causing right actions,
that they should be free to perform them, etc.
Second, apart from the condition of intent ionalitv,
if is important to realize that these principles (as they
are concerned strictly with objective rightness) are for-
mulated with reference to acts
,
not agents. They set forth
the conditions under which acts ought to be free, under which
right and under which acts are obligatory. They do
not specify any conditions under which agents can be said
to deserve praise or blame. Consequently, these principles
justify claims about the freedom, rightness, or obligatori-
ness of acts by reference to the consequences of those acts,
and not by reference to any specific intentions the agent
has v/hen he performs them. This means, then, that what the
agent believes or does not believe
,
desires or does not de-
sire
,
has nothing whatever to do with the freedom, rightness,
74
ox ooligatonness of his act. Hence, it is possible both
for an agent to perform an act without making every reason-
able effort, before acting, to justify his belief that his
act will actually be one which ought to be free; and yet
for that act in fact to be one which ought to be free, or
to be right, or obligatory. And likewise, it is possible
both for an agent to perform an act with the unfulfilled
desire that his act will be one which ought not to be free;
and yet ior chat act in fact to be one which ought to be
free, or right, or obligatory.
Third, although a particular act might be a means
both to happiness and to mental attitudes of approbation
or a particular act might be a means both to unhappiness and
to mental attitudes of disapprobation, attitudes of approba-
tion or disapprobation are excluded from counting as aspects
of happiness or unhappiness respectively. This is a re-
striction Mill would have accepted and is supported by
the arguments employed by him, principally in On Liberty
.
Fourth, in the spirit of Mill, v/ho framed the prin-
ciple of utili oy with reference "to the whole sentient cre-
• »t33ation," included in the category of those sentient forms
,o„.
lines 3,27-330, and Chapter IV, lines384-394; 454-462; 617-634; and 743-750.
33T9 e passage referred to is in "Utilitarianism, " p.214; ''This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion,
the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard
of morality; which may accordingly be defined, 'the rules
and precepts for human conduct, ' by the observance of which
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of liie v/hich night be significantly affected by our ac-
tions are animals and perhaps plants. If there is some
plausiole sense in which they may experience pain and plea-
sure (which does not seem doubtful for animals) and so be
made happy or unhappy by at least some of our actions, they
ought to be considered as included in the class of "whoever
is affected" by those acts.
In this regard it might also be noted that if one of
the sentient beings affected by our actions is a god or gods
(as some claim good reasons for supposing) who is made hap-
py or unhappy by our actions, then this possibility must
also be included in our metaphysical account of the morality
of actions. For even though it is unknown whether there are
such beings or, if there are, what their nature is, the pos-
sibility requires that such effects of our actions must be
included in the notion of right action, etc., in the meta-
physical ( objective) sense in which we are considering them.
And if there are other sentient creatures, though not known
by us to exist, who are significantly affected by our actions,
we must include these as well.
It is necessary to consider only homicide with refer-
ence to these principles. If an act of homicide is self-
an existence such as has been described might be, to the
greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not
to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits,
to the whole sentient creation."
76
regarding, 34 then it ought to be free if and only if it
satisfies
P;L
_a
above; it is right if and only if it satis-
fies P,; and it is obligatory if and only if it satisfies
P3* 4'nerefore
,
as long as the act of homicide is a self-
regarding act, and as long as it is an intentional act, it
is wrong to interfere with it; under these conditions, people
ought to be iree to kill other people. A self-regarding
act of homicide which satisfies the further condition that
no alternative act which the agent could perform is a means
to less unhappiness or more happiness to the agent is a pru
dentially right act; not only ought the agent to be free to
kill someone under these conditions, it is prudentially
right for him to do so. Finally, a prudentially right act
of homicide which is such that there is no alternative act
which the agent could perform which is a means to equal un-
happiness or equal happiness for the agent is prudentially
obligatory; in this case, it is prudentially obligatory to
kill the other person and one acts prudentially wrongly if
he does not commit homicide.
34It should be noted that an act of homicide is self-regarding if and only if it is a means to happiness or un-happiness only for the agent. It fails to be a means tohappiness or unhappiness for the victim if and only if the
victim, were he to. live, would experience either no happi-
ness and no unhappiness, or on the whole, an even balance
of happiness and unhappiness. As this would rarely be the
case with reference to the victim and as it would also be
rare that the death of a victim would not be a means to hap-piness or unhappiness for some third person besides the
agent and the victim, an act of homicide would very seldombe self-regarding.
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On xne other hand, if an act of homicide is other-re-
garding, then it ought to be free if and only if it satis-
ftes ^
1 _-b ; it is right if and only if it satisfies P
2 ;
and
it is obligatory if and only if it satisfies
; therefore,
as long as an act of homicide is other-regarding and in-
tentional and such that no alternative act which the agent
could periorm is a means to less unhappiness or more happi-
ness to whoever is affected by the act or by any alternative
act which the agent could perform, it is morally right; not
only ought the agent to be free to kill someone else under
these conditions (by but it v/ould also be morally
right for him to do so.
Finally, if tne act of homicide is other—regarding
and morally right and such that no alternative act which
the agent could perform is a means to equal unhappiness or
equal happiness to whoever is affected by that act or any
alternative act which the agent could perform, it is a
morally obligatory act; not only ought the agent to be free
to kill the other person, and not only is it morally right
for him to do so, but moreover, it is morally obligatory for
him to kill his victim: he acts morally wrongly if he does
not commit homicide.
-
Consider, for example, a variation of the familiar
scapegoat objection to utilitarianism. The oppressed citizens
of a political state conspire to assassinate their tyrannical
ruler but fail in the attempted assassination. Unable to
78
discover who among the citizens was responsible for trying
to kill him, the tyrant demands that the citizens surrender
five of their number to be executed for the assassination
attempt. If the citizens refuse, he assures them that they
will all be even more heavily taxed, their liberties will be
even further curtailed, and they will be subjected to other
abuses at the whim of the tyrant. These hardships will con-
tinue for a long time unless the citizens comply, in which
case they will suffer no retribution. It is impossible to
depose the young and healthy ruler, and he has now taken
thorough and effective precaution against assassination.
From a metaphysical perspective, the situation is such
that, among all the available alternatives, there is none,
other than surrendering five innocent people as scapegoats,
which v;ill produce less unhappiness or more happiness for
those affected; more importantly, it is also true that sur-
rendering the scapegoats v/ill produce only a very slightly
lesser amount of unhappiness or only a very slightly greater
amount ol happiness than, accepting the alternative of every-
one's having to live with the imposed hardships of the ruler
with no one's being sacrificed. Furthermore, even though
surrendering the victims is only very slightly better than
not doing so, no alternative action is a means to equal un-
happiness or equal happiness to those affected. Consequently,
surrendering the scapegoats under those circumstances not only
ought to be free, but also is morally right and even morally
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obligatory.
Sub-sectionJEI-B: The
,
distinc ti on between metaphyseal
and
_
non-iaeta-physical rightness
, other examples could be con-
sidered but, insofar as a theory's sanctioning scapegoats
under conditions like the above is taken to constitute a
serious kind of objection, the preceding example is sufficient
to show that, as concerns the issue of homicide from this
perspective, the utilitarian theory being considered is not
compatible with intuition. That an act of homicide can be
regarded as (prudentially or morally) free, right, or obli-
gatory whenever the above-described conditions obtain seems
clearly to constitute a sufficient condition for rejecting
any theory from which inferences like this follow, on the
ground that they are not at all in accordance with the in-
tuitions of any morally sane person. However, if one re-
calls that all of the above was developed with reference
to acts, not agents, there is an important distinction be-
tween this metaphysical account of actions which the theory
is committed to and what can be inferred from the theory
concerning agents. The result is that there is a seeming
but no actual inconsistency in allowing that, according to
the same theory, an
-action can be right in a metaphysical
(objective) sense but wrong in a non-metaphysical (subjec-
tive) sense (and vice-versa). For what the agent is justi-
fied by the theory in doing--without reprehension— often
turns out to be far different from what seems to be implied
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by the metaphysical considerations. 35
The point is that there are two separate and distinct
senses of justification in operation here. On the one hand,
one can speak of an action which is justified as right from
a metaphysical standpoint; in this case, it would have been
much more accurate to phrase the questions we previously
considered somewhat as follows: Under what conditions is
it metaphysically right or metaphysically obligatory for
him to kill? (it was with this sense of justification in
mind that these questions have been answered.) On the other
nand, one can speak of the same action from a non-metaphysi-
cal (subjective or agent's) standpoint and so judge the ac-
tion as right or wrong, etc,, from a significantly different
set of considerations; in this case, the questions should be
phrased somewhat as follows: Under what conditions is it
subjectively right or subjectively obligatory for the agent
oo kill? These two senses of justification have, to my
knowledge, never been adequately distinguished and it is
the failure to do so which has primarily been responsible
35
.
This means, in the example above, that although sur-
rendering the. scapegoats would be right on the basis of meta-physical considerations
,
the agent would not necessarily be
abie, according to the theory, to justify the action as right
and thereby to commit himself to its performance. That thisis so will be made apparent below.
,
, .
v;i11 bscome evident shortly, what is not meant by
subjectively' here is 'what the agent thinks is right, obli-
gatory, etc.’ There is another sense of 'subjectively' whichbears a much closer logical relation to the metaphysical.
81
for the charges that utilitarianism cannot
of our moral intuitions.
account for many
It is important to realize, then, that intuitive in-
compatibility with the theory at this stage can now be in-
its metaphysical commitment to what constitutes a right or
obligatory action. This is true with the material above
with regard to the utilitarian position on killing; this
result can also be applied to an objection like the fol-
lowing, taken from Frankena's Ethics
, in which he is re-
counting objections to act-utilitarianism made by Joseph
Butler and Sir David Ross:
The other Butler-Ross argument is that in a certain
situation. there might be two courses of action, A
and^B, which are such that when their total scores
in. terras of a balance of good over evil for the
universe as a whole are calculated, the results
are as follows: A is conducive to a slightly
larger balance of good over evil than B. But it
might also be that A involves breaking a promise,
telling a lie, or being unjust. Here the act-
utilitarian must say that A is right and B wrong.
But again, Butler and Ross contend, B is or at
least may.be right and A is or at least may be
wrong; this conclusion would be insisted upon by
our ordinary moral consciousness. Hence, act-
utilitarianism must be rejected. 37
Independently of a consideration of the success or
failure of various o~fcher attempts which have been made to
show that utilitarianism can counter this kind of objection,
it is certain that the distinction made above can be
terpreted, in thi o new light, as the result of considering
3?Frankena, p. 32.
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successfully employed to do so. 38 That is, although in
the metaphysical sense of justification-calculating
"thier
•total scores in terms of a balance of good and evil for the
universe as a whole*'—the rejection of act-utilitarianism
has seemed to Ross and Butler to follow of necessity, I
propose to demonstrate that, once we consider the non-meta-
physical standpoint of the theory, it does not.
The success of this approach for resolving the diffi-
culties of utilitarianism with respect to moral intuition
rests on the assumption that the ultimate acceptability of
an ethical theory does not depend, in the final analysis,
on what it implies metaphysically but, rather, on what its
implications are from a subjective (agent's) non-meta-
physical standpoint; i.e., what it allows the agent to do
without reprehension. In other words, if a theory being
employed does not sanction an agent's doing something which
clashes with intuition, then, regardless of its metaphysical
implications with respect to the rightness of actions, there
is no reason why, from considerations of compatibility with
intuition, that theory should not be judged acceptable.
First, as is demonstrated further on, 39 it is theoretically
38By other attempts I have in mind, for example, J.J.G
Smart's "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism," The Philoso-
phical Quarterly. VI (1956), pp. 344-354, and John Rlwls'
well-known article "Two Concepts of Rules," The Philosonhi-
cal Review
,
LXIV (1955), pp. 3-32.
^Sub-section III-D, pp. 126-132.
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impossible for a finite moral agent to know what the theory
entails metaphysically about the rightness or wrongness of
particular actions. Consequently, although it has been
demonstrated that utilitarianism may not be compatible with
intuition from a metaphysical perspective, 40 this objection
to the theory must be judged as uninteresting. For if it is
theoretically impossible for a moral agent to know whether
particular actions are metaphysically right or wrong, it is
only from a non-metaphysical perspective that it becomes
significant, to judge the rightness and wrongness of particu-
4llar actions, and, consequently, only from this perspective
that it becomes significant to consider accepting or reject-
ing the theory because of the compatibility or incompatibility
with intuition of particular actions sanctioned by the theory.
Secondly, as a result of this, we must conclude that the
only purpose served by the notion of metaphysical rightness
40This was demonstrated in Section II, pp. 66-79, which
considered utilitarianism and its implications regarding the
right to life. ^
41
Regarding particular actions (those actions which
an agent may be considering as possible alternatives on some
occasion of moral choice), if he doesn't know which particu-
lar actions are sanctioned by a theory as metaphysically
right, how can they be compared with intuition? In other
words, a moral agent is in no position to judge particular
actions as compatible or incompatible with intuition from a
metaphysical perspective. Of course he can speculate about
possibilities but this would be a superfluous endeavor, given
what he has to do; for it has nothing directly to do with
making real moral decisions when they have to be made. It
should also be noted that it will later be made evident that
i’t is not theoretically impossible for an agent to know what
is right from a non-metaphysical perspective.
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is ,o point out possible discrepancies between what a
finite moral agent may judge to be right and what is right
in fact (i.e., metaphysically or objectively right), ac-
cording to the theory's principles. And this conclusion
must be regarded as trivial with respect to the process of
accepting or rejecting utilitarian theories.^ 2
In conclusion, regardless of the objections to a
theory's metaphysical commitments, what we must be con-
cerned about, as philosophers concerned with devising or
discovering an acceptable ethical theory, is whether the
application of any theory undergoing philosophical scrutiny
will possibly sanction, from a non-metaphysical perspective,
at least one action for a moral agent in a possible situa-
tion which is clearly incompatible with what would be
sanctioned by preanalytic moral intuition. Although, as
metaphysicians, we might justifiably condemn a theory such
as Mill's version of utilitarianism on the basis of its
possible metaphysical implications, as philosophers who
are interested in justifying a moral theory that is theo-
retically unobjectionable from a non-metaphysical perspective
42The fact that it is possible that we may make mis-
takes in calculating- consequences--assuming that it is a
mistake not to accord with metaphysical implications--is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for reject-
ing an ethical theory. V/e might recall, for example, that
Mill rejected the contention that his theory v/as objection-
able because the world was too complicated to calculate
consequences accurately, by replying that this was a de-
fect with the world, not with his theory ("Utilitarianism,"
pp. 225 - 6 ).
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-the level at which the theory is applicable to moral
agents— this version of utilitarianism can be shown to be
acceptable
.
As will be demonstrated in the next and final section
of this chapter, the metaphysical commitments of the theory
are only of speculative interest, whereas the non-metaphysi-
cal commitments are crucial so far as acceptance or rejection
as an agent-oriented theory is concerned. In brief, it will
be demonstrated that the rejection of the theory as a meta-
physical theory about actions does not entail the rejection
of a theory as a non-metaphysical theory, and it is the lat-
ter which should constitute our major concern in our search
for an ethical theory which satisfies the requirements of
moral intuition.
The main point of this section can be summarized with
reference to a final quotation from Brandt’s article:
The question. whether there is an objective sense,
or a subjecoive sense, or perhaps both such senses,is a difficult one. Although I think it plausibleto suppose there is an 'objective' sense, I do feeldoubt about the. matter. I propose, nevertheless,
to discuss utilitarianism as a theory about rivht
and wrong in this sense.
Because it is both necessary and possible to differentiate
both the objective and subjective senses within the theory
and to turn to the latter in an attempt to demonstrate the
accordance of utilitarianism with intuition, I propose, in
the final section of this chapter, to discuss Mill's version
43Brandt, p. 114.
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of utilitarianism in the subjective sense and to demonstrate
further reasons why we must do so. Accordingly, "The ques-
tion whether there is an objective sense or a subjective
sense or perhaps both such senses” is not a difficult one.
The theory can consistently be (and is) committed to both.
Section III
The Metaphysical and Non-Metaphysical Distinction
in Mill's Theory
In this section it will be argued that Mill made this
metaphysical-subjective distinction, that several of the
positions he is committed to necessitate its acceptance.
Accordingly, after Sub-section III-A summarizes Jan Nar-
veson*s view of utilitarianism as a theory of intrinsic
value, Sub-section III-B will turn to evidence in "Utili-
tarianism" and On Liberty in an attempt to demonstrate that
Mill was committed to a similar theory of intrinsic value.
Through an analysis of the first half of Mill’s proof in
the fourth chapter of "Utilitarianism," Sub-section III-C
complete the picture of Mill's theory of intrinsic
value by explicating his conception of the general happi-
ness and revealing the part it plays in the second half of
the proof. Sub-section III-D will discuss the effect of
Mill’s theory of intrinsic value on the calculation of
consequences, concluding that it is theoretically impossible
for a finite moral agent to know whether actions are meta-
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physically right or wrong.
Sub-section III—E, that we
xhese results necessitate, in
distinguish between two kinds of
rightness (metaphysical and non-metaphysical) and formulate
a principle of utility corresponding to each. At this point
the metaphysical and non-metaphysical distinction in Mill's
fcheo-y s established and the last Subsection (III-F) is
meant to show that the problems of justice can only arise
with the principle of utility formulated with respect to
non-metaphysical rightness, thus eliminating one of the
commonly alleged sources of incompatibility between the
principle of utility and principles of justice. Eventually,
in Chapter IV, it will be demonstrated that, once we con-
sider this formulation of the principle of utility, utili-
tarian theory is not at all incompatible with our intuitions
regarding distributive justice.
Sub-section I II-At Utilitarianism as a theory of in -
trinsic value according t o Narveson
. Jan Narveson, in his
bool: Morality, and Utility
,
proposes and attempts to support
an interesting hypothesis about the commitment of utilitarian-
ism to a theory of intrinsic value. In several places he
asserts that utilitarianism is not a theory of intrinsic
value in the way that philosophers have generally supposed.
For example, early in the second chapter he says:
...it. does not provide an answer to the following
questions: (1) V/hat is the (general) criterion
of value? (2) How ought I (anyone) to live?
(3)
t
What, is intrinsically good? V/hen I say that
it ’’does not" provide an answer to these questions,
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however, perhaps I should say that we shouldnot think of it that way/* n i
And later in the same chapter, while criticizing Sidgwick's
contention that utilitarianism requires that we produce as
many people as possible (to "produce the greatest amount of
happiness on the whole"), he concludes, "This is a fundamental
error, involving as it does the supposition that utilitarian-
ism is a theory of intrinsic value, coupled with the moral
position that the moral value of an act is proportional to
its production of intrinsic value,
For Narveson, it is desirable to reject utilitarianism
as a theory of ‘'absolute intrinsic value :
"
If we say that the moral value of an act is pro-portional to the absolute intrinsic value of * its
consequences, then there is no logical connectionbetween the principle and a concern with otherpersons as such. Whereas... a concern for otherpersons as such is precisely the hub of utilitari-
anism.
In other words, it is his contention that commitment of the
theory to a specific substantive theory of intrinsic value
results in unacceptable inconsistency with what is sanctioned
by preanalytic intuition. Among the examples he provides
for both hedonistic and ideal varieties of utilitarianism,
the following is an example of the latter:
44
Jan Narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 19&7 ), p. 30 .
45^
Narveson, p. 47.
46
Narveson, p. 67 .
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hitler could have been an "Ideal"utilitari anan^ probably was, He probably believed that thequantity of absolute intrinsic value broughtnto being by millions of Jews, and
+ u^
Stinh rni l 1 i°ns of people from the activities
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fie?d
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H
they ^ht g0 ™t~and
everyone had been permitted to lfve as he SeaLd
^Sglfvalu e
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+h S disPute about in-
'
urinsic val
. ow is it to be resolved? This
Sain
S1
xvhi'nh
ra
h
Se a
ii °f thS ° ld questions over
untati’
WS that ldeal utilitarianism issatisfactory as a moral theory. 4 ?
The denial that utilitarianism is a theory of absolute
intrinsic value does not, however, commit one to the position
ohat ’value" is ”sub jective
.
" Narveson is careful to point
out that the view he is advocating implies no "theory of
value" at all. As a utilitarian, one can consistently sub-
scribe to either the view that intrinsic values are "objec-
tive" or the view that they are "subjective." Although it
is difficult to determine what may be meant by "objective,"
Narveson takes it to mean "at least that if two people are
o± difierent opinions about the intrinsic value of some-
thing, then at least one of them is wrong;" if one takes the
suo jective view, the position adopted is that "such quarrels
are made of thin air." Utilitarians may consistently admit
either if they are so inclined. What the utilitarian must
deny, however, is that "statements about intrinsic value
per s_e may be admitted among the premisses of moral argu-
ments.
47
'Narveson, p. 69.
48
Narveson, pp. 69-70.
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However, it is not the cuse that utilitarianism is com-
mitted to no theory of intrinsic value whatever. As a teleo-
logical ethical theory, it has to he. So what Narveson really
means when he asserts that utilitarianism is not a theory of
absolute intrinsic value is that it is not a theory of intrin-
sic value of the kind that has generally been attributed to
it. Having rejected the latter, Narveson's proposal in this
regard is that "We need to complicate the picture of evalua-
tion for moral purposes, by introducing a category which might
be labeled 'intrinsic moral value,' or perhaps 'intrinsic value
for moral purposes' or 'intrinsic value from the moral point
of view. In short, what he means is that
generating idea of utilitarianism is a con-cern for the values that individuals adhere to
3 utllity> then, is its productiveness of*what those affected by it believe to be int?in-
^caiiy good. Utilitarianism will be the prin-
ValUe (i,e ” that by reference
in thafsl'L^aiSe a° tS BoraU*>’ iB utility
Sub-section III-Bi Mill 's theory of intrinsic value-
what hanpiness is: an open question
. Rather than proceed
with further explication and discussion of Narveson’s theory
49
.
har^eson, p. 66. In the same paragraph in which hediscusses the new category of intrinsic good on p. 78, Narve-
f, ;'
hlch is helPful by way of explanation.
*
**J
ne
J
act.tha», o oner people enjoy something is a good rea-son for helping them to procure it, or at least for lettine-them do it unimpeded, regardless of what one thinks of theirihe Stylization of this would be to say nrima facie.that if someone regards doing X as an intrinsically (non-
morally) good thing, then it is a good thing (morally) to
assist him in doing X (regardless of the ’real’ intrinsic
value of doing X) .
"
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at this point, I wish to do so indirectly by considering in
some derail something which Narveson mentions but does not
argue for. He observes, at one point, that his own view of
utilitarianism might be "in accord with Mill's intentions."
In what follows, therefore, the contention that Mill was com-
mitted to a similar view of intrinsic value will be argued
for on the basis of the evidence that can be found in "Utili-
tarianism" and On Liberty to support the following hypotheses:
(1) Mill is committed to the position that what happiness is,
m fact, is an open question. Contrary to a hedonist (such
as Bentham), who regards 'happiness' as identical with 'plea-
sure and the absence of pain,' Mill is quite obviously a kind
of "liberal eudaemonist. "
—And this, despite his own alleged
agreement with Bentham. ( 2 ) Even if what happiness is, in
fact, were not an open question, Mill is committed to the
position that it is to he treated as if it were. If either
interpretation of Mill's position can be supported, it will
become clear that he could not have held the position that
the morality of actions is to be determined with reference
to a theory of intrinsic value of the kind that has been
attributed to him and most other utilitarian writers. It
will also substantiate the preceding discussing in Section I
regarding the theoretical differences between Bentham and
Mill and eventually will result (at the end of this section)
in a new formulation of the principle of utility.
Before getting into the substance of these issues,
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however, something must be made clear at the outset. Some
critics have contended that Mill's defense of freedom in
On_Liberty is incompatible with his utilitarian theory which
supposedly commits him to the view that ultimately pleasure
IS the only good. Thus, for example, Henry D. Aiken has
asserted
:
Bri^ly I c°ns ider the case for i iberty, either onstrict utilitarian or idealist-utilitarian grounds*
nf.
ITh
shaky
}n
^
eed * At one point or another! botho T ese points of view betray the cause of liberty
or less^xolic i »
the betrayal was more’s expl it; m the case of the utilitariansit remained for the most part implicit, and, atiAthe case of Mill, recognition of the fact was fore-stalled only by muddle-headedness and inconsistency . -5°
Aiken’s position is typical of all those who operate
on the presupposition that Mill’s utilitarian theory is
based on a theory of intrinsic value sufficiently similar
to Bentham’s so that either he could not have been evi-
dencing adherence to the theory in his defense of liberty
or, if he was, he shouldn’t have, since appeal to it does
not support his views on liberty. Rather than accept the
hypothesis that On Liberty is inconsistent with the author's
utilitarian theory for this reason, the method adopted in
v/hat follows will be to proceed on the much more plausible
view much more consistent with the supposition that Mill,
.
Henry David Aiken, Reason and Conducts New Bearings
.121 Moral Philosophy (New York! Alfred A. Knopf, 19S2), p.29b. Aiken goes on to offer some very weak arguments forthe much. more implausible view, which' Mill denied, that
liberty is to be looked upon as a kind of natural right.
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as a careful thinker, was at least somewhat consistent in
his thinking—that the position defended in On liberty is
to be interpreted as evidence that Mill's utilitarian theory
has been seriously misinterpreted in this regard. That the
converse of the usual interpretation has never seriously been
argued in the history of moral philosophy must be judged as
somewhat incredible.
In the second chapter of Oft Liberty
, Mill argues against
the suppression of opinion on two grounds. First, if the
opinion which is suppressed is true, those who suppress it
are "deprived of the opportunity of exchanging truth for
erior. Second, even if the suppressed opinion is false,
those who suppress it lose "what is almost as great a bene-
fit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error.” In other words, "we
can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to
stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling
it would be an evil still." 51 He then proceeds to defend
each hypothesis in turn.
The means most often employed for supporting the first
is to emphasize the fallibility of man. Among the many
places in which he makes this assertion, the following is
its most cogent expression:
...the opinion which it is attempted to suppressby authority may possibly be true. Those who desire
51 .
Mill, On Liberty
, p, 1 6.
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to suppress it, of course deny its truth- butthey are not infallible. They have no aithoritvto aecide the question for all mankind, and ex
"
9V0ry°ther person from the means of jud*--in^. lo refuse a hearing to an opinion because'
iS is ~ tha^Lirceroainty is the same thing as absolute certaintv -
infan ot discussion is an assumption of
to rea+^+h-'
ItS condemnati°n may be" allowed
for Llm , thlS common argument, not the worsei being common. 52
Insofar as all claims of absolute truth rest on an
assumption of infallibility, and insofar as the latter is
severely disparaged by Mill as an unwarranted assumption,
it is reasonable to suppose that Mill must have thought
of his own beliefs about happiness as in the fallible
category. His claim in "Utilitarianism" that "happiness
is pleasure, and the absence of pain,"^ his subsequent
claim chat indulging in the higher pleasures is conducive
to a happier life than indulgence in the lower pleasures,
and his assertion that an appeal to competent judges would
he the best way of determining which pleasures were pre-
ferable could not have consistently been regarded by him
to oe what his readers should accept as the final word on
xhe matter. Rather, in light of his position just noted
m On . L
i
b erty , and the additional evidence presented
below, a more plausible interpretation of his discussion
in "Utilitarianism" of what happiness is, is that he was,
52 „Mill,^On Liberty
, p. 17. Other places in the essay
in which the fallibility of man is emphasized are pp. 21 and
56 .
^Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 210.
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on the one hand, generally expressing his own beliefs and
preferences and, on the other, specifically suggesting that
the best means available to an empiricist like himself for
determining which pleasures are best would be to confer with
those who have experienced a wide range of pleasures and take
note of their preferences.
For example, although what competent judges prefer is
some evidence (indeed, perhaps the only evidence available
to a finite being) for making the decision as to what the
content of happiness is, it cannot be taken to entail co-
extensiveness with what happiness is, in fact. Because not
all competent judges can be consulted or, even if they could,
might prefer on one occasion something quite different from
what they preferred on another, any previous judgment as
to what happiness is might have to change on the basis of
the available evidence. For this reason, and the fact that
continued agreement could only be construed as empirical
evidence in support of a particular hypothesis, even though
Mill may ha>/e believed it to be a necessary truth that
happiness is ’pleasure and the absence of pain'*' and that
this was the general preference of competent judges, he
would have nad to concede that he and they might be mistaken.
Mill could not consistently have supposed there to be a
necessary connection between the preferences of competent
judges and what happiness is, in fact. Since competent judges
(and Mill) are not infallible, it is certainly possible that
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their judgments with respect to the content of happiness
can be and/or are mistaken. And this must also extend to
the general judgment that 'happiness' is co-extensive with
pleasure and the absence of pain.
'
will's beliefs about happiness can only appear as the
conclusion of an inductive argument or of a deductive argu-
ment in which the premisses can only be regarded as con-
tingently true. From the argument of man's fallibility,
then, it follows that Mill must have held that what happi-
ness is, m fact, is an open question. It is not even
necessarily, as Mill at one point stated it was, 'pleasure
and the absence of pain.'
—And this, even though he may
have believed or been quite certain that he knew what hap-
pines s was
.
J
54.
^or a discussion of this see the material on Mill'spr
o
01
, pp. 97-IOO and especially Sub-section III-C, pp. 111-26.
i
the thesis it follows that theclaim(s) by any fallible being(s) to know what happiness ismust.be suspect, that any judgment about the content ofhappiness (e.g., that it is 'pleasure and the absence ofpain ) must not be. unquestionably accepted as true. And thisis precisely what it means to speak about happiness as anopen question , i.e., to regard happiness as an open questionis, qui te literally, to be open to the possibility that hap-piness is, m fact, correctly identified with something otherthan pleasure and the absence of pain,' or any other pro-posed equivalency, even though v/e may strongly believe andhave good reason for believing that it is "such and such."
In orief, no proposed definition is to be regarded as havingfinally settled the question as to what happiness really is?Moreover, it should be noted that even if 'pleasure and the*
absence of pain' were to be accepted as an adequate defini-
tion, this would be philosophically uninteresting and, con-
sequently, not very helpful. As will be demonstrated shortly
(pp.103and 102)
,
even though Mill stated that this is what he
9?
Apart from any problems in the proof Itself, brief
consideration of the second half of Mill's proof of the prin-
ciple of utility in "Utilitarianism” will provide additional
evidence for the hypothesis that Mill regarded the actual
content of happiness as an open question; that he was not
committed to a specific theory of intrinsic value of the kind
that has generally been attributed to him; that he was,
rather, committed to a theory of intrinsic value of the kind
discussed above with reference to Narveson.
After having supposedly proven in the first half of the
proof that both individual and the general happiness are in-
trinsically desirable, Mill proceeds in the second half to
prove that happiness is the only thing which is intrinsically
desirable. Here, he is attempting to answer those critics
who claim that there must be '’other ends of human action be-
sides happiness” because it is an empirical fact that people
do seem to desire other things than happiness in and for
themselves. At this point, happiness "has not... proved itself
to be the sole criterion. To do that, it would seem, by the
same rule, necessary to show, not only that people desire
happiness, but chat they never desire anything else,”^^
meant by ’happiness* in actuality he must have intended thisto be interpreted quite differently than has usually been
supposed. In fact, it v/ill be noted that this difference
represents one of his major points of departure with Ben-
tham. Acceptance of this as an adequate definition is seri-
ously problematic for additional reasons noted on pp. 107 - 11 .
^°Mill, "Utilitarianism,” p. 234.
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ever
have
kill replies to his critics by contending that what-
is desired as an end—though it might, at one time,
been desired as a means only— is really a part of hap-
piness
:
Tne ingredients of happiness are very various andeach of them is desirable in itself, and not ^erSv
ciDle°of
S
nt?V+
swellinS an aggregate. The prin-
ce as „ "2* mean that ari^ given Plea-
from’nafn as ^
instance, or any given exemptionp i , for example health, are to he looked
t ° a collective something termed hap-piness, and to be desired on that account. Thev
besides
1
^ and desira
'
ole ^ and for ' themselves
;
bemg means, they are a part of the end.Virxue^ according to the utilitarian doctrine, isnot naturally and originally part of the end, butic is capable of becoming so; and in those who love
.
disinterestedly it has become so, and is de-
sired and cherished, not as a means to happiness,but as a part of their happiness, 57
The second half of the proof can be made explicit by
means of the following argument:
(1) Happiness is desirable as an end.
(2) Whatever is desired as an end is a part of hap-
piness.
(3) If whatever is desired as an end is a part of
happiness, then happiness is the only thing de-
sirable as an end.
Therefore, happiness is the only thing desirable as
an end
.
The first premise is the conclusion of the first half
of the proof (which will be examined later) except that the
^Mill, "Utilitarianism,
" p. 235.
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happiness he's concerned with at this point is interpreted,
for tne purpose of the discussion, as individual rather
than general happiness. Premise ( 2 ) is obviously regarded
by Mill as true; this is evident from the passage above and
from tne fact that he also considers things like health,
money, fame, and power as parts of happiness for those who
pursue them as ends; for if the latter can be parts of hap-
piness, it seems unlikely that other things desired as ends
can be excluded; or, at least, it is not at all obvious how
one would go about doing so. Acceptance of (2) is also
evidenced in the following, in which it seems clear that
he is referring to any object of desire whatever. "What
was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of hap-
piness, has come to be desired for its own sake. In being
desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as oart of
cr o
happiness.' That ( 3 ) is accepted by Mill as true is sub-
stantiated in the last statement in "Utilitarianism" re-
garding this part of the proof:
...if human nature is so constituted as to desire
nothing which is not either a part of happiness or
a means of happiness, we can have no other proof,
and we require no other, that these are the only
things desirable. If so, happiness is the sole
end of human action, and the promotion of it the
test by which 'to judge of all human conduct; from
whence it necessarily follows that it must be the
criterion of morality, since a part is included
in the whole. 59
^Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 236.
^Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 237.
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Tha. Mill regarded the actual content of happiness as an
open question and that he was committed to a theory of
intrinsic value of the kind referred to above with refer-
ence to Narveson now appears to follow readily
.
60
As noted, people desire many things as ends in them-
selves; consequently, virtue, health, money, power and fame
are all mentioned by Mill as parts of happiness. These can
only plausibly be construed as examples, however, as it is
obvious that many other things are pursued as ends in them-
selves (e.g., cars, entertainment, love affairs, etc.).
Whatever it is that people desire as an end, "...from be-
ing a means to happiness, it has come to be itself a prin-
ciple ingredient of the individual's conception of happi-
ness." And as Mill goes on to conclude, this "may be said
oj. the majority of the great objects of human life." 6 '1'
Because Mill says that what is a part of happiness
( what is desired as an end) may differ from individual to
individual and because he believes that whatever is desired
as an en<3 is a part of individual happiness (premise (2)
above), it is safe to conclude that Mill is, in reality, a
roight be thought plausible to attribute to Millthe view that 'happiness] is 'pleasure and the absence ofpain,, and that the particular content or states of hapni-
ness include money, fame, etc. However, although the
above account of the second half of the proof is compatible
with and may support—this contention there are serious
problems with accepting 'pleasure and the absence of pain'
even as what might be called an adequate general definiens.
As is also suggested in the footnote on p. 97 , see pp. 107-11.
6lMill, "Utilitarianism," p. 236 .
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kina of "liberal eudaemonist.
" For we can conclude, with
Narveson (though he was not specifically referring to Milm l),
that
:
oiicj regara as intrinsically good. 62
Mill is not unfairly interpreted, then, as meaning by
pleasure and the absence of pain, ' 'whatever it is that
people regard as intrinsically good.' In fact, it seems
the best interpretation of his intentions. And because
there is a great deal of diversification in what is regarded
by individuals as intrinsically good, it seems to follow
that there is nothing specific Mill had in mind when he
Uo0d the word 'happiness,
' What he personally desired
is what he tnought competent judges would have preferred,
Dut This could only have been thought by him to be a "part
of happiness." Whatever else is desired by others as ends
comprises the other parts. Consequently, the interpreta-
tion which commits Mill to a specific theory of intrinsic
value (such as 'pleasure or the absence of pain,' which
Bentham was clearly committed to), is untenable. All that
can be said is that happiness (v/hatever is desired for its
own sake) has intrinsic value. What happiness is, in fact--
/2
'Narveson, p. 66.
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its actual content is is an open question for Mill.
The only evidence available to finite moral agents is what
it is that people actually desire as ends in themselves, but
this kind of evidence can never justify the inference that
what is desired by someone or some group is, in fact, hap-
piness. It is this theory of intrinsic value which will
result, at the end of this section, in a new formulation
of the principle of utility.^
We can now return to On Liberty for evidence that,
whether or not what happiness is is an open question, Mill
thought that it should be regarded by any moral agent as
if it were.
In the first paragraph of the third chapter of On
Liberty
. Mill asserts*
The
. liberty of the individual must be thus farlimited; he must not make himself a nuisance to
other people. But if he refrains from molest-
mg others in what concerns them, and merely
acts according to his own inclination and judg-
ment in things which concern himself, the same
reasons which show that opinion should be free,
prove also that he should be allowed, without
molestation, to carry his opinions into practice
at his own cost. 64
This brings us to the second argument against the
3It should be' noted that these considerations of the
second part of the proof strongly support the previous con-
tention that Mill's talk of competent judges, etc., was
only a prudential recommendation; i.e., was not to be taken
as the last word from an infallible being with a grasp of
ultimate truth.
64
Mill, On Liberty
, pp, 55-56.
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suppression of opinion, which we now realize is also used
against those who hold the corresponding position regarding
actions, that men should not be
-free to act upon their
opinions—to carry these out in their lives, without hin-
drance, either physical or moral, from their fellow-men,
so long as it is at their own risk and peril. We have
just considered the reasons for not suppressing opinions
that are not known to be false. The reasons for not sup-
pressing those which are known to be false are succinctly
presented by Mill in a summary at the end of the second
chapter as the last two of four grounds for "...the neces-
sity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their
other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and free-
dom of the expression of opinion,"
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only
true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered'"
to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly
contested, i o will, by most of those who receive
it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with
little comprehension or feeling of its rational
grounds. And not only this, but fourthly, the
meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger
of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its
vital effect on the character and conduct: the
dogma becoming mere formal profession, ineffica-
cious for good, but cumbering the ground and pre-
venting the growth of any real and heartfelt con-
viction, from reason or personal experience. 66
63 .
"'Mill, On Liberty
, p. 55*
66
Mill* On Liberty
, p. 52. It might be noted that al-
though Chapter II of On Liberty is concerned with opinions
in general (among which, those about the content of happi-
ness are only one variety)
,
Chapter III is devoted almost
entirely to the question of acting on only one kind of
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This argument applies to the problem of happiness,
generally, as follows: Even if we know at present or might
ln thS fUtUre know with certainty what happiness is, in fact,
and so would know that other opinions are false, stifling
these differing opinions would be wrong. Consequently,
even if we know what happiness is, Mill is advocating that,
as moral agents, we must nevertheless treat the issue of the
real content of happiness as though it were an open question.
According to the passage just referred to, failure to do so
is to dispense with the possibility that beliefs regarding
happiness will be rationally chosen, defended and pursued
with conviction.
It can be concluded, therefore, that on either the
supposition that our opinion as to what happiness is may be
false or on the supposition that we know it to be true, it
io highly unlikely
-chat Mill was committed to a theory of in-
trinsic value .for utilitarianism any more specific than the
one which says generally that "happiness" has intrinsic value.
opinion, viz., those as to the content of the hapoy life,here the position being argued is that people ought to be
•if
u
? ac - on their own. opinions as to what happiness con-
s ^'ts ln * 3<
?
-onS as their doing so is not injurious to
others. This is worth mentioning insofar as it serves asfurther indication of the concern Mill had that each indi-
vidual be allowed to live in accordance with his own con-
ception of happiness, and consequently, supports my previ-
ous conclusion that Mill was not insisting upon appeal toquant itative
. and/or qualitative hierarchies of pleasures
-i or determining the morality of actions—that consulting
such hierarchies in determining the morality of actions
would sometimes require choosing contrary to the pleasure
preferences 01 others and would thereby result in injustices.
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But then, as has previously been noted, we are to interpret
this i or individual happiness as equivalent to ’’whatever it
is that people regard as intrinsically good." In any case,
as moral agents, we are directed to proceed on the assumption
Before leaving this topic, it is necessary to recall
v/hat was stated above with respect to any individual, that
"...the same reasons which show that opinion should be free,
prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation,
to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost." This
means that, ceteris paribus, individuals should be allowed
to adopt their own life-styles (pursue their own means) to
obtain whatever they believe constitutes happiness. At one
point, in which he is emphasizing individual differences,
Mill maintains that the question regarding life-styles must
always be answered relative to the individual; consequently,
given the various opinions about happiness and the possible
life-styles that should be (and are) chosen as means to the
same conception of happiness, the question regarding life-
styles would receive a (perhaps limitless) number of answers.
-‘he same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one,keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in
their best order, while to another it is a distract-
ing burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal
life. Such arc the differences among human beings
in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibility
of pain, and the operation on them of different
physical and moral agencies, that unless there is
a corresponding diversity in their modes of life,
they neither obtain their fair share of happiness,
nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic
stature of which their nature is capable. 6?
^Mill, On Liberty
, p. 68.
106
For our purposes, this means that, ceteris tmHw
,
It would he as wrong to suppress life-styles as means of
ing on one s beliefs as it would be to suppress beliefs
about happiness. And, of course, the same arguments which
apply to opinions about happiness would apply also to opin-
ions about life-styles; i.e., if beliefs with respect to
happiness should not be suppressed, neither should beliefs
with respect to the best means for obtaining happiness (life-
styles). Not only is the content of happiness to be regarded
as an open question but also the best means to happiness is
bo be so regarded. And This includes opinions about de-
sired life-styles. 68
All of this marks a very striking and significant dif-
ference between Mill's utilitarian theory and a theory like
Bentham 1 s
. Because Bentham accepted the position that only
pleasure has intrinsic value, his theory is best termed
hedonistic. Mill's theory, on the other hand, is better
categorized as eudaemonistic
,
for when it is said that Mill
is not committed to a theory of intrinsic value in the usual
sense, it can be inferred from this as also meaning that he
was no o committed to saying that only pleasure has intrinsic
value. Good empiric-ist that he was, Mill held that "the sole
evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable,
68Throughout his third chapter, Mill emphasizes the de-
sirability of a diversity of life-styles within society as
good for the individual as well as for society. In particu-
lar, see pp. 56-60 and 67.
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is that people do actually desire it," 6? meaning that the
only evidence we have for anything’s having intrinsic value
is gained by observing whatever it is that people desire as
ends m themselves. However, since whatever is desired as
an end in itself is thought by Mill to be a part of happi-
ness (as previously demonstrated) and because what is desired
for itself is often only remotely— if al all—connected with
what is ordinarily meant by pleasure, the only conclusion one
can infer from the available evidence is that happiness—what
ever people desire for its own sake—has intrinsic value. 70
If it is thought doubtful that one might desire some-
thing as an end with no corresponding thought or expectation
of ensuing pleasure, one might consider, for example, the
6q
Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 234 .
70Of course, given Mill's position with respect to the
3
UeS
J:i
0n as w^a 'c happiness is, to interpret 'hanniness
’
lor the purposes of the employment of utilitarian theory as
whatever people desire for its own sake' must also be re-garded as uncertain, though based on the best available
evidence (for another example of Mill's attitude with re-
spect
-to evidence^, see the
^
discussion of the first part of theproof, ^pp, H5“12o. In brief, it has been argued that, given
the evidence, the interpretation as to what happiness is can-
not be made any more specific than this. As will later bediscussed, there are certain restrictions which must be placed
on those desires for happiness which necessitate harming
others in the process of satisfaction, such that we might
conveniently distinguish between what might be called "legiti-
mate desires" and "illegitimate desires" (meaning, by the°lat-
ter, "those which are only satisfied at the expense of harm-
ing someone," and, by the former, the negation of this). What
is meant by "harm" will also be discussed later. There are
perhaps, in addition, qualifications that must later be made
concerning what people regard as having moral value.
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pursuits of some kinds of religious ascetics, who seem to
pursue as ends what would ordinarily be classified as pain-
e..p^riences
. if such things as sleeping on beds of nails
and sitting for hours at a time contemplating one’s navel are
to be included as instances of pursuing pleasure, it must
surely be admitted that "pleasure” has become a useless con-
cept; it is no longer capable of being used to distinguish
the agreeable from the disagreeable because its extension
now seems to be every and any kind of experience whatever.
Consequently, it is only by a very gross and ill-conceived
extension of the term that desiring, as ends, things like the
above can also be said to be instances of desiring pleasure.
These are not the activities which one v/ould normally be
attributing to someone in describing him as a hedonist. Yet
ohis is what we must do if, even in light of the second part
of the "proof," we insist on categorising Mill as a hedonistic
utilitarian.
Mill plainly seems to be arguing in the second half of
the proof that people pursue as ends either pleasure or only
tnose tnings which are so intimately linked with pleasure that
though there is no conscious thought of the connection whenever
they are desired, there is, through long association, what
might be called an unconscious connection. All in all, how-
ever, it seems apparent that what his position really commits
him to is the admission that some things can be (and are) pur-
sued as ends (even for the first time) with no conscious thought
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of association with pleasure; consequently, that the best-
perhaps only-evidence we have, as moral agents, regarding
the actual content of individual happiness is (with the neces-
sary qualifications) just what we have said it is—whatever
people desire for its own sake
.
71 And because it is possible
to desire otner things as ends than pleasure, Mill must be
interpreted as a eudaemonist and not a hedonist.
Even if it were plausible to interpret Mill as a hedon-
ist, it is worthwhile noting that the problem of deciding just
v/hat pleasure is, is a major difficulty. As Narveson admits,
m the first part of a discussion of pleasure, what it is
is no easy question, and I do not intend to answer it in a
precise way .” 72 After having considered at. some' length the
insight that others have offered in the attempt to deal with
the problem, he concludes with the observation that:
...when writers attempt to define the notions ofpleasure and enjoyment, invariably they end up say-mg, m one way or another, that they consist ofpro-attitude or positive evaluation of some experi-
ence on its own account. If this is so, then small
wonder that ’psychological hedonism’ was so popular
71Though it is somewhat difficult to imagine, I suspectit would . be possible for one to desire as ends some of thethings Mill mentioned as examples of parts of happiness (e.g.
money and health) with no thought of resulting pleasure, even
when they are first desired. For more nlausible examples,
consider the pursuit of knowledge or self-realization, which
many might originally desire with no thought of a pleasant
result, in the ordinary sense of the term.
72
Nar-veson, p. 63.
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is regaled
In the lengthy dehate over intrinsic goods, carried out
throughout the history of moral philosophy, many have denied
that pleasure is a good at all and many have held that there
are, in any case, other good things besides pleasure. For
ampl^, tioor. s ideal utilitarian” theory was meant to ob-
literate the identification of good with pleasure, as Moore
regarded "good” as a primitive term which was correctly ap-
plied to many other things held to be good in themselves be-
sides pleasure. For at least two reasons, it is clear that
this is not the kind of debate that Mill could have been con-
ce^n-d ^oout. First, metaphysical or intuitionist assertions
about intrinsic goodness which are not susceptible to empiri-
cal confirmation or refutation would have to have been regard-
ed by Mill as meaningless. The available evidence shows that
things desired as ends are multifarious; they are, says Mill,
to be looked upon as parts of happiness; what connection they
have with what is really intrinsically valuable (what has been
called 'objective” intrinsic value) cannot be known on the
basis of the only evidence which finite moral agents have
available to them. Second, and more importantly, on the basis
ol' previous discussion of On Liberty and pleasure hierarchies,
it is abundantly clear that whatever it is that is regarded
by moral agents as having intrinsic worth is not something
that Mill thought utilitarians should be concerned about,
73Narveson, p. 65.
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Signer to condemn or to recommend, in anything other than a
prudential sense. 73 In the essay On liberty and elsewhere,
it is apparent that Mill regards the individual's conception
of happiness—as well as his style of living—as up to the
individual, and not something that the moral theorist should
ever suggest or consider imposing on others.
Suffice it to say that the concept of oleasure is
either vacuous or its status as an intrinsic good is suffi-
ciently nebulous so as to be of little or no value in the
calculation of consequences and therefore in the determina-
tion of the morality of actions. As will be discussed further
on, the implication is that calculation of consequences in
the manner urged by Bentham's hedonic calculus is, for finite
moral agents, theoretically impossible.
—ab-section Ill—C: frill's theory of intrinsic value -—
th e general happiness
. Thus far, we have only considered
what Mill meant by individual happiness. We reached our con-
clusions partly through analysis of the second half of Mill’s
proof; we can discern what he meant by the ’’general happi-
ness” if we examine the first half of the proof. It will be
helpful if we first discuss briefly an essay by Everett W.
Hall, who attempts t.o demonstrate that Mill was not attempt-
ing a strict proof and, consequently, that objections to the
73 •
-'With the qualification (see p. 107n) that the result-
ing desires are "legitimate;” i.e., that their fulfillment
would not be other-regarding and harmful.
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proo; which are based on the assumption that he was, are
easily dispensed with.
-Bradley, like Moore, is assuming
that our 'great modem logician,' as he derisively charac-
terized Mill, must be presenting in his 'proof of the prin-
ciple of utility a strict logical deduction. It is high time
that this whole interpretation be fundamentally and decisively
challenged. "
^
Hall claims that Mill, as an empiricist, clearly dis-
avows any attempt to give a strict proof of the principle of
utility. Because he is an opponent of all forms of intuition
and a priorism, and, consequently, cannot appeal to self-
evidence or inductive generalization (because the rightness
or wrongness of individual acts is not open to direct per-
ception)
,
Mill is not attempting "to prove the principle of
utility, but to make it acceptable to reasonable men."^^
He offers an interpretation of what Mill is doing here
which he claims "at least makes sense of Mill's argument as
a whole. His procedure is to draw an analogy between an
empiricist's approach to the first principle in epistemology
and the first principles of ethics. He explains that "in the
area of knowledge the empiricist cannot strictly prove his
74
Everett W. Hall, "The 'Proof of Utility in Bentham
and Mill," in Mill, A Collection of Critical Essays
, ed.
J. B. Schneewind (Garden City, New York; Doubleday & Co.,
Inc., Anchor Book's, 1968), p. 156.
75Hall, p. 159.
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first principle," it is not possible for him to use an in-
ductive argument or to deduce from a more ultimate principle
that there are no unobserved entities, no visible things
never seen, audible occurrences never heard, etc. However,
he can, claims Hall,
...set it up as a plausible principle (as a 'mean-ing criterion,
'
^ as a later positivist put it) that
any epistemological theory that requires visible
or audible entities that are never seen or heardis talking nonsense. The only test anyone can
seriously propose that a thing is visible is thatit is actually seen. A theory that conflicts with
the requirement will just not be accented by reason-
able people.
It is the same in ethical theory:
A theory
_
that sets up as ends desirable in them-
selves (i.e., good, not simply capable of being de-
sired), states of affairs that nobody ever desires
is
.
just academic and unrealistic. "If the end
which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself
v/ere not, in theory and practice, acknowledged to
be an end, nothing could ever convince any person
that it was so." That is, if no one appealed to
the greatest happiness to justify ethical prin-
ciples, or ever in practice desired the greatest
happiness, no considerations capable of getting
reasonable people to accept that principle as
ethically ultimate could be presented. Let us
call this the requirement, directed toward any
^
ethical first principle, of "psychological realism.
Contrary to Hall, it is my contention that the first
half of Mill's proof can plausibly be interpreted as con-
taining two separate proofs--a proof that individual happi-
ness is desirable followed by a proof that the general hap-
piness is desirable. For the sake of convenience, they will
be referred to in the following as I a and 1^,, respectively.
76
'Hall
,
pp. 160-161.
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It is Hall s contention that, for Mill, neither could he con-
strued as an inductive or deductive proof. On the contrary,
I believe uhe conclusion of is an inductive generalization
and the conclusion of 1^ (given what Mill means by "general
happiness") can be established as the conclusion of a de-
ductive argument.
Something needs to be said at this point about Mill's
contention, in the first chapter of "Utilitarianism," that
any proof of the principle of utility "cannot be proof in
the ordinary and popular meaning of the term," that "ques-
tions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof.
Although Hall has taken these statements to mean that Mill
was asserting the impossibility of constructing either in-
ductive or deductive arguments and has employed this in-
terpretation to exonerate Mill from accusations that he
has made use of logical fallacies in his proof, I find it
difficult to believe that inductive and deductive arguments
could not have been unproblematically constructed by Mill
in support of his ultimate ethical principle. Given our
knowledge of his empiricist stance, plus plausible in-
terpretations of the passages in "Utilitarianism" in which
he talks about the proof, it seems reasonably certain that
the employment of inductive and deductive arguments is not
something that Mill v/ould have thought impossible. However,
conceding that he might have thought it impossible, there
"^Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 207.
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seems to be no substantial reason for his adopting this
position, since appealing to inductive and deductive proofs
(although with conclusions that have less than lOOfo prob-
ability of being true) is something that appears to have been
clearly open to him. In this case, what he meant or should
have meant in the passages quoted above was merely that em-
pirical propositions (in this case, "individual and/or gen-
eral happiness is desirable" ) can never be completely con-
firmed, an assertion that is much less difficult to accept
than the one Hall attributes to him.
In brief, it is my contention that the following
analysis of the first part of Mill's proof as a separate
inductive and deductive proof is—contrary to Hall's analysis
--much more in accordance with his empiricist stance; more-
over--as with Hall's analysis--it is not susceptible to
the objection that he was employing logical fallacies.
Essentially, there are three reasons why the first
half of the proof should be looked upon as consisting of
two parts, I and I
fe
. In the first place, Mill made a point
of maintaining that "the sole evidence it is possible to
produce that anything is desirable is that people actually
do desire it." Because both individual and general happi-
ness were thought by Mill to be desirable, it is reason-
able to suppose that this passage was meant to apply to
both, with the result that the desirability of each kind
of happiness is proven as the conclusion of a separate
116
inductive argument
.
78 Secondly, it is only in this way that
it is possible to avoid attributing to Mill the empirically
vacuous theory of psychological hedonism, thereby avoiding
having to ascribe to him a position which is blatantly in-
consistent with his empiricist stance. Finally, if there
were not this division, it would be difficult to make much
sense of the second half of the proof since (as will soon be
shown) it is obvious that the "parts of happiness" referred
to are to be thought of as parts of both individual and
general happiness. The conclusion, then, is to be inter-
preted as referring to both individual and general happiness,
but in order for it to follow, there needs to be a premise
to the ef fec
t
that both individual and general happiness are
desirable (a premise which must be the result of the con-
junction of the conclusions from two separate arguments). 7 ^
It is Hall's contention that, in arguing for the de-
sirability of the general happiness, Mill is assuming the
truth of psychological hedonism. This, he thinks, is the
only plausible interpretation of that passage in which Mill
says that "each person, so far as he believes it to be
78
However, it will be argued that although the desir-
ability of individual happiness appears as the conclusion
of an inductive argument, the desirability of the general
happiness appears as the conclusion of a deductive argu-
ment. Nevertheless, this is not inconsistent with the
assertion that Mill intended two separate proofs in this half.
79
'The second half of the proof was previously discussed
in terms of individual happiness only, for the purpose of ex-
plicating what Mill meant by individual happiness.
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attainable, desires his own happiness." However, it can be
much more plausibly contended that Mill, as an avowed em-
piricist, must have asserted this as a contingent proposition,
which he realized could quite possibly be (or become) false.
Bearing m mind that, upon analysis, the position of psycho-
logical hedonism is found to be held as a necessary truth
(in the sense that its adherents allow no evidence to count
against it), it would, I think, have been quite inconsistent
of him to subscribe to such an empirically vacuous position.
Consequently, the proposition that "everybody desires his
ov/n happiness (equivalent to the passage above) was most
likely thought ox by Mill as the conclusion of an inductive
argument in which the degree of probability of the conclu-
sion's being true is dependent on the strength of the evi-
dence presented in the premisses:
(1) Individual A desires his ov/n happiness.
(2) Individual B desires his own happiness.
Therefore, it is probable that everybody desires
his own happiness.
As an empiricist who maintained that "the sole evi-
dence it is possible to produce that anything is good is
8 0Good evidence that Mill rejected psychological ego-
ism is found in Mill's essay on Bentham in John Stuart Mill
on Bentham and Coleridme
,
ed, F. R. Leavis (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 19^2 ) , pp. 66-6?.
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that people actually do desire it," it is also plausible to
interpret Mill as having thought of this same evidence as
support for the desirability of individual happiness as the
conclusion of an inductive argument. Part I of Mill's
a
proof should than be set up as an inductive argument with
the same premises as the argument above. Again, the degree
of probability of the conclusion's truth is dependent upon
the strength of the evidence presented in the premisses:
(1) Individual A desires his own haopiness.
(2) Individual B desires his own happiness.
Therefore, it is probable that individual happiness
is desirable. °l
The conclusion’s having been established with a high
degree of probability means, of course, that individual
happiness is a good worth aiming at, a worthwhile objec-
tive that we can recommend to others, etc., from a pru-
dential standpoint. Its connection with morality, though
Mill, of course, would have thought the conclusion
established with a very high degree of probability, as it
was undoubtedly inconceivable for him--as for us—that there
could be anyone ( or' very many) who did not desire to be
happy. However, in the true spirit of empiricism, because
it is a fact that not everyone who has lived or will live can
be questioned on the matter, the conclusion is necessarily
something less than lOOfo probable. It could, of course,
turn out sometime in the future that the conclusion would
be very weakly supported if many or all of those of some
future generation should, for some reason (insanity, per-
haps) not desire to be happy.
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not immediately apparent at this point, is evidenced by the
part it plays as a premise in the proof for the desirability
of the general happiness, to which we now turn.
Part I
fe
, however, immediately poses a problem, for if
the only evidence that it is possible to produce that any-
ohing is good is that people actually desire it, the em-
pirical evidence in support of the general happiness as a
good will turn out to be embarrassingly weak. That is, it
seems safe to say that the number of individuals who desire
the general happiness is far less than those who desire
their own individual happiness. As a consequence, the con-
clusion of the following inductive argument is going to be
less probable
--perhaps far less—than the conclusion of the
previous argument for the intrinsic goodness of individual
happiness t
(1) A desires the general happiness.
(2) B desires the general happiness.
Therefore, it is probable that the general happi-
ness is desirable.
As this is presumably the most important part of the
first half of the proof, since the principle of utility is
formulated with reference to the general happiness (the
greatest happiness of the greatest number) as the end by
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which one is to determine the morality of actions, this re-
suit must be regarded as most unfortunate.
At this point, however, we must turn to another point
Hall makes about Mill's proof:
mill cannot and does not argue that each seeks thegeneral happiness or that society as a whole some-how has its own motives, over and above those of its
members, and that these are directed toward the gen-
?ral J.u
appiness
* Ra 'ther
» Mill simply says (anticipat-lng ohe outcome of step 2 and the acceptance of thepleasure of each individual as a good ) that, sincehe pleasure of each is a good, the sum of these
must be a good: "each person's happiness is a goodto that person, and the general happiness, therefore,
a good to
. the aggregate of all persons.” Or, as he
explains in a letter: "I merely meant in this par-
ticular sentence to argue that, since A's happiness
is a good, B's is a good, etc., the sum of all
these goods must be a good. ”82
If Hall is right here about what he takes Mill to be
doing in this part of the proof, then it is obvious that the
objections raised by Moore, Bradley, and others simply don't
hold. As Hall goes on to say, "This may be incorrect; it
may be that goods cannot be added, though surely it is not
just obvious that Mill is mistaken in this matter. However
that may be, Mill is clearly not trying to prove /~as claimed
by Moore and Bradley, for example/ that ' because everybody
desires his own pleasure, therefore everybody desires the
pleasure of everybody else.'” 88
I should like to add here some support for Mill's pro-
82Hall, pp. 161-162.
83Hall, p. 162.
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cedure, assuming that Hall has interpreted it correctly.
Although rail's claiming that the sum of individually good
things is also good seems to be an instance of the informal
lallacy of composition—inferring that a property charac-
teristic of the parts is also characteristic of the whole
—
it certainly is not obvious that it is. First of all, not
all instances of inferring from the property of a part that
the same property characterizes the whole are instances of
the fallacy of composition. For example, although it is
certainly fallacious to argue that if all the individual
parts of an engine are light, the engine itself is light,
it unproblematic ally follows that if each of the apples of
a bushel is sweet, the entire bushel of apples is sweet.
Secondly, it is not at all apparent that the inference that
the sum of individually good things is good is not more
like the second unproblematic example than like the first.
In other words, if Hall's interpretation is correct, there
seems to be no compelling reason(s) for concluding that
Mill has employed a logical fallacy; rather, there seems
more reason to believe that he wasn't, though it won't be
argued for further here.
However, if it is clear that Mill was not trying to
prove what Moore and Bradley contended he was, it is also
clear that 1^ no longer has to be interpreted as an in-
ductive argument similar to I . Contrary to Hall's asser-
tion that no strict proof is possible or intended, with
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the concept of general happiness defined as it is, it is
possiole uo interpret 1^ as a deductive argument. Whether
Mill intended this or not, it was clearly open to him if
what he meant by general happiness is in accord with Hall's
interpretation. Part 1^ can now be constructed as follows:
(1) Individual happiness is desirable.
(2) On the basis of (1), A's happiness is a good,
B*s is a good, C's is a good, ...etc.
(3) If A’s happiness is a good, B's is a good, C's
is a good, ...etc., then the sum of A's, B's,
C*s, ...etc. happiness is desirable.
(^) 'General happiness' =df 'the sum of A's, B's,
C's, ...etc. happiness.'
(5) Therefore, the general happiness is desirable.
Premise (1) is the conclusion of 1^; (2) follows analytic-
ally from (l) in that 'desirable' for Mill is a synonym for
'good;' (3) and (4) must have been acceptable to Mill as
following from the meaning of the passage "the general
happiness is good to the aggregate of all persons," on
the assumption that Hall's interpretation is correct. And
(3) is acceptable to us if, as suggested above, Mill was
not guilty of employing a logical fallacy.
As the conclusion of a deductively valid argument,
( 5) '
s
truth is 100% probable on the assumption that all the
premisses are true. In terms of soundness, however, because
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premise (1) is the conclusion of an inductive argument and
so is a contingent proposition, (5)'s truth is not, in fact,
100/6 probable. This result is in accordance with the position
we have previously maintained Mill would have subscribed to—
that empirical propositions cannot be completely confirmed.
There are several reasons for accepting Hall's in-
terpretation as to what Mill meant by the general happiness,
not the least of which are the evidence Hall provides and
the fact that it allows one to make sense of Mill's proof.
In addition, however, it is supported by what has previously
been argued is what Mill meant by individual happiness.
Here it was argued that there is no one conception of in-
dividual happiness which everyone must strive for; Mill's
primary concern was that each individual should be able to
live according to his own conception of happiness, with the
restriction that his doing so did not harm others unneces-
84
sarily. Given this conception of individual happiness,
the most plausible way of characterizing the general hap-
piness seems to be to say—-not that it is some kind of ab-
straction, somehow independent of individual happiness-~but
R4
'Unnecessarily' is to be interpreted as 'without
moral justification. 8 It is essential to add this, since it
is clear that there- are some occasions on which to harm
others would be morally justified; e.g.
,
when all the al-
ternatives available to a moral agent involve harming others
and not at least one action, if performed, would result in
less harm than the others. The necessary conditions for the
moral justification of harm are elaborated on in parts of
Chapters III and IV of this work; see, for example, Sections
I and II of Chapter III.
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tha^, in any given society, the general happiness is equal to
the sum of all those living within it who are happy. Con-
sequently, if the general happiness is equivalent to the sum
O-f 2-11 those v/ho are individually happy, then, in any given
society, the general happiness would he at a maximum if as
many individual members as possible were living as they
chose, according to their own conception of happiness; i.e,,
if as many members as possible were individually happy. It
would follow that, in any society, the degree of general
happiness within it would be, at any one time, directly pro-
portional to the percentage of its populace enjoying indi-
vidual happiness.
At this point it should be noted that, because some
individual conceptions of happiness (what is desired for
its own sake) v/ould, if acted upon, seriously infringe
upon and hamper the efforts of others in the pursuit of
their own conceptions of happiness, it is apparent that the
general happiness can be maximized only if some such de-
sires are classified as "illigitimate. " In other words,
in order to maximize the general happiness, it is neces-
sary to differentiate between two conceptions of happiness:
"whatever is legitimately desired for its own sake" and
"whatever is illegitimately desired for its own sake," and
to do whatever possible to prevent the latter from being
O c'
acted upon. 9
^Something is legitimately desired for its own sake if
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Considering what Mill meant by general happiness, it is
now apparent that there is a close logical relationship be-
tween it and individual happiness, in that pursuing individu-
al happiness is the same as pursuing a part of the general
happiness and pursuing the general happiness is nothing other
than pursuing its parts.^ We can now return to the second
and only if satisfying or attempting to satisfy the desire
would not result in. harming someone unnecessarily. Con-
versely
,
something is illegitimately desired for its own saken
,
and only if, satisfying or attempting to satisfy a desire
would^ result in harming someone unnecessarily. It is neces-
sary, here only to note the necessity for making the generaldistinction; it is the purpose of Chanter III to relate thedistinction to specific desires, to define the concept of
.harm em
. ihat people should have the general right to sat-isfy their legitimate desires is argued on p.142. Mill, of
course, argued for this distinction at several places in On
Ljfberu^y. ror example: “All that makes existence valuable to
anyone, depends on the enforcement of restraints on the ac-
tions of other people'' (u. 5; see also n. 63 ). He also rec-
ognized the great difficulty involved in making specific de-
cisions in this regard: "What these rules should be is the
principle question in human affairs" (p. 5). From now on,
the phrase "whatever is legitimately desired for its own sake"
will be freely employed when speaking of the content of indi-
vidual happiness.
® This is not to be construed as meaning that one's mor-
al duty is to. do his best to see that he is individually happy;
insofar as this is a duty at all, it is a prudential one.
Rather, as will later be made clear, our moral duty is, rough-
ly, as Mill expressed it in On Liberty
,
not to harm others;
i.e., not to interfere with their pursuits of happiness, un-
less their doing so is harmful to others and, whenever possi-
ble, to prevent others from interfering with anyone's harmless
pursuits. Our duty, then, as moral agents, is not to make
people individually happy but to allow them the opportunity to
become so. In this way, we guarantee the optimum conditions
for the growth and development of individual (and, consequently,
the general) happiness. Mill thought of individual happiness
as an extrinsic as well as an intrinsic good. For example:
"In proportion to the development of his individuality, each
person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore
capable of becoming more valuable to others" (p. 63 ). He goes
on, in the next few pages, to elaborate on this.
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hal_i Ox tne prooi
,
previously considered only with reference
to individual happiness. With the knowledge that both in-
dividual and the general happiness were regarded by Mill as
having intrinsic worth (there having been a separate proof
for each)
,
and that there is an intiinate logical relation-
ship between them, it is also apparent that both are to be
included in uhe second half. It is now correctly set up
as follows:
(1) (Individual and the general) happiness is
desirable
.
(2) Whatever is desired as an end is a part of
(individual and the general) happiness.
(3) If whatever is desired as an end is a part
of (individual and the general) happiness,
then (individual and the general) happiness
is the only thing desirable as an end.
(4) Therefore, (individual and the general) happi-
ness is the only thing desirable as an end.
Sub-section III-D: effect of Mill’s theory of in-
trinsic value on the calculation of consequences
. It has
been established that, for Mill, the general happiness for
any society is equal to the sum of its members who are happy,
that in order to maximize the general happiness the content of
individual happiness is to be interpreted as "whatever is
legitimately desired for its own sake," and that, consequently,
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pleasure is not the only thing that can be judged by the
theory to be intrinsically good. It can now be demonstrated
that a further consequence of all this, and one which serves
to mark another major difference between Mill's theory and
one like Bentham's is that it is theoretically impossible
for a moral agent to calculate and determine, with any de-
gree of certainty, whether actions are metaphysically (ob-
jectively) right or wrong. 8 ^ One reason for this is the
fact that, for finite moral agents, what happiness is, in
fact, is an open question. Since a decision on this issue
is a necessary condition for being able to determine meta-
physical rightness and wrongness, it is theoretically im-
possible for a finite moral agent to know whether any given
action is metaphysically right or wrong, 88
8 *7
' The claim. being made and supported in the next few
pages is that it is theoretically impossible (for an ex-
planation of this term, see footnote immediately below)
to know. which acts are metaphysically right or wrong, etc.
The claim is not that we can't know any empirical truths,
though it has been asserted that Mill subscribed to the po-
sition that general empirical propositions cannot be com-
pletely confirmed (see material on first part of the proof,
pp. 111-126.) The conditions under which one could justifi-
ably
.
claim, metaphysical knowledge of this type are roughly
specified in a footnote on p.131. For the distinction be-
tween metaphysical and non-metaphysical rightness, etc,,
see pp. 79-86; also, pp. 132-135.
88The term 'theoretically impossible' is not meant
in the strict logical sense, according to which it is logic-
ally impossible that one could ever accomplish whatever is
so regarded. Obviously there is no logical restriction in
this sense on one's knowing what happiness is, in fact (or
on one's finiteness—non-omniscience— if it is this which
is responsible for the lack of such knowledge). But given
the absence of this knowledge (and the fact of one's finite
--non-omniscient--nature)
,
it is impossible in a very strong
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Bentham and other utilitarians have supposed that happiness
is identical with pleasure. If this assumption were accept-
aole, it would seem that the difficulties encountered in
calculating the consequences of actions (and so determining
their morality) could be categorized as merely practical.
Consequently, it would be theoretically possible to overcome
these difficulties by, for example, developing the technology
for implanting a sensing device in the pleasure center of
everyone's brain and observing on a pleasure-meter the effects
of innumerable actions. Over a long period of study and ob-
servation, it would become possible to predict, with a great
deal of accuracy, which actions among those available as al-
ternatives on any occasion of choice, would be productive of
the most pleasure for all those affected and, therefore, which
action would be morally right. Such a system might be justi-
fiably regarded as a paradigm situation so far as the measure-
ment of pleasure is concerned and v/ould certainly be the
ideal for the employment of Bentham's “hedonic calculus .” 89
—perhaps more than merely practical—sense that such a be-
ing could employ utilitarian theory for attaining knowledge
as to which actions are metaphysically right or wrong. Given
that knowing what happiness is, in fact, is a necessary con-
dition for knowledge of metaphysical rightness and wrongness,
it is in this sense that the term 'theoretically impossible'
is intended.
89 .Given a sufficient degree of sophistication, such a
pleasure-measuring device could more or less adequately take
into account all of the “circumstances" for measuring quan-
tities of pleasure which Bentham deemed important— " intens ity ,
"
"duration," "certainty or uncertainty," "propinquity or re-
moteness," "fecundity" and "purity." At least I see no
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However, because it has been observed that, according to
Mill, what happiness is, in fact, is an open question or that,
.
in any case, it is to be looked upon by any moral agent as if
it were, using such a pleasure-measuring device would be to
presuppose that ’happiness’ is identical with 'pleasure (and
the absence of pain)’ and so would have to be regarded as
theoretically objectionable. In short, because Mill's theory
is not committed to any theory of intrinsic value sufficiently
specific that one could conclude that only pleasure or some
other particular mental state has intrinsic value, it is theo-
retically objectionable to proceed as if it were so commit-
ted; and if one proceeds as if it weren’t (as one should), it
is theoretically impossible, in employing it, to know whether
actions are metaphysically right or wrong. The only thing
which has intrinsic value is happiness and, on the basis of
the only available evidence, this is to be interpreted by
any finite moral agent as "whatever it is that is legitimately
desired.” From a metaphysical perspective, then, the content
of happiness is an open question and, since it is not known
what to calculate with reference to, it is obvious that we
cannot, so to speak, even get started with the metaphysical
calculation process.
^
reason why it wouldn't be theoretically possible to do so.
For Bentham's description of these terms, see "An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," Collected Works
cf Jeremy Bentham
, pp. 38-39.
90However, even if one were able to calculate with ref-
erence to pleasure and/or some other intrinsic good(s) (and
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This brings us to the old practical difficulty of cal-
culating consequences. Suppose that it were known what hap-
piness is, in i act, and that (operating with a theory other
than Mill's) moral agents are not required to proceed as if
the question of happiness were open. Even though one could
now operate as a utilitarian with a substantive theory of
intrinsic value, it would still be (at least^1 ) practically
impossible for finite moral agents to know the extent and/
or the nature of all of the effects of their actions. Bear-
ing in mind that a right action, metaphysically speaking,
was defined as one v/hich is intentional and such that "there
is no alternative act which is a means to less unhappiness
or greater nappiness, to whoever is mads unhappy or happy by
the act," and that "whoever is made unhappy or happy by the
act was taxen to include "the whole of sentient creation,
so. employ a classical formulation of the principle of utility)
this would presumably result in all of the previously noted
objections in the early part of Chapter I with regard to dis-
tributive justice, etc. Because, in Mill’s theory, the ques-
tion as to what happiness is, is open; and it is theoretic-
ally impossible to calculate in this way, the theory is able
to avoid objections like those which are based on the assump-
tion that one is able to use the theory for making this kind
of quantitative calculation. The specific demonstration of
this is the concern of Chapter IV.
°1
'
'At least* is used because, although it is certain
that the difficulty is practical, it is not certain that it
is not also theoretical (in the sense defined above), inso-
far as the knowledge of the effects of actions might require
an omniscient being; hence, use of the term ’finite* to quali-
fy 'moral agent' v/ould preclude the possibility of being able
to know the extent and/or nature of the consequences of one’s
actions, etc.
92See p. ?4-75, footnote.
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it cannot be seriously doubted that we cannot know the extent
and/or nature of the effects of our actions and, consequently,
cannot know that our moral judgments are in accord with what
is really (i.e., objectively or metaphysically) right and
wrong, etc. Though we might regard this as only a practical
difficulty (in that the theory now allows us to know what
has intrinsic value), insofar as knowledge of the nature and/
or extent of the consequences of actions is a necessary—
though not sufficient
—condition for having knowledge of
metaphysical rightness or wrongness, absence of this knowl-
edge of consequences can be said to constitute an additional
reason why it is theoretically impossible (in the sense de-
fined) to know when and if actions are metaphysically right
or wrong.
It is not necessary to maintain that we cannot know
the utility 01 a given act because the consequences of our
acts go off into the indefinite future (although this may
be true). It is enough to realize that we do not know who
93Although I do not wish to become involved in a dis-
cussion oi epistemological theories of the necessary con-
ditions for knowledge, I am assuming that it is not suffi-
cient for knowing that P is true (where P is some proposi-
tion asserting the metaphysical rightness or wrongness of
some action)
,
that one believes that P is true and that P
is true, in fact. I 'am contending that at least two other
conditions are required in order to have knowledge that P
is true; viz
.
,
knowing that two other propositions are true:
one with respect to the nature and extent of consequences;
the other with respect to what happiness is, in fact. To
go on and attempt to specify the conditions under which one
would know that the latter are true (and so avoid the cir-
cularity of this procedure) would be to delve unnecessarily
into a superfluous epistemological diversion.
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or what to include as significantly affected by our actions
or how they are affected, so we cannot know who or what to
include in calculating the consequences. Thus, even though
we might know what happiness is, in fact, we still cannot
know that our moral judgments are objectively true (at least
not at our present level of knowledge about the relation of
cause and effect, etc.). Consequently, a rational moral agent
will look for the best method available for determining which
actions maximize happiness on the basis of the evidence avail-
able. It is to this that we now turn.
Sub- section III-E: Objectively Rjght
1
, Objectively
—
and the principle of utility corresponding to each
,
ihe present situation can be illustrated by distinguishing
between three concepts of rightness. We can speak about an
action’s being right from three different perspectives
:
(1) Objectively Right
-,
: This is what has been re-
ferred to previously as "metaphysical rightness" or "what
is right, in fact,” and, as has been noted, is not the kind
of predicate which finite moral agents can knowingly use
to characterize actions. It is only possible to use it
abstractly; thus we say that an action is Objectively Eighty
if, and only if, among the alternative actions available on
any occasion of choice, it maximizes the general happiness,
where the general happiness can be taken as meaning the sum
of those who are individually happy. But it is recognized
that it cannot be known which action is right in this sense
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because sentient beings may be affected by our actions which
we're not aware of, or they may be affected in ways we're
not a,/are of, in addition, what individual happiness is, in
fact, is something we do not know. 9^
(2)
: This is the concept of right-
ness which is based on the evidence that a finite moral agent
has regarding the content of individual happiness. As has
been demonstrated, Mill's conclusion was that the only evi-
dence we have is "whatever people regard as intrinsically
good. Where the concept of the general happiness remains
ohe same, we will say that an action is Objectively Rightg
if, and only if, among the alternative actions available
on any occasion of choice, it maximizes the general happi-
ness, where the general happiness is the sum of all those
who are individually happy and where the content of individual
happiness is taken to be whatever it is that is desired for
its own sake. Because in formulating the concept of Ob-
jective Rightness
2
one is attempting to determing what is
Objectively Eighty, but is restricted to the only evidence
available, it is apparent that Objective Rightness
2
is
q4A comment by Narveson is worth noting with regard to
the uselessness of Objective Rightness., from the standpoint
of the . agent: "...if the applicability of a predicate is
sufficiently difficult or obscure, that in itself constitutes
a reason for not placing very much weight on the outcome. It
it surely contrary to the general interest to require people
to spend too .much time trying to make precise calculations of
happiness or unhappiness, so long as methods for doing so are
not available." (pp. 40-41),
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logically dependent, in an important sense, on Objective
Righ vness^
. ( w^y this is so will become more apparent by
comparing Objective Rightness^ with the concept of Subjec-
tive Rightness, discussed below.) Of course, it is possible
that Objective Rightness
2 is equivalent to Objective Right-
ness
l in some or all moral situations, though this point is,
for all practical purposes, irrelevant; because a moral
agent cannot know what is Objectively Right^j even if he
knows what is Objectively Right
2 ,
it follows that, on any
given occasion, he cannot know whether or not they are
equivalent.
(3) Subjectively Right ; It is desirable to define
this predicate so as to make certain that what is meant
by it is not confused with Objectively Right^ This is
used to refer to whatever the agent thinks is right, in-
dependent of any rational process based on available sources
of evidence. He might, for example, decide upon the right
action in any moral situation by flipping a coin. Thus,
an action is said to be subjectively right if, and only
if, the agent performing the action thinks that the action
is right. It is possible that an action which is subjec-
tively right is also Objectively Right-^ or Objectively
Right
2 (or both, if they were co-extensional predicates for
that action) but the agent, in this case, would not know or
be concerned that they were.
It may now be clearly stated that when a utilitarian
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of the kind we're concerned about makes judgments about the
objective rightness of actions he can only be said to do so,
as a rational moral agent, from the perspective of Objective
Rightness^. Because this is formulated with respect to the
evidence that a finite moral agent has regarding Objective
Rightness^ (i.e., the evidence with respect to happiness--
whatever is desired for its own sake), and so bears a logi-
cal relationship to the latter, we avoid having to say that
his moral judgments are merely subjective. At the same
time, we are not to be interpreted as making the untenable
assertion that his moral judgments must be (and are) in
accordance with Objective Rightness^, in fact.
It is now obvious that it is perfectly consistent to
formulate a principle of utility which specifies the condi-
tions which must be met by an action to fall under Objec-
tive Rightness^ and to formulate another principle of
utility which specifies the conditions which must be met by
an action to fall under Objective Rightness,-,. By formu-
lating both, it is possible to call atention to the fact
that there may be a discrepancy between what is really
right (Objective^) and what an agent must judge as right
according to the only conception of rightness appropriate
for a finite moral agent (Objective Rightness
2 ). Hence-
forth, the principles will be referred to as P-^ and P^,
Q £
respectively.
9^0f course, these principles are not to be confused
with those in Section II of this chapter.
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Tne PrinciPle of utility is usually formulated with
the intention that it be interpreted as Where X is a
variable for actions which are alternatives to each other
on an occasion of choice, P
1 can be formulated simply as
follows
:
X is right IFF X maximizes the general happiness
more than any alternative action
which the agent could perform.
Correspondingly:
X is obligatory IFF there is no alternative action
which the agent could perform which
is as right as X.
Again, it is important to realize that for this for-
mulation of the principle, even though the meaning of
"general happiness" might be taken to be "the sum of all
haPPy individuals," the meaning of "individual happiness"
is undefined, v/ith the result that there is no theory of
intrinsic value which can be specified as the one that p.^
is formulated with reference to. However, if the actual
content of individual happiness is unknown, and one can't
know when individuals are really happy, it follows, as
previously noted, that it is theoretically impossible for
the agent to know which action, in fact (among available
alternatives) will maximize the general happiness, and
so be right according to P^. From the standpoint of the
agent, therefore, P^ is of no use for the determination of
duty and, as noted, can only serve the function of marking
a possible discrepancy between what is really (i.e., meta-
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physically or objectively) right and what the agent judges
to be right in accordance with the much more plausible prin-
ciple, P
2 .
Examination of Mill’s theory has revealed that the only
evidence we have for v/hat constitutes individual happiness,
in fact, is what is actually desired. Consequently,
is to be formulated with reference to a theory of intrinsic
value wnich holds "happiness" to be the only intrinsic good;
which, in turn, is to be regarded by the moral agent as
"whatever is desired for its own sake." In other words,
P
2
is not to be formulated with reference to a theory of
intrinsic value in the usual sense but rather with reference
to what Narveson has alternatively called a theory of "in-
trinsic value from the moral point of view."^ The general
happiness is "the sum of those who are individually happy"
and is determinable with reference to this notion of in-
dividual happiness.
At first glance, it seems that P
2
should be formu-
lated in the same way— in the same words--as P^, with
the difference that "individual happiness" and "the gen-
eral happiness" are both defined; i.e., as P
1
is formu-
lated precisely in accordance v/ith the definition of
"the general happiness" in the account of Objective Right-
ness^, P^ should be formulated precisely in accordance
with the definition of "the general happiness" and
9^See p. 90.
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individual happiness" in the account of Objective Rightness
2
however, to formulate P
2 in the same way as ^ would be mis-
leading, for it seems to entail an unacceptable conclusion re
garding moral obligation. Consequently, before formulating
P2 more precisely, it is essential for its justification and
understanding that we turn to consider briefly the problem
of moral obligation.
In accordance with the utilitarian theory which has
been developed thus far, it might seem that one's duty, at
any one moment, is to do whatever possible to provide as
many people as possible with the object(s) of their de-
sires, i.e., to do everything possible to make the most
people happy. To state this more precisely, if P
2
were
formula oed in the same way as P^
» it would seem that the
only right action at any time for any moral agent is to
satisfy as many legitimate desires as he is capable of
satisfying. However, if it is remembered that the prin-
ciple of utility is intended as an absolute ethical prin-
ciple, and so is universally binding, it is obvious that
in most societies it v/ould not maximize the general hap-
piness (understood in terms of Objective Rightness
2 )
if
everyone acted as if this were an obligation. In fact,
97This is more precise because, as previously noted
on p. 124 given the meaning of "individual happiness" and
the "general happiness," in order to maximize the general
happiness it is necessary to distinguish between 'legiti-
mate" and "illegitimate" desires.
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ix is no t difficul u "to see "that a definite inconsistency
with the principle is likely to arise if this is a duty;
for if everyone s duty is always to do whatever possible to
provide others with the object(s) of their legitimate de-
sire^, then it follows that it would be wrong for anyone
—
v/hose own conception of individual happiness was something;
other than making other people happy—to take the time to
pursue or enjoy individual happiness. As is the case in
any society, there are many whose desires for their own
happiness is something other than making other people happy.
In those societies, it will follow that everyone's having
as his goal the maximization of the general happiness will
be inconsistent v/ith everyone's duty being to do whatever
possible to provide for the happiness of others. For if
the general happiness is regarded as equivalent to the sum
of individually happy people, and if there are some who
desire to pursue their own legitimate pleasure preferences
but are not allowed (are not obligated not) to do so; if
it follows that they cannot obtain individual happiness
(which surely it must, in most cases), then the general
happiness cannot be maximized.
However, although it is true that in most societies
the general happiness would not be maximized if it were
everyone's obligation to make others happy, it is, of course,
theoretically possible for there to be a society in v/hich the
general happiness would, in fact, be maximized if this were
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the case. Consider, for example, a hypothetical society, A,
in which there are some whose only desire for individual hap-
piness is that others he happy and who have the means for nro-
viding all of the others in the society with whatever they
legitimately desire. In Society A everyone would he happy and
uhe general happiness would he at a maximum if everyone's
obligation was to do whatever possible to make others happy.
Even though the general happiness is maximized in this
case, the objection to requiring, as an obligation, the satis-
faction of others' desires can be made on theoretical grounds.
First of all, if it is maintained that our duty is the maxi-
mization of the general happiness but that the best means to
it is for everyone to regard as a duty the maximization of his
own happiness, it would be, as a matter of fact, absurd to
maintain that "satisfying others' desires for happiness, so
far as possible" is either identical with or the only means
Q R
to individual happiness. In addition, this would be theo-
retically objectionable, for it would be to presuppose that
the question as to what happiness is or the question of the
best means to it is closed— that individual happiness or the
best means to it is, in fact, "satisfying others' desires for
98 .This could be regarded as an answer to the question
as to what happiness is if it were maintained that it is
the only thing which is capable of being regarded as in-
trinsically good. It could be regarded as an answer to the
question as to the best means to happiness if it were main-
tained that this life-style is the only way in which any-
one could obtain happiness. Of course, both of these pos-
sible answers are absurd.
happiness, so far as possible. 1 ' As previously noted, closure
of these questions is not something that could be sanctioned
by our Theory. Finally, establishing the satisfaction of
others’ desires as a duty would be to accept the absurd sug-
gestion that maximizing the general happiness is not desir-
able in every society, meaning that the principle of utility
is not to be regarded as a universal ethical principle. For
in other possible societies than A, requiring this as our
duty would constitute an inconsistency with the principle
of utility which requires as our general duty, maximizing
the general happiness. For there are possible societies in
which the situation in society A would not obtain and, yet,
because of the universal character of the principle, if it
were everyone's duty in A, it would be everyone's duty in
these other societies as well, to do whatever possible to
make other people happy. Therefore, to insist on this as
a duty would, in many cases, make it theoretically impos-
sible to maximize the general happiness. It must be con-
cluded that the utilitarian theory we have been examining
could never sanction, as a duty, satisfying others' de-
sires for happiness.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from all of
this is that although it v/ould be right (and also praise-
worthy) to give to people that which they legitimately
desire, could never require that it be one's duty to
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do so. m fact, it is to be noted that even in Society A,
above
,
the general happiness would be maximized on either
the assumption that it was right or on the assumption that
it was one s duty to satisfy others' desires. However, now
that it has been established that ?
2 could only sanction it
as right, it is clear that its universal employment will not
3-How for the maximization of the general happiness in
Society A but in all other societies as well.
On the other hand, it is apparent that one thing v/hich
can be established as a duty, on the basis of p^, is not to
interfere with others in their attempts to satisfy their
legitimate desires and, whenever possible, to prevent others
from engaging in this kind of interference. The justifica-
tion for asserting this as an obligation can best be stated
in terms of a universal right v/hich can be sanctioned by P^.
Because it has been established that what individual happi-
ness is, in fact, and the best means to it, is an open ques-
tion (or at least is to be regarded as such) it is apparent
that anyone advocating a utilitarian theory in v/hich this
presumed to be true must also justify, as a right, that any-
one be allowed to pursue his own individual conception of
happiness, in any way he pleases, so long as his doing so
99This is perhaps what Mill v/as referring to in Chap-
ter V of "Utilitarianism" v/hen he was speaking of imperfect
obligations, to which there were attached no correlative
rights; thus, it v/ould sometimes be our duty to make others
happy, but not always, which v/ould be the case if they had
this as a right against us.
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does nor interfere with others' doing the same (i.e., in the
previous vernacular, as long as their desires for happiness
are legitimate). Such a right is justified in the only way
that any right can be justified by utilitarian theory— estab-
lishing it as a right is more conducive to the maximization
of the general happiness than not establishing it as a right.
If one then takes the usual route with reference to rights
and assumes that for every right there is a correlative ob-
ligation for those against whom the right may be exercised,
it is everyone’s duty to prevent himself and others, when-
ever possible, from interfering v/ith anyone's legitimate
pursuit of individual happiness. 100
The utilitarian justification for establishing the
right to the pursuit of individual happiness and requiring
others to respect that right is stated by Mill as follows:
As much compression as is necessary to prevent the
stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching
on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with;°
but for this there is ample compensation even in
the point of view of human development. The means
of development which the individual loses by being
prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the
injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the
That Mill had this concern for respecting the rights
of others to pursue individual happiness is evident in a pas-
sage from Chapter II of "Utilitarianism:" "The great majority
of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the
world, but for that of individuals, of which the good of the
world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man
need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular per-
sons concerned, except so far as is necessary to assure him-
self that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights
--that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations—of
anyone else" (p. 220).
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expense of the development of other people. Andeven .0 himself there is a full equivalent in thebe oxer development of the social part of his nature
s:Si^p^tS?ioi e by the restraint put upon the*™’
In opposition to this view, it has been argued by several
philosophers that the general happiness cannot be maximized by
allowing as much freedom as possible in the area of self-re-
garding actions, that maximizing utility and providing as
much liberty as possible for the satisfaction of legitimate
desires are incompatible objectives. However,, all of the
sources of this contention that I’m aware of base this ob-
jection on classical formulations of the theory? 102 and,
although the objection may be valid against classical forms
of the theory, it is not applicable to the form of the theory
being dealt with here. That is, given what is meant by
'individual happiness’ and ’the general happiness,’ it fol-
lows that the amount of liberty should be granted which would
insure as many individuals as possible being enabled to pur-
sue their own conceptions of happiness, meaning that as many
as possible should be able to freely perform in the area of
self-regarding actions.
Thus, for example, Robert Paul Wolff argues for inter-
fering with self-regarding actions as follows:
101
Mill, On Liberty
, p. 63.
102
-,For v/hat is meant by "classical formulations of the
theory," see pp. 1-2,
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...oho very best way in the world to increase this
social
. sum of happiness would be to interfere quite
exuensiveiy in people's lives, prodding them to do~
xne things that will bring them happiness, stoppingthem from imprudent or self-defeating actions which
xnreaten to make them unhappy, 1^3
However, this kind of interference is justified only
if we're dealing with a classical formulation of the theory,
in which the question as to what comprises individual hap-
piness and the best means to it is assumed to be closed; if
so, it may well be true that the general happiness will be
maximized by sometimes interfering with self-regarding ac-
tions; i.e., on the grounds that we assume that we know what
will make people happy. However, if we're not permitted to
proceed on the assumptions that the content of individual
happiness is something other than "whatever is legitimately
desired for its own sake" and that we know which are the best
means for attaining happiness—something which is clearly
disallowed by our theory-then one is not justified, as
Wolff supposes, in interfering with self-regarding actions.
For it is only by not preventing people from engaging in such
actions, whenever possible, that the general happiness can be
. . , 104
maximized.
103Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston
The Beacon Press, 1968 ), p. 8,
104
A much more extensive defense of- the claim that
people should have the right to pursue the objects of their
legitimate desires (should have liberty in the area of self-
regarding actions) can be found below in the sub-section
titled "Mill's Commitment to the Right of Liberty," pp. 177-
81, and especially the sub-section titled "The Justifiable
Extent of Liberty," pp. 181-191. This position is also
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It can be concluded, then, that insofar as non-inter-
ference with pursuing the objects of one’s legitimate desires
is a necessary condition for realizing individual happiness;
and insofar as the latter’s being possible for everyone is
a necessary condition for maximization of the general hap-
piness, it follows that the utilitarian using P
£ as his ethi-
cal principle must justify the pursuit of individual happiness
as a universal right and respecting that right as a duty bind-
ing on everyone.
If our duty, as utilitarians, is to maximize the gen-
eral happiness—where this is understood to be "the sum of
individually happy people" and where individual happiness is
to be regarded as "whatever is legitimately desired for its
own sake it is obvious that we can do so only if we oper-
ate wi til a principle of utility which defines rightness and
obligation in accordance with the above analyses. P can
now be more precisely formulated as follows:
X is right IFF X is intentional a.nd X satisfies one
or more legitimate desires of one or
more persons.
Corresponding to the discussion of obligation above,
X is obligatory IFF X is right; the desire or desires
to be satisfied by X is (are) a
member(s) of the class of desires
briefly argued on pp. 158-59* The last-mentioned sub-section
deals with another specific objection to utilitarianism--
John .Rawls’ claim that the theory cannot justify the degree
of liberty and non-interference required to account for cer-
tain principles of justice.
14 ?
not to be harmed; among the real
alternatives
. for the agent, X is
uhe only action wnich will resultin preventing the most harm.
This principle of obligation would seem to have the
unfortunate result that one could be in a position of seeing
someone who v/as unknowingly about to be harmed and yet not
be obligated to do anything to try to prevent it because the
person had no desire, at the time, not to be harmed. Con-
sequently, we must add that what is intended here is that
the person about to be harmed either has the desire not to
be harmed or we have good reason to believe has the desire
or would have the desire if sufficiently aware of the im-
pending events, etc. Similar objections regarding the ir-
rational and insane can be handled by adding, similarly, that
we have good reason to believe one would have the desire if
rational or sane. It should also be noted that by "desires
not to be harmed" is merely meant desires which can, in
fact, be characterized as those in which the actual content
or object is "not to be harmed." What is not meant is that
the content or the object of the desire is something else
(e.g., food or money), and that desires like these are not
to be harmed. 10 ^ In other words, desires are satisfied or
In the first two pages of Chapter III the distinction
is made between " justified” desires not to be harmed" and "un-justified desires not to be harmed." It is also demonstrated
early in the chapter that, for the purpose of dealing spe-
cifically with justice, our utilitarian theory regards "harm"
as "a violation of rights," so that "desires not to be harmed"
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unsatisfied; only people are harmed. By ’’real alternative”
is mean u an alternative action which the agent is aware
of and aole to perform.” With this qualification, the prin-
ciple of obligation is in accordance with the "ought implies
can” principle, and so does not require, as an agent's dutv,
something which he is unable to do.
It is essential to realize that one is not to infer
from the above that the greater the number of legitimate de-
sires satisfied, the greater the quantity of happiness pro-
duced, If we ' re not in the position, as finite moral agents,
to say what happiness is, it seems obvious that we’re also
not In the position of being able to embrace the extremely
simplistic view that if someone has more desires satisfied
than another, he is the happier of the two. Consequently,
we can say that it is always right, ceteris paribus
, to
satisfy legitimate desires, but it is not necessarily the
case that the more legitimate desires that are satisfied,
the greater the amount of happiness produced.
turn out to be "desires not to have one's rights violated."
V/hat these rights are is made more precise in the rest of
the chapter.
106Narveson makes this mistake on pp. 92-93 of Moral -
ity and Utility when speaking of "objective moral value,”
as part of the formulation of the principle of utility.
V/here X and Y are variables which range over any set of acts
which are alternatives to each other on any particular occa-
sion of choice, he says that X has more objective moral
value than Y if, and only If, X produces a greater net
amount of v/hat is valued by those affected than Y produces.
It should be noted that, although Narveson attempts to de-
velop principles of rightness and obligation in Morality and
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m conclusion, the relationship between P, and Objec-
tive Rightness-^ and P
2 and Objective Rightness,-, is as fol-
lows: Whereas P
1 indicates which actions (right and ob-
ligatory/- ) will maximize the general happiness, as defined
in the account of Objective Rightness^, P
2 indicates which
actions (right and obligatory) will maximize the general
happiness, as defined in the account of Objective Rightness
2
.
The major difference between P-j^ and ?
2
is that by appealing
^ ^- s 'theoretically impossible for a finite moral
agent to know which particular actions (right or obligatory)
will maximize the general happiness in accordance with Ob-
jective Rightness^; whereas by appealing to ?
2
it is not
theoretically impossible for a moral agent to know which
particular actions (right or obligatory) will maximize the
general happiness in accordance with Objective Rightness 2<
Once again, P^ merely serves to indicate possible discrep-
ancies between what the agent judges as right or obligatory
in accordance with P 9 and what is metaphysically right or
obligatory in accordance with P^.
In other words, to operate with P^ is to operate with
a principle that a finite moral agent cannot employ for de-
termining the rightness or wrongness of particular actions,
etc,, because in order to do so he would need to know both
what happiness is in fact and what the nature and/or extent
Utility in some ways similar to those developed above, they
are significantly different in that they are seriously in-
adequate in many respects and are not argued for in the same
way
.
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of the consequences of his actions are. And as it has been
arguea that this is theoretically impossible for him, to
employ ?
1 is nothing other than to speculate (what has been
rei erred to as metaphysical speculation). On the other hand,
operating with P^, he is employing principles of rightness
and obligation which are based on the empirical evidence
available as to what individual happiness is ("whatever is
desired for its own sake") and which enable him to determine
which actions are right, wrong, or obligatory in accordance
with those principles. Because is formulated on the basis
of available empirical evidence and can be employed by agents
for determining the moral status of particular actions, it
is sai e to say that, v/hereas to employ is a wholly specu-
lative process, to employ P
£ is not; with P2 there is no
metaphysical speculation involved. 10 ^
107Professor Robert Ackermann has noted a possible
problem. If Objective Rightness2 represents the attempts
of finite. (non-omnisc lent ) moral agents to determine what
is right in the sense of Objective Rightnessq, then, since
P2 and Pq are formulated with reference to these senses of
rightness, respectively, there may be a serious problem in
determining which specific rights P2 should be formulated
with reference to. For two moral agents may legitimately
disagree about what specific human rights should be estab-
lished, because the best evidence for each suggests di-
vergent sets
. of rights. If, in reply, it is insisted that
the total evidence, if available to both, would resolve
the problem, it's not clear how P2 differs from Pq, which
has been argued is vacuous because of unascertainable meta-
physical commitments. On the other hand, in the absence
of more evidence or agreement as to what the evidence is,
P2 is still problematically vacuous with respect to the
establishment of particular rights. And although this may
not be so much of a problem with respect to the general
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Sub-section III-F: Justice--associated with only one
o x
.
the principles
. Before concluding this chapter, it is to
be noted that if we accept Mill's assertion that justice is
the adherence to, and injustice is the violation of, a right
or justified as such by the principle of utility,
ohe concept of justice we're concerned about is associated
with P
2
and not at all with P^ First, P
1
is formulated
only with reference to actions and specifies the conditions
under v/hich an action is metaphysically or objectively
right. As such (and as previously noted) the only function
P^ serves in the theory is to indicate a possible discrep-
ancy between what is right, in fact, and that which the
agent judges as right on the basis of the only principle
he can successfully employ, P^. Second, even if it makes
sense to say that acts can also be judged metaphysically
rights to life and liberty, it might be so when one begins
to consider particular liberties (which liberties there
should be in a particular society, and/or how much, is dis-
cussed on pp. 181-91 of Chapter III). This may be a seri-
ous problem, but I think it can only be replied at this
point that the theory I develop does rest on the assumption
that, although there may be difficulty at times in resolving
these disputes, there can be sufficient agreement about what
the available evidence is, and what follows from it, with
respect to the establishment of particular rights. This is
the kind of problem which I think (and which I believe Mill
thought) can only be resolved empirically (also see foot-
note on p.16 6) . On -the other hand, if it is maintained
that metaphysical disputes may arise as to what "evidence"
is and that these may be irresolvable, then P2 could per-
haps turn out, in the long run, to be as metaphysically prob-
lematic as Pi.
^^See Chapter V of "Utilitarianism," pp. 240-259
•
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just according to and that it therefore makes sense to say
that P
1 can be used to establish rights from a metaphysical
perspective, it is theoretically impossible for a finite
moral agent to know which acts are just, for the same reasons
(noted previously) that it is impossible to know which acts
are merely right. However, since P
£ is formulated for the
purpose of specifying the conditions under which an action
is right for an agent (on the basis of Objective Rightness
2 )
and so is formulated with reference to both acts and agents
in a way that P
]L
is not, P
2
is also capable of being used
to establish and justify rights (as with the universal right
to the pursuit of individual happiness, above). As rights
can be derived and justified by P
g ,
so can justice. Fi-
nally, there is a very significant consideration which has
to do with punishment. If it is unjust to violate someone’s
right(s), it also constitutes an action which we ordinarily
feel merits punisnment of some kind (indeed, Mill advances
this position in the last chapter of "Utilitarianism”).
Now, as it would be absurd to consider punishing someone for
not complying with obligations specified by p but not at
all for not complying with those derivable from P 0 , it is
obvious, again, that justice can only be considered with
reference to P2#
It must be concluded from all of this that it is not
possible to consider any inferences from P^ as incompatible
with our intuitions regarding justice from anything other
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than a metaphysical perspective— if at all— since can
have nothing to do with justice in any other sense. Conse-
quently, although it may be possible to reject the theory
from considerations of justice based on P
1 (such as those
in Section II 01 chis chapter), this would be a rejection
on metaphysical grounds alone. From the non-metaphysical
perspective of the theory—which we are interested in as
moral philosophers searching for an intuitively acceptable
agent-oriented ethical theory— it is only with reference to
1*2 that we can determine whether or not utilitarianism is
compatible with justice. If it turns out that P
2
does not
sanction agents' performing unjust actions, it must be con-
cluded that the theory is unobjectionable in this respect.
With this is mind, we proceed to Chapter III to consider
P 9 in more detail and, finally, in Chapter IV, to deal
specifically with the problems of distributive justice.
CHAPTER III
THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY AND THE NECESSARY
CONDITIONS FOR HAPPINESS
...it is a preliminary condition of rational ac-
ceptance or rejection, that the formula should he
correctly understood. I believe that the veryimperfect notion ordinarily formed of its mean-
inS»^is the chief obstacle which impedes its re-
ception; and that could it be cleared, even from
only the grosser misconceptions, the question
would be greatly simplified, and a large propor-
tion of its difficulties removed.
1
Section I
Harm as a Violation of Rights
As P
2
has been formulated, it would be right to satisfy
legitimate desires but obligatory to satisfy, whenever pos-
sible, those legitimate desires which are of the class of de-
sires not to be harmed. However, as it is a fact that there
can be erroneous conceptions as to v/hat is harmful and what
is not, it is necessary to differentiate clearly within this
category between those desires not to be harmed which are jus-
tified and those which are not. Roughly, we can say that a
desire not to be harmed is justified only if it is held with
respect to something which is, in fact, harmful; all other
’Mill
,
"Utilitarianism," p. 208.
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desires not uo be harmed being correctly classified as un-
justified
.
2
oy definition of right action, it is also true that a
desire not to be harmed is justified only if it is a legiti-
mate desire, all illegitimate desires not to be harmed being
unjustified. V/ith this in mind, our principle of obliga-
tion can now be more accurately formulated:
X is obligatory IFF X is right; the desire or desires
to be satisfied by X is (are) mem-
ber(s) of the class of justified
desires not to be harmed; among
the real alternatives for the
agent, X is the only action which
will result in preventing the most
harm.
Our principle of obligation is of little value until
the meaning of a ” justified desire not to be harmed" is made
more precise. Since the problem of justice is the one we are
specifically concerned about, the task is somewhat simplified.
For although there are perhaps occasions on which one may be
justly treated and yet harmed, we need only concern ourselves
2 .This distinction is m accordance with Mill, who
wanted to disallow that something like disapprobation could
be regarded as harm.
3
-'in the formula for rightness, it now appears that one
can have a legitimate desire which is other-regarding and
harmful, since it is possible that a desire not to be harmed,
if satisfied, may result in someone’s being physically re-
strained, shot, etc. However, as harm is to be discussed in
terms of a violation of rights, we can often speak of one who
violates the rights of others as forfeiting his own right(s)
not to be physically abused, etc. Consequently, since his
rights are forfeited, there are none violated and he is not
harmed
.
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wi uh ohcse harmful acts which can he categorized as injustices
Generally, we will regard an act of harm which is an injustice
as Mill did-~as the violation of someone's right(s). For our
purposes, therefore, we will say that "A desire is a justified
desire not to he harmed if, and only if, it is a desire which
can correctly he described as a desire not to he treated un-
justly
,
where 1 to he treated unjustly" is to he interpreted
as "to have one or more of one's rights violated."^
Mill's adherence to the position that justice has to do
with rights is made clear in Chapter V of "Utilitarianism."
Referring to the distinction between what he refers to as
"perfect" and "imperfect" obligations, he says:
Now. it is known that ethical writers divide moral
duties into two classes, denoted by the ill-chosen
expressions, duties of perfect and of imperfect
obligation; the latter being those in which,' though
the act is obligatory, the particular occasions of
performing it are left to our choice; as in the case
of charity or beneficience
,
which we are indeed bound
to practise, but not towards any definite person, nor
at any prescribed time. In the more precise language
of philosophic jurists, duties of perfect obligation
are those duties in virtue of which a correlative
riaht resides in some person or persons; duties of
imperfect obligation are those moral obligations
which do not give birth to any right. I think it
will be found that this distinction exactly
Once again, the desire is one v/hich has as its object
"not to be harmed" or "not to be treated unjustly" or "not
to have one or more of one's rights violated." Consequently,
it is not to be interpreted as a desire, having something
else as its object, v/hich can be harmed or treated unjustly,
etc. Again, it does not seem to make much sense to speak
of desires in these ways; they are, among other things,
either satisfied or unsatisfied; but only sentient beings
can be harmed, treated unjustly, etc.
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coincides with that which exists between
°hs other obligations of morality.
5
justice and
'To say that someone has a right is to say that:
...he has a. valid claim on society to protect him inthe possession of it, either by the force of law, o^by that of education and opinion. If he has what weconsider a sufficient claim, on whatever account, tohave something guaranteed to him by society, we sayhe a "t 0 it. If we desire to prove
^
at
.
^ything does not belong to him by right, v/ethinx this done as soon as it is admitted that so-
ciety ought not to take measures for securing it tohim, ou o should leave it to chance, or to his own
exertions.
6
Mill justifies rights in terms of general utility. "To
have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which
society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the
objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other
reason than general utility." In fact, the kind of utility
that the assigning and protection of rights provides for is
security, ".. .to everyone's feelings the most vital of all in-
terests." Moreover, security is regarded by Mill as a neces-
sary condition for happiness. "Nearly all other earthly
benefits are needed by one person, not needed by another; and
many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully foregone, or
replaced by something else; but security no human being can
possibly do without." It is not, however, a sufficient con-
dition, as he goes on to mention physical nutriment as another.
5 .
uMill, "Utilitarianism," P. 247.
^Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 250.
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"Now this most indispensible of all necessaries, after physi-
cal nutriment, cannot be had, unless the machinery for pro-
viding it is kept unintermittedly in active play .” 7
hill s position can be better understood within the
context of the theory attributed to him in the previous chap-
ter. If tne concept of the general happiness is to be under-
stood as the sum of all those who are individually happy,
then a necessary condition for the maximization of the gen-
eral happiness is as many people as possible attaining in-
dividual happiness (the ideal state of general hanpiness
being one in which everyone is individually happy)
. How-
ever, because the theory is also committed to the position
tna t what happiness is, in fact, is an open question (or
should be treated as such), no one conception of happiness
(within the bounds of legitimacy) is to be looked upon, for
the purposes of morality, as better than any other. Conse-
quently, the general happiness would be most effectively
maximized by providing everyone— so far as possible—with
an equal right to whatever conditions are necessary for
the attainment, by anyone, of individual happiness. These
conditions can more accurately be referred to as 'universally
necessary conditions for happiness,' the conditions which
every individual must have satisfied in order to be happy.
We can say, then, that this is what it means to say (as was
7Mill, "Utilitarianism,” pp. 250-251.
159
said on pp. 142-143) that everyone has an equal right to the
pursuit oi happiness, i.e., that they have an equal right to
the conditions which are universally necessary for its attain
O
ment
.
As no ued
,
one of the necessary conditions recognized
by Mill is security. It is evident from several passages in
the chapter that what he means by this is that a necessary
condition ior happiness is the knowledge that one will not be
harmed unnecessarily 9 and that a necessary condition for the
latter is establishing not being harmed as a general right,
such that anyone for whom this right is unjustifiably 10 vio-
lated is also treated unjustly. However, to know that every-
one has a general right not to be harmed is not very helpful
so far as knowledge ol specific obligations is concerned, and
it is desirable to determine the specific rights everyone can
.Hereafter, the term 'necessary condition, ' unless
otherwise specified, v/ill be used to mean 'universally nec-
essary condition. 1
o
ySee Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 255, in which reference
is made, in this context, to "the moral rules which forbid
mankind . to hurt one another." Also, p. 256; "Thus the
moralities which protect every individual from being harmed
by others .... Now it is these moralities primarily, v/hich
compose the obligations of justice."
10 . Unnecessarily' and 'unjustifiably' are added as quali
f.ications because, as will soon be noted in explanation of
the principle of obligation, there is one condition under
which utilitarian theory must sanction the violation of
others' rights--when all of the alternative actions involve
violating at least one right; in this case, one is obligated
to choose the action which does the least amount of harm;
i.e., usually, which violates the least number of rights.
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S ~ ^ ^ ve
* violations Ox which would constitute specific
kinds of harm. In other words, the important question with
which we must deal is, "What, specifically, are the necessary
conditions for happiness which can be established as rights—
as necessary conditions for the general right to security—
and violations of which are to be regarded as injustices?"
In answering this question we will be able to determine what
some of the desires are which are such that they are ' justi-
fied desires not to be harmed,' thereby giving substantive
content to both the general right to security and the prin-
ciple of obligation.
The principle of rightness and the principle of obli-
gation have been formulated so as to insure that, by acting
in accordance with them, the general happiness (as defined
for Objective Rightness^) will be maximized. In the last
three pages it has been argued that the general happiness
can be maximized if, and only if, the "rights" referred to
in the principle of obligation are interpreted as rights to
the universally necessary conditions for individual happiness.
Further on, a corollary to the principle of obligation will
be formulated which will specify the conditions under which
these rights can be violated. Although the above defense of
rights as rights to universally necessary conditions for
happiness provides a general utilitarian account of rights
which I think is clearly not circular, it will be a sig-
nificant part of the purposes of that which follows, in
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speaking of the specific rights to the universally necessary
conditions for happiness (life, liberty, etc.), to insure
thal uhe utilitarian account of them will continue to be
non-circular. Given the particular utilitarian theory being
worked with, I am confident that doing so will pose no major
problem.
Section II
The Right to Life
Having noted in the last section that harm is to be re-
garded as a violation of rights and a right is a universally
necessary condition for happiness, Sub-section II-A of this
section will demonstrate that, with life as an obviously
necessary condition for happiness, we can develop a corollary
to the principle of obligation which specifies the conditions
under which life can justifiably be taken. In Sub-section
II-B, it will be demonstrated that no necessary condition
for happiness can justifiably be sacrificed for conditions
for happiness which are either not necessary or not univer-
sally necessary conditions; in other words, it will be shown
why the corollary developed above with respect to life alone
must be generalized so as to encompass all necessary condi-
tions for happiness. As a result, violating rights only in
accordance with the corollary results in no incompatibility
with intuition.
Sub-section II-A: a corollary to the principle of
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o oligation
. Though not mentioned specifically hy Mill, one
of the most obviously necessary conditions for happiness is
lue. ho temporal being could be happy if it were not alive
and noxhmg without life could possibly be happy. The propo-
sition, "If one is happy then he is alive" is analytically
true. Life is also a necessary condition for whatever other
conditions are necessary for happiness. As a necessary con-
dition for happiness, establishing life as a right for every-
one allows us to deal with the problem of the right to life
in a way which is intuitively unobjectionable. Before turn-
ing to other matters we will diverge for a time to consider
this
.
In the second section of Chapter II, it was noted that
a strictly metaphysical view of actions from the standpoint
of utilitarianism allowed us to infer that killing someone
would be a right action whenever (generally speaking) the
general happiness would be maximized by doing so. 11 This
seemed to be grossly inconsistent with our moral intuitions
until it was later pointed out (last part of Section III)
that what the theory implies metaphysically about the right-
ness of actions is not necessarily identical with what it
allows moral agents to do without reprehension. Consequently,
when we made the distinction between Pi , formulated with
reference to metaphysical rightness (Objective Rightness^)
^For the specific conditions which allow this, turn
back to pp. 71-72 of Section II of the last chapter.
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and P^, lormula^ed on the basis of the evidence a finite
moral agent has regarding metaphysical rightness (Objective
Rightness
2 ), it became apparent that whether or not the theory
resulted in inconsistencies with intuition can only be judged
on the basis of the latter; i.e., knowing what is right via
?! is theoretically impossible, an agent's only being able
to know what is right according to P
2 ; therefore, if apply-
ing the latter principle results in any incompatibility with
intuition, we concluded that we are justified in rejecting
utilitarianism as an unacceptable ethical theory; if it does
not, we are not.
At this point, it has been established that among the
'justified desires not to be harmed' are desires, in general,
not to have one's rights violated and that one of the specific
rights that has been justified as a necessary condition for
happiness is the right to life; moreover, the latter also
serves as a necessary condition for every other condition
which is necessary for happiness. The importance of the right
to life being what it is, it is necessary to establish a
corollary to the principle of obligation.
A right or rights to life can be violated if, and only
if (1) all the alternative actions on the occasion of choice
involve harms, and either (2) taking life results in the
least amount of harm, where alternative harms are violations
of the right to life or necessary conditions for life, or
1 2By necessary conditions for life is meant subsistence
items (food, water, shelter, sometimes medicine, etc.).
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(3) there is sufficient evidence to indicate that taking life
is the only alternative for obtaining one of the other neces-
sary conditions for happiness and that production of this is
sufficient compensation for taking life. In any situation
m whlch these conditions are satisfied, it would be contrary
to intuition not to take life; under any other conditions, tak-
ing life would be contrary to intuition. It is desirable to
consider some examples.
Consider the following, which satisfies (1) and the first
disjunct of (2). The president of a small country is aware of
the fact that a much more powerful enemy is erroneously con-
vinced that one o_l his cabinet officials has been a spy and
so they are demanding that he must be surrendered for execu-
tion or they will engage a war, in the event of which the
smaller nation will be inundated, and it is a certainty that
thousands oj. its inhabitants will be killed. If, no matter
what kind of evidence is produced to establish the official's
innocence, the enemy disregards it, it would be irrational
and contrary to intuition if the president did not decide to
sacrifice the official. In other words, given that life is
a necessary condition for whatever else is a necessary con-
dition for happiness, that taking it is an irreversible action
and that no one's life (according to the theory) is to be re-
garded as intrinsically better than another for moral considera-
tions, this is the only alternative that can be sanctioned via
?
2
-~as it would clearly result in the least amount of harm--
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and ths only alternative that any norally sane person can
regard as compatible with intuition.
lhe same example can be altered to satisfy (1) and the
second disjunct of (2) if we suppose that the extrinsic worth
of ohe cabinet official is such that he is the only man in the
country possessing sufficient knowledge and skill to insure
that the people ol the nation can be assured of subsistence,
i.e., enough of the staples of life to assure their continued
existence. In this case, his execution at the hands of the
enemy would mean that a very large number of the people of
his country would eventually starve to death. Because his
extrinsic worth is such that his continued existence in the
country is necessary for maintaining a necessary condition
i. or life, ii there is a greater likelihood that more people
in the country would starve to death than would be killed in
an enemy attack, the justifiable move in this case would be
to go to war.
Numbers (1) and (3) are satisfied if it is supposed
that the official's extrinsic worth is such that his con-
tinued existence and service to his country are necessary
for preserving certain liberties for the inhabitants of the
country. This might be the case, for example, if someone
opposing the president is desirous of becoming a tyrannical
dictator and this man is the only one with sufficient pres-
tige and power to prevent him from doing so. If these lib-
erties are necessary conditions for happiness and if all or
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most of the inhabitants would lose them if the official were
surrendered, the president would be justified in choosing war
if he could determine (in satisfying ( 3 )) that there is suf-
ficient evidence to indicate that this action is the only al-
ternative for obtaining--in this case, maintaining--these lib-
erties and That xheir production or maintenance is sufficient
compensation for lives that will be lost.^^
Sub- section II-B: violation of any right-- justified
fb . i .r-y— —j-Ue—corollary . It is important to realise, however,
chat although an agent would on some occasions be justified
in sacrificing life for one of the other necessary con-
ditions for happiness, one would never be justified in
sacrificing life or any other necessary condition for
13 there is great difficulty involved in determining
when (3) is . satisfied, as the concept of 'sufficient evi-
dence' is difficult--perhaps impossible in this case—to make
precise, .Although it is surely true that one would sometimes
be justified in sacrificing life for actualizing or maintain-
ing one or more of the other necessary conditions for happi-
ness, decisions in these cases must, unfortunately
,
be left to
the judgment of the moral agent deciding. I know of no way to
set up a calculus on the basis of to equate so many lives
to so much of other necessary conditions for happiness; it is
only clear that sometimes such sacrifices would be necessary
and. morally justifiable. This points out, I suppose, that
ethical theories are unlike mathematical theories in that it
is not possible to calculate with the precision of the mathe-
matician, and so mathematical theories are unrealistic models
f
ior ethical theories. However, as Mill pointed out, not being
able to calculate in this way is not attributable to a defect
of the theory, but to the complicated nature of the world;
"It is not the fault of any creed, but of the complicated na-
ture of human affairs, that rules of conduct cannot be so
framed as to require no exceptions, and that hardly any kind
of action can safely be laid down as either always obligatory
or always condemnable" ("Utilitarianism," p. 225).
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the purpose of satisfying one or more conditions for happi-
ness which are not necessary.
By a ’condition for happiness which is not a necessary
condition,’ is meant ’one for which there are adequate substi-
tutes or for which there is some chance that it can be re-
placed by an adequate substitute.’ This is in contrast to
necessary conditions for happiness, for which there are no
adequate substitutes and no chance that they can be adequately
replaced. For example, Jones might adequately substitute love
for money as a condition for his happiness, but there is noth-
ing ohat can adequately replace his life as a necessary condi-
tion for happiness. Because of the absence of adequate subs-
titutes, a utilitarian of the kind we have been discussing
would not oe justiiied in sacrificing one or more necessary
conditions lor happiness for one or more conditions for hap-
piness which are not necessary.
I suppose it is possible that there are some conditions
for happiness which are necessary conditions for some but
not all people, i.e,, that there are some necessary condi-
tions which are not universally necessary conditions for
happiness. However, knowing that universally necessary con-
ditions for happiness cannot be adequately replaced but not
knowing that any other condition claimed to be necessary for
happiness (though not universally necessary) could not be
adequately substituted, our utilitarian theory would not jus-
tify, on any occasion, sacrificing one or more of the former
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for one or mors of the latter. Thus, for example, Smith
mif.hu claim that money is a necessary condition for his
happiness and that, since Jones has enough to make him happy,
he contends his killing Jones and taking his money is justi-
fied on utilitarian grounds; since there is only one happy
man in either case, what difference does it make? However,
a utilitarian proceeding rationally, on the basis of the evi-
dence he has available to him, would reason that he knows
Jones life could not be adequately replaced but does not
know that Smith's desire for Jones' money (or even his gen-
eral desire for money) could not be replaced consequently,
his only justifiable choice would be to condemn Smith's ac-
tion. And this reason is in addition to all the often-used
utilitarian arguments that could be revived with respect to
a diminishment of security if such actions were allowed;
providing a greater chance that such actions will occur
again because of the damage done to Smith's character, the
bad example he sets for others, if seen, etc.
The last two paragraphs can perhaps be made clearer by
the following considerations. If the necessary conditions
for happiness are, like life, conditions that everyone must
have satisfied in order to attain happiness, and if the gen-
eral happiness is the sum of all those individuals who are
14Of course, it should be, if possible, since finding a
suitable substitute—one which did not involve abusing others
--would obviously be more conducive to the individual happi-
ness of others, and, consequently, the general happiness.
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happy, .hen the general happiness is at a maximum only when
everyone is happy. This means that the general happiness
can be maximized, in this sense, only if the necessary con-
ditions for happiness are satisfied. In other words, when
we speak of the necessary conditions for individual happiness,
we are also speaking about the necessary conditions for maxi-
mizing the general happiness. 15 Thus, for example, if we
sanctioned killing Jones in order to take his property and
give it to others because this would maximize happiness in
°he particular situation, this would constitute an extremely
short-sighted approach to the maximization of the general hap-
piness. Just as one advocating hedonism is not committed to
maintaining that one should be satisfied with the pleasures
of the moment but would sometimes be justified in concluding
that future pleasures would be more worthwhile
,
so utilitari-
anism is not committed to maintaining that one should do
whatever possible in particular situations to make as many
people as happy as possible (even if this involves violating
rights)
.
It must be remembered that utilitarianism requires that
we maintain those conditions which will best serve to maximize
the general happiness in the long run. As was previously
15 .With reference to the corollary above this means that
if, ^as utilitarians, we say that violating the right to life
is justifiable we mean that its violation is a necessary con-
dition for maximizing the general happiness; which means, in
turn, that the conditions specified by the corollary above
are satisfied.
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noted, after defining Objective Rightness,,, the best way
(means) so maximizing the general happiness in the Iona run
would be to allow everyone, so far as possible, to pursue
individual happiness; what we are saying presently is that
what this really amounts to (and what Mill really meant by
this) is providing everyone, so far as possible, with the
necessary conditions for happiness, and regarding them as
nights which can only be violated when the conditions speci-
fied by the corollary above are met. In other words, on the
basis of available evidence as to what is right (Objective
nigh tness^ ) , the general happiness can be maximized in the
long run only if ohe necessary conditions for happiness are
acquired or maintained for everyone, so far as possible; it
cannot be if they are sacrificed for the maximization of the
general happiness in the short run— in particular situations.
What this means for our example is that, although the general
happiness would be maximized in the particular situation for
a short time, Jones' happiness could never be attained; by
making Jones’ happiness impossible, we also render impos-
sible maximizing the general happiness in the sense in which
it includes Jones’ happiness and so constitutes maximization
ox the general happiness in this larger sense— in the long
run.
Most importantly, if it is claimed, as it usually is,
that utilitarians are under an obligation to provide for
other people's happiness (which sometimes requires the
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sacru ice of necessary for non-necessary conditions for hap-
piness) it raust he emphasized that our utilitarian theory is
committed to maintaining that they are not. 16 Yet, if we are
to regard, as our obligation, violating rights to the necessary
conditions for happiness in order to satisfy desires which are
not directed toward necessary conditions for happiness, this
would be to suppose that our duty is to make other people hap-
py, that they have a right against us regarding happiness.
Consequently, if we consider it an obligation to take life
for the purpose of satisfying such desires, it is apparent
that we are no longer subscribing to the utilitarian theory
developed thus far, but rather, to some other ethical theory. 1 ^
Finally, we concluded in the last chapter that our ob-
ligation is not to make other people happy but rather to pre-
vent them from being harmed whenever possible; i.e,, to pre-
vent them from having their rights violated. Again, assert-
ing this as an obligation was justified— on the basis of Ob-
jective Rightness^—as the best means for maximizing the gen-
eral happiness in the long run. Consequently
,
we could not
lbSee pp. 137-142.
17For m any situation in which we regard this as our
obligation, we are subscribing to the theory that not the gen-
eral happiness, but some person's or group of persons' desires
should be maximized. In fact, it v/ould perhaps be correct to
say that doing so would be to suppose that the question as to
what happiness is, is closed, at least on particular occasions;
that our duty on some occasions is to cater to particular con-
ceptions of happiness, something which is clearly disallowed by
the utilitarian theory which has been developed.
172
even say that sacrificing necessary conditions for happiness
to provide others with the objects of other desires is right
.
To do so would be to disregard our obligation by satisfying
illegitimate desires; for their satisfaction v/ould involve
harming others when it is not the case that all the alterna-
tives involve harms.
± o summarize, according to our utilitarian theory one
would never be justified in sacrificing universally necessary
conditions for happiness for conditions which are not necessary
or not universally necessary because of the following reasons;
(a) it could never be our obligation to do so, since we have
demonstrated previously that no one has a right to be happy;
consequently we have no correlative obligation to see that
they are. (b) For those conditions for happiness which are
not necessary, there are adequate substitutes or at least a
chance that adequate substitutes can be found, whereas this is
not the case for universally necessary conditions. Since we
are interested in maximizing the general happiness in the
largest sense—where everyone is happy in the long run--we
could not be justified in sacrificing those conditions for
which no adequate substitutes can be found. (c) If there are
necessary conditions for happiness which are not universally
necessary conditions, we could not be justified in sacrificing
the latter for the former, because we don't know that they are
necessary conditions ( consequently
,
that adequate substitutes
cannot be found) . Whereas we do know that adequate substitutes
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cannot be found for universally necessary conditions, we
could not be justified in sacrificing them in this case for
the same reasons advanced in (b) above. (d) As we have dem-
onstrated that no one has a right against us to be happy but
that everyone has a right against us not to be harmed, 18 it
could not even be right-let alone obligatory-to sacrifice
universally necessary conditions for those which are not.
So far we have only specified that life and the neces-
sary conditions for life are necessary conditions for happi-
ness. Before moving on to consider another, it would be
helpful, perhaps, to provide an example of a situation in
which it would not be right to sacrifice life in exchange
for other non-necessary conditions for happiness.
For some reason, one is faced with the alternatives
of taking the li.j.e of an inventor or two or more ordinary
people, ihe inventor is responsible for creating many items
of luxury that many people in the society of which he is a
raemoer enjoy, whereas the others combined do not equal his
1
8
r , . ^it must be remembered that the term "harm'' is beinp-
used to reier only to ''necessary conditions for happiness"
and that this restriction is made because we are dealing
specifically with justice. Consequently, what is not being
argued for is that Mill maintained that everyone has the rimht
not to be harmed, where the harm referred to includes those
cases of harm where no right is violated (i.e,, where no in-justice is committed). First, it seems clear that Mill
thought that people could be harmed without having any of
their rights violated (see, for example, p. ?5 of" 0n Liberty ),
Secondly, it. seems clear that Mill thought that it was some-
times justifiable to harm others in this sense (see, for ex-
ample, p. 95 of On Liberty ). Lastly, whether or not Mill
really subscribed to these positions, it is beyond the scope
of what is being argued here to be concerned about it.
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extrinsic worth to the rest of society. However, because the
inventor's efforts are such that only a portion of the popu-
lation is aDle to benefit from them, and consequently do not
constitute universally necessary conditions for happiness, it
would be obligatory to save as many lives as possible in this
case and not sacrifice the others to save the inventor.
Again, it is not our duty to make others happy, but it is our
duty to abide by our principle of obligation and the corollary
whenever possible, thereby violating as few rights as pos-
sible in this case.
V/e have observed that not only would it be wrong to
sacrifice life in order to satisfy desires which are not
directed toward necessary conditions of happiness; it would
be wrong to violate any right for the purpose of satisfying
such desires. The corollary above, which was restricted to
life, can now be stated more generally so as to apply to the
violation of any right whatsoever. Where rights are restrict-
ed to universally necessary condisions for happiness, where
harms are violations of rights and X is a variable for rights:
X is justifiably violated IFF
(1) all the alternative actions on the occasion
of choice involve harms and either
(2) violating X results in the least amount of
harm, where all of the alternative harms are
violations of X or necessary conditions for
X
,
or
(3) there is sufficient evidence to indicate that
it is the only alternative for obtaining one
of the other necessary conditions for happi-
ness and that production of the latter is
sufficient compensation for violating X.
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What all of this ultimately means, regarding the right
to life, is that all of the usual objections concerning
scapegoats and sacrificing lives for the purpose of making
other people happy cannot he leveled against the theory, as
has previously been supposed. The principle of obligation
and its corollary, specifying the conditions under which life
can be taken by a moral agent, are in accord with moral in-
.
. 19tuition. Although P-^ seemed inconsistent with intuition,
is not and, so far as acceptability of the theory is con-
cerned with respect to this particular problem, this is all
20that can reasonably be required.
^As these principles also apply to all other rights,
their application is in accord with intuitions concerning
these as well. The intention in that which remains, at
least in part, is to demonstrate this.
20Professor Ann Brentlinger has commented that F^ may
be vacuous; that it would not, for example, enable one to de-
cide whether one's duty is to do everything possible to stop
the U. S. bombing of Cambodia or to continue living much as
as one has been. Similarly, Professor Robert Ackermann has
suggested that the principle could not clearly choose between
a society based on a form of Marxism or a capitalist society.
For example, many Marxists claim that in capitalist societies
people are misled about what they desire and what is desir-
able, and there seems to be no way that the employment . of P2
could enable one to decide whether or not to accept^ this
claim. In reply, it must be remembered that the utilitarian
theory which has been developed here claims to do nothing
more than provide the theoretical framework with which to ap-
proach the resolution of moral problems, that the solutions
to problems as complicated as the above are found to be dif-
ficult due to the complicated nature of the world, not neces-
sarily due to a defect in the theory (for Mill's statement of
this position, see "Utilitarianism," pp. 225-226). In my
judgment- -and in accordance with what I think Mill clearly
had in mind—what one must do in these situations is (as the
theory prescribes) to judge as best he can the consequences
which would result from the available alternatives and choose
Section III
The Right to Liberty
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In L,his section it will be demonstrated in Sub-section
III-A that Mill v/as committed to the position that liberty
is a necessary condition for happiness and so is a right, the
violation of which constitutes an injustice. In Sub-section
"th 0 question is posed, "How much liberty is justifi-
able by our utilitarian theory?" and the answer is shown to
be identical with one of John Rawls* principles of justice.
to act on the one for which there is the greater probability
that it would produce the best consequences. For" example,if the evidence available in the situation suggested that* thegeneral happiness would not be maximized if one did do every-
thing. possible to stop the bombing of Cambodia (such as de-
stroying the U. S. government if the opportunity arose)-*-that
more rights to the universally necessary conditions for hap-
piness, will be violated by doing the latter than something
else (i.e., supposing that this conclusion is the result of
appealing to the corollary to the principle of obligation)
—
then. one should not regard as one's duty
-
doing everything
possible to stop the U. S. bombing of Cambodia. And whether
a Marxist society is to be judged by a moral agent as better
than a. capitalist one is going to be dependent upon whether
the evidence the agent considers leads to the conclusion that
the Marxist society is better able to provide the conditions
necessary for attaining individual happiness (and/or dis-
covering what it is), and so maximizing, in the long run, the
general happiness. (Historically, the
-
evidence would seem to
suggest that it is not, and Mill appealed frequently to the
kind of empirical evidence in his defense of a democratic
free-enterprisc kind of society in On Liberty ). Of course,
one. may choose wrongly (in the metaphysical sense), but as
a. finite (non-omniscient ) moral agent, one can only make de-
cisions on the basis of the best evidence one has available.
Appealing to available empirical evidence was essential to the
development of P2 and is no less essential to its application.
Given the empirically-based theory which has been developed,
I know of no other way for the satisfactory resolution of these
difficulties
.
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o u^-section III 4.:.. Mill ' s commitment to the right to
liberty
. There is one other necessary condition for happi-
ness to consider before turning specifically to the problem
of distributive justice. C. L. Ten, in his essay, "Mill on
Self-regarding
.actions," ^ claims to understand what Mill
means by utility which is "grounded in the permanent inter-
est of man as a progressive being." He explains it in terms
of liberty:
Liberty is ^necessary for "the free development ofindividuality,' and without liberty "there is want-lne one of the
.
principle ingredients of human hap-
piness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual
and social progress." Thus Mill is still appealing
to utility or the promotion of human hacpiness as
the standard for appraising the value of liberty.
He also argued that because of the diversity of the
sources of human pleasures and pains and their dif-
ferent effects on different human beings, men will
nei tner ootain their fair share of hapciness, nor
grow up to the mental, moral and aesthetic stature
of which their nature is capable" unless they are
allowed freedom to pursue their own modes of life
.
22
Ten is correct up to this point, but he goes on to
claim that, according to Mill,
Liberty is not to be valued because it increases
the sum of total human happiness, for this implies
that the connection between the two is a contingent
one, but because it is a necessary condition for
the growth of individuality.
.. .Men must be allowed
to choose for themselves not because this will lead
to an increase in their happiness, but because this
is in itself the most important ingredient of hap-
piness.
And later,
21Philosophy
, XLIII, No. 163 (January, 1968), pp. 29-38.
22
Ten, p. 35 .
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ill's reason for allowing liberty in self-regarding:
actions was not that human happiness would thereby
-- increased, but that without such liberty there
can he no "individuality." His defense of freedom
xo no o in terms of utility, but of utility in "thelargest sense," i.e., "individuality . "23
Ii the previous analysis of what Mill meant by individu-
al happiness is correct, fen is wrong in supposing that Mill
did not consider liberty to be a necessary condition for in-
creasing "the sum total of human happiness" (what we have
noted bO be what Mill meant by the 'general happiness'); that
he interpreted it, instead, as only a necessary condition for
individuality. According to our previous analysis, liberty
is desirable only as a means to happiness because only happi-
ness is intrinsically good; consequently, if liberty is a
means to individuality, individuality is also most plausibly
regarded as an extrinsic good, desirable only as a means to
happiness. In fact, the passage above by Ten adequately sum-
marizes Mill's concern for liberty as a necessary condition
for individuality. "...because of the diversity of the
sources of human pleasures and pains and their different ef-
fects on different human beings, men will 'neither obtain their
fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the moral and aesthetic
stature of which their nature is capable* unless they are al-
lowed freedom to pursue their own modes of life."
To suppose that individuality could be regarded as an
'Ten, p. 37.
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intrinsic good, is, at first glance, an absurd utilitarian the-
sis to attribute to Mill; for, according to Mill, only happi-
ness is intrinsically good; meaning that, if individuality is
no c a pars of happiness, then, if it is good at all, it could
only be extrinsically good. This position is made clear in
Utilitarianism.' Having explained that "by happiness is in
tended pleasure, and the absence of pain," Mill says;
...pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only
things desirable as ends; and that all desirable
things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian
as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the
pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means to
the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of
pain.
If we dispense with the suggestion that individuality is in-
herently pleasurable, it is clear that Mill could only have
regarded individuality as extrinsically good, as a means to
the only thing which is intrinsically good—happiness, 2 ^
In all fairness, however, in our analysis of the sec-
ond half of Mill's proof, it was pointed out that Mill held
that many things could be (and are) held to be intrinsically
good besides pleasure and that whatever was so regarded was
26thought by Mill to be a part of happiness. Consequently,
we say that liberty is a necessary condition for acquiring
whatever is held to be intrinsically good, if there might be
H
24
Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 210.
9 cr
'
~-^See also On Liberty
,
p. 63 and the next few pages,
where Mill speaks exclusively of individuality as having
extrins i c wo rth
.
26See pp. 97-102.
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some who hold individuality to be intrinsically good, then
lib-r oj 1 is a necessary condition for their acquiring it. We
can go this far with fen. However, to maintain, as does Ten,
that liberty is good as a necessary condition only for acquir-
ing individuality is untenable. For it would entail, in this
case, contending that only individuality is or would be held
to be intrinsically good, something which is, as a matter of
fac u , false, and clearly denied by Mill (given his discussion
oj. intrinsic goodness in the second part of the proof. ) Even
if Mill considered individuality to be "the most important
ingredient of happiness," as Ten asserts at one point, it is
obvious that there are others and that liberty is a necessary
condition for acquiring these also
.
27
Among other things, Ten has missed what Mill had in
mind by individual happiness, that Mill regarded its content,
for moral purposes, as "whatever is legitimately desired."
Had he noted this, he would also have discovered that, as a
consequence, Mill held that the best way to maximize the num-
ber of people who are individually happy (i.e., the general
happiness) is to grant them whatever conditions are universally
27
It is worth mentioning that Ten’s analysis rests on in-
terpreting Mill as meaning by ’ingredient,' ’part,' rather than
’necessary condition. ' However, in the passage Ten quotes in
which Mill says that "without liberty ’there is wanting one of
the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the
chief ingredient of individual and social progress,'" it can
be argued that it is much more plausible to interpret Mill,
in this context, as using 'ingredient' to mean 'necessary con-
dition. ' Because it would constitute a lengthy diversion, it
will not be argued here.
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necessary for pursuing whatever it is they legitimately de-
sire. As it turns out, liberty is one of the necessary con-
ditions. With happiness understood in this sense, it is not
at all "misleading to say simply that On Liberty provides a
utilitarian defense of freedom," a defense grounded on the
premise that liberty is a necessary condition for individual
happiness, the maximization of the number of individually
happy people, and, consequently, the general happiness. Ac-
cording uo our present terminology, then, liberty is a right,
and one which everyone has equally.
Sub-section III-B: the .justifiable extent of liberty ,
ihe question remains, however, as to how much liberty is
necessary. Paradoxically, the general answer is provided by
John Rawls, an anti-utilitarian. In several articles and
nis recenu book, A Theory of Justice
. Rawls arsues for a
kind of social contract theory of justice and defends a prin-
ciple of justice which he claims utilitarianism can’t account
for: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most ex-
tensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for
others
.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 60.
The articles referred to are "Justice as Fairness," The Jour-
nal of Philosophy
, LIV, No. 22 (October 24, 1957), pp. 653 -
662; "The Sense of Justice," Philosophical Review
, 72 (July,
1963), pp. 231-305; and "Distributive Justice," Philosophy
,
Politics and Society (3rd Series), ed
.
Peter Laslett and
W. G. Rune iman ( London : Billing & Sons, Ltd,, 1967 ), pp. 58-
83 . The principle has been formulated somewhat differently
in Rawls' articles and is reformulated on p. 250 of A Theory
182
It should be apparent, first of all, that this prin-
ciple serves as a rather accurate description of the general
position that Mill was defending in On Liberty
.
29
For it was
t.ill s concern that everyone should be free—should have the
righ t~~to perform those actions which are self-regarding and
should be restricted only at that point at which they became
other-regarding and harmful. In other words, "the most ex-
tensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for
others" was, for Mill, restricted to the area of self-regard-
ing actions. Rawls' principle is descriptive of only the
general position which Mill was defending, however, for the
line between self- and other-regarding actions was thought
by Mill to be the major difficulty. As he says in the early
part of the first chapter:
All thax makes existence valuable to anyone, depends
on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of
other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore,
must be imposed by lav; in the first place, and by
opinion on many things which are not fit subjects
for the operation of law. V/hat these rules should
Jysbic
e
.
^
As I am making only a general point regarding
Rawls* principle, the slight differences between formulations
are not significant enough to be concerned about. It should
also be noted that, of his two principles of justice, Rawls
gives priority to this. one. As he says on p/244 of A Theory
of Justice
,
"The two principles are in lexical order, and
therefore the claims of liberty are to be satisfied first.
Until this is achieved no other principle comes into nlay."
29
It is apparent, that is, as soon as we realize that
the "basic liberties" Rawls is referring to are almost identi-
cal with the liberties Mill was concerned about defending in
On Liberty
.
(See A Theory of Justice
, p. 6l.)
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! r? ^ne Principal question in human affairs:
. ^
1
-L v
’/e exce P"t a few of the more obvious cases.lu
J
~ S
.
one °~ ^h° se which least urogress has been
made m resolving. 30
Rawls’ denunciation of utilitarianism is not surprising,
as his contention is that "This conception of justice differs
from that of the stricter form of utilitarianism (Bentham and
Sidgwick) f and its counterpart in welfare economics, which
assimilates justice to benevolence and the latter in turn to
the most efficient design of institutions to promote the gen-
eral welfare. ^ If this is the kind of utilitarian theory
he is considering, then he is correct in maintaining that, al-
though his principles of justice can sometimes be justified by
utilitarianism
,
As an interpretation of the basis of the principles
of justice the utilitarian conception is mistaken.
It can lead one to argue against slavery on the
30
.
On Liberty
, p. 5. There is substantial confirmation
in. On Liberty that Mill was, in fact, arguing generally in
this way for "an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others." A
few passages from the essay will suffice as examples. "The
only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our
own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to de-
prive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it"
(p. 12). "The liberty of the individual must be thus far lim-
ited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people.
But if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns
them, and merely acts according to his own inclination and
judgment in things which concern himself, the same reasons
which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he
should be allowed, without molestation, to carry out his opin-
ions into practice at his own cost" (pp. 55-56). "As much
compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger speci-
mens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others,
cannot be dispensed with..." (p. 63 ).
3
1
J Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," p. 660.
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grounds that the advantages to the slaveholder do
n °
:
counterbalance the disadvantages to the slave
society at large burdened by a comparatively
mefucient system of labor.
Whereas, he goes on to say, "The conception of justice as
fairness, when applied to the offices of slaveholder and
slave, would forbid counting the advantages of the slave-
holder at all."-^ 2
The utilitarian theory that has been developed thus far
as the more explicit formulation of what Mill had in mind
would also disallow "counting the advantages of the slave-
holder at all," For, as has been made clear through explana-
tion of the principle of obligation and its corollary, it
would not be justifiable to deprive other human beings of
one of the necessary conditions for happiness--in this case,
liberty—in order to satisfy particular desires which must
be classified as illegitimate. The utilitarian theories
Rawls considers perhaps would sanction the objectionable
reasoning concerning slaves and slaveholders. The one that
has been developed in the preceding pages would not.
The situation can be explained somewhat differently.
One of the criticisms of utilitarianism Rawls offers in
A Theory of Justice is that "there is no reason in principle
why the greater gains of some should not compensate for the
lesser losses of others; or more importantly, why the viola-
tion of the liberty of a few might not be made right by the
32J Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," p. 66l,
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greater good shared by the many." 33 if we bear in mind that
he is concerned about classical varieties of utilitarianism,
we might agree that a metaphysical view of right actions ac-
cording to these theories might justify this allegation. Thus,
the "in principle" in the passage may be interpreted as refer-
ring to the principle of utility which v/as previously develop-
ed to specify the conditions for metaphysical rightness (p )
,
However, our utilitarian theory, which does not employ this
principle for the assessment of actions by moral agents, does
not allow, "in principle," the kind of situation above which
Rawls suggests, rrom a non-metaphysical perspective, and
the principle of utility which corresponds to it, the theory
is not subject to Rawls' objection.
Liberty, then, is another necessary condition for hap-
piness. However, it might be objected that some people need
very little liberty to attain happiness and that, in general,
the degrees of liberty required are relative to the needs of
particular individuals. Nevertheless, the amount of freedom
that our utilitarian theory justifies having available to
each individual in society is, in accordance with Rawls'
principle of justice, as much as is compatible with everyone's
having the same amount. The reasons for this are many. The
major one is simply based on the many actual and possible con-
ceptions of individual happiness. Because of the number of
unique individuals and the consequent diversity of individual
33Rawls, A Theory of Justic e, p. 26.
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conceptions of happiness, some are obviously going to require
more lioerty for realizing happiness than others. Consequently,
because our utilitarian theory is committed to maximizing the
happiness of the greatest number of individuals and regards
no legitimate conception of individual happiness as intrin-
sically superior to any other; in a society in which the vari-
ance between individual conceptions of happiness is such that
some require more freedom for realisation than others, the
more liberty it is possible to have available (i.e., within
tne bounds of compatibility), the greater is the probability
that all of the people will be happy. Those requiring the
maximum amount of allowable liberty will have this as a nec-
essary condition for their happiness, as will those who re-
quire lesser amounts.
^
Other
—
perhaps no less important—reasons can be sum-
marized from previous discussions of On Liberty :
(a) If it is supposed that what happiness is, in fact, and
the best means to it are in the category of open ques-
tions, people should have available to them as much
opportunity as possible to experiment with different
conceptions of happiness and styles of living. In ac-
cordance with Mill's arguments in On Liberty which
favor the open society as the best means for attain-
ing truth, only under these conditions is the possi-
34See the quotation above on p. 178 of this text, which
very much supports the point being made in this paragraph.
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oility maximized, that the truth might someday be dis-
covered. Insofar as truth in these matters is desir-
aoie, a maximum of liberty is the best means towards
its discovery.
(b) Even in a society in which what happiness is and the
best means for attaining it are known, a diversity of
conceptions of happiness and life-styles is desirable.
For, according to arguments previously examined from
Oji
—
Liberty
,
only in an atmosphere where truth has
opposition will it remain alive and not become mere
dogma from the lack of necessity to defend it. Inso-
far as this is conducive to the maximization of happi-
ness, it is desirable. Again, there is a much greater
likelihood of this situation’s existing in a society
with a maximum of possible liberty.
(c) A maximum of liberty is conducive to individual devel-
opment, which is extrinsically good in that it provides
the best chance for discovery of the conception of hap-
piness and the means to it which best matches one's
potential. In a manner of speaking, one might not be
as happy in a society with little freedom as he could
be in a society with a great deal more, because in the
latter he is better able to discover the kind of life
he is potentially most capable of enjoying.
Without further argument, I think it can be maintained
that utilitarianism can deal adequately with Rawls' objections.
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In ana it ion
,
it may have a significant advantage over Rawls'
theory. It perhaps allows one to avoid an important objec-
tion against a social contract theory of justice. In his re-
ply oo Rawls paper, "Justice as Fairness," Everett W. Hall
ha° no oed a serious difficulty. He considers the problem of
going from "a contract freely entered by individuals to their
obligation to live up to it," as one involved with the "is-
ought-distinction.
" Referring to the contract one enters
into with respect to the principles of justice, Hall con-
cludes, "Hume and Bentham played this up: the notion of a
duty to keep a contract once entered must be there from the
start on the social contract theory. What is its basis?
Clearly, Mr. Rawls' modernized version is involved in this
deduction of an 'ought' from an 'is.'"^
in contrast, the principle of utility is a normative
ethical principle which justifies one's obligation to abide
by principles of justice, not by the antecedent fact that
one has previously agreed to do so, but because doing so is
more productive of general happiness in the long run. Inso-
far as a violation of the "is-ought-distinction" is a seri-
ous problem (as I believe, with Hall, that it is), utilitari-
an theory may have an important edge over Rawls' theory in
possibly being able to avoid it.^ In conclusion, perhaps
35Everett W. Hall, "Justice as Fairness: A Modernized
Version of the Social Contract," Journal of Philosophy
,
LIV,
22 (October 24, 195?), pp. 667-668.
^ This position is further argued by Hall. Because this
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^3-11 is right in concluding that
^
. , v/hat Mr. Rawls is up to differs from what he
LhinKs he is; l ^am saying that he is doing an in-tuixional justification of fairness as hisic to the
concept of social justice as a normative idea,
whereas he explicitly disclaims that he is. 37
There is one other objection by Hall that is worth
noting. In addition to other criticisms of the social con-
tract theory of justice, Hall also thinks that Rawls is in-
correctly interpreting utilitarian theory when he claims
that according to the theory,
Justice is interpreted as the contingent result of
a higher order administrative decision whose form
is similar to that of an entrepreneur deciding how
is a minor point in contrast with the major thrust of this
sub-section, and is merely mentioned as a
-possible advan-
tage over Rawls' theory, I do not v/ish to become involved
in a. lengthy discussion of the "is-ought" problem, relative
to Mill's theory. Very simply, having concluded in the
first part of the proof that "happiness is desirable," and
in the second part that "happiness is the only thing desir-
able,” Mill also (at least implicitly) accepted a further
general premise which he thought to be acceptable to rea-
sonable people— "whatever is desirable (i.e., good) ought
to be maximized as much as possible," In fact, the ques-
tion, "Why should we maximize v/hat is good?" may be one of
those highly skeptical queries which defies attempts at
"proof" and so cannot be seriously or sensibly dealt with.
Having accepted this general premise, it unproblematically
follows that, if an action is more productive of good (hap-
piness) than any alternative action, then one ought to per-
form it. What has been argued against Rawls is that a prom-
ise made on the basis of a social contract theory is not jus-
tified by anything independently good and, consequently, it
is much more difficu-lt— if not impossible--to derive from
"the promise has been made" the conclusion that "the promise
ought to be kept." That is, a premise like the above--"what-
ever is desirable ought to be maximized as much as possible"
--is not available. At the very least, the "is-ought" prob-
lem appears to be much more of a problem for a social contract
theory than a utilitarian theory like Mill's,
-^Hall, "Justice as Fairness," p. 668-669.
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or to that of someone dis-criDUbing goods to needy persons according to th®relative urgency of their wants. 38
(Rawls makes a similar statement about the nature of these
utilitarian decisions on p. 27 of A Theory of Justice .
)
As
Hall astutely observes:
I think it does not in the least help when Mr. Rawlstalks o± acceptance by the parties involved and con-trasts it with executive decision from above. In the±irot place, the latter method of implementing utili-tarianism is not logically demanded by that doctrine.
It might plausibly be argued that the greatest happi-
ness can only be achieved in an essentially democratic
society
. . .
.
jy
Insofar as a democratic society is thought of as one
where everyone has at least some rights equally, what Hall
is anticipating here is roughly the kind of society and the
kind of social justice that results from the employment of
our utilitarian theory. In other words, not only is Hall
correct in asserting that Rawls' account is "not logically
demanded by' utilitarianism, he is also correct in saying
that "It might plausibly be argued that the greatest happiness
can only be achieved in an essentially democratic society."
In fact, what I am contending and what I believe Mill was
maintaining is that "an essentially democratic society" is
the only kind of society in which the greatest happiness can
be achieved.
In summary, liberty, like life, is justified by utili-
q Q
Rawls, "Justice as Fairness," p. 66l.
19J Hall, "Justice as Fairness," p. 668.
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tarian theory as a universal right which everyone has equally
and which can only he violated according to the conditions
specniea in the corollary to the principle of obligation;
where, once again, not violating the right to liberty when
these conditions are satisfied is as contrary to intuition as
violating the right to liberty when they are not. In addi-
tion, it is obvious that the limit of liberty which Rawls
has specified as a principle of justice is that which is
necessary for maximizing the general happiness. Finally, in
addition to the general happiness being maximized in "an
essentially democratic society," the utilitarian theory we
have developed may have a significant advantage over Rawls'
theory, in that it may be able to avoid objections stemming
from the "is-ought-distinction.
"
CHAPTER iv
A UTILITARIAN ACCOUNT OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Having established life and liberty as rights, and
having thereby avoided two objections to the theory--the one
that it violates our intuitions concerning the right to life,
and the other, Rawls' objection, that it cannot account for
the principle of justice which requires equal liberty for
an— it is time to consider the theory's capabilities for
accounting for principles of distributive justice. One of
the most forceful attacks against utilitarianism in this re-
gard is Nicholas Rescher's book, Distributive Justice .^ In
order to narrow the scope of this topic within the bounds of
manageability, much of the discussion which follows will be
focused on Rescher's arguments.
Section I
Rescher's Objections to Utilitarianism
Distributive Justice is dedicated to demonstrating
that utilitarian theory is inadequate alone to account for
intuitively acceptable principles of distributive justice:
We shall base our inquiry into the principle of dis-
tributive justice upon an investigation of the doc-
trine of utilitarianism. This doctrine is founded
^(New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968).
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-:-?= ffiog^01?18 - uUW' • Exact as it sounds,~ nis classic principle is lmrrecise and indeed in-
adequate. The first objective of our discussion isuo.x.nbit these shortcomings in considerable detail,
..na v/nen i,he necessary emendations are made, the re-sulting position will be such that the label 'utili-tarianism' (as usually construed) can be pinned toit only with serious reservations, if at all,
2
It is not difficult to demonstrate that, from the stand-
point of che utilitarian theory that has been developed and
defended as the most plausible interpretation of what Mill
had in mind, Reseller' s entire enterprise is ill-conceived.
Generally, all oi his objections to utilitarianism are made
with reference to "classical” formulations of the principle
of utili ty
,
and there is absolutely no indication that he was
aware that, when considering justice, Mill spoke in terms of
rights which are justified because their establishment is
necessary for the maximization of the general hapniness.
Analysis of some of his objections v/ill make it readily
apparent that this is the case.
In the example referred to in the first part of Chap-
3ter I,- Rescher asked us to suppose that there are three per-
sons (A, B, and C) who are to be given the utility shares (a),
(b), and (c), respectively, in accordance with either of two
schemes, as follows:
Share ' Scheme I Scheme II
TiT
(b)
(c)
3 units
3
3
2 units
2
6
2
Rescher, up. 8-9.
3
^pp. 5~6, above.
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lx is his contention that because Scheme II yields "the
greater good" and Scheme I yields the greater advantage in
goods for "the greatest number," application of the principle
o± utility cannot result in a decision as to v/hich scheme we
should adopt. "The example brings out the fact that the prin-
ciple of utility is a tv/o-factor criterion ( 'greater good, *
greater number'), and that these two factors can in given
cases work against one another,"^
First of all, it is obvious that if is the principle
of utility which he has in mind in this example, it is true
uhat employing it in this case would not allow us to choose
one scheme rather than the other; but this is so quite irre-
spective oi any specific difficulty inhering in the concepts
of "greatest good" and "greatest number." As it has been
demonstrated that P^ only specifies the conditions under
wnich an action can be said to be metaphysically or objectively
right, that it is theoretically impossible for a finite moral
agent to know what is right according to this principle, and
that this principle has nothing whatever to do with justice,^
4
Rescher, p. 25 .
^That is, although Pq may have something to do with jus-
tice from a metaphysical perspective, it has nothing to do with
it in a non-metaphysical sense. Consequently, as argued pre-
viously (Subsection ’III-F)
,
justice, in the only sense that
can . be interesting and relevant to finite moral agents, is as-
sociated with ?2 , not Pq. I see no reason why this claim
about Pq does not apply generally to all kinds of justice
(distributive, retributive, etc.), although the present con-
cern is not to elaborate on this but only to demonstrate that
P2 can account for intuitively acceptable principles of dis-
tributive justice.
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there is no way that can he employed for the purpose of
determining which distribution scheme is just according to
utilitarianism. As previously noted, the only function this
principle can succeed in fulfilling is to point out what
must be judged as the relatively trivial truth--that the
judgments that moral agents make regarding the rightness of
actions on the basis of P
2 are not necessarily in accord with
that which the theory justifies as metaphysically right.
However, application of P
2 would allow us to decide
which scheme is best; but since we are dealing v/ith justice,
it would allow us to decide only by a consideration of rights
justified by P
2 .
6
Presumably, in the situation described
by Rescher, the individuals involved are to be thought of as
having equal rights to the item in question, since he men-
tions nothing at all about any of them having a special claim
to whatever is being distributed. In this case, our first
reaction might be that he has presented us with what might
well be regarded as an instance of a false dilemma. For,
6 ~Rights have previously been spoken of only in connection
with necessary conditions for happiness. Although it is not
necessary to do so for the purposes of the argument, the ex-
amples Rescher employs can be adapted in this way, so that we
can speak, for example, about his distribution schema in terms
of subsistence items (necessary conditions for life), such as
food.
^
However, Reseller's examples need not be restricted to
the rights we have spoken of thus far, since, later on, other
rights will be justified as aspects of the general right to
liberty. That Rescher has failed, throughout his entire book,
to consider rights with reference to utilitarianism is suf-
ficient evidence, I think, for concluding that he has not
read Chapter V of "Utilitarianism" or, if so, that he has not
read it carefully.
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o Dviousiy
, if we have ten items to distribute to three indi-
viduals, all of whom are presumed to have an equal right to
the item in question, there are two other options available:
(a) if the items are divisible, we could distribute according
to a Scheme III, in which individuals A, B, and C each re-
ceive 3-1/3 of the items in question. (b) If the items are
not divisible, and assuming there are no other considerations
that could be employed which would enable us to decide who
should have the tenth item, some sort of random selection pro-
cedure (e.g., coin-flipping) should be used to decide the is-
oue, since this kind of procedure would recognize everyone's
equal right to the item in question. Consequently, we have
another scheme as an option in which either A, B, or C would
receive four units, the other two receiving three.^ In any
case, it would be irrational to consider one's options for dis-
tribution limited to Rescher's Schemes I and II, if all three
°- individuals have an equal right to the items in question
and there is another distribution which is possible. 8
7Assuming A, B, and C are rational, it would be absurd
for Them not to agree on the use of a random selection pro-
cedure in. this
. situation
. It would also perhaps be absurd to
suppose, in this particular situation, that happiness would
not be maximized if they did so, since all would be assured
that they were given equal consideration in accordance with
their rights, and so* would have no grounds for complaint. If
they were utilitarians, they would also be assured" that the
decision as to who was to receive the tenth item was made in
accordance with the principle of utility (P2). Of course,
there is also the possibility that one or two would abdicate
their right in the situation and so execute a much more laud-
able- -supererogatory--act ion.
0
That A, B, and C have equal rights to whatever is being
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..o./9'/er, ii
,
ior some reason, there is no possibility
of employing another distributive schema and we are left with
only Sen ernes I and II to choose between, P
2 will still allow
us to make a selection. Because our principle of obligation
uells us, generally, that we are to violate as few rights as
possible on any occasion of choice, and since it is evident
that A's and B's rights to the distributed item are both vio-
lated if we act in accordance with Scheme II (assuming every-
one s rights are equal in this case), it is obvious that we
snould distribute in accordance with Scheme I, since no one's
righ ^ are violated (again, if we accept the somewhat absurd
assumption that no alternative scheme of distribution is pos-
sible). To distribute in accordance with Scheme II would be
to distribute in accordance with some other theory than utili-
tarianism, for if would be to presuppose that our sole concern
distributed in Reseller's schema is assumed on the grounds that
Reseller does no u indicate that any of the three have a. special
claim (right) to the distributed items. If C has a right to
a greater share than A and B, then an unequal distribution like
Scheme Ii will be justified, and there is no problem. It must
be remembered that Rescher is concerned about distributive jus-
tice and that, for the utilitarian theory which has been de-
veloped, just actions are those which are in accordance with
rights—as specified by the principle of obligation and its
corollary. Consequently, it" makes sense to speak about one
distribution scheme's being more just than another only by
considering the rights involved. In the absence of rights,
one can distribute in any way he chooses (see pp.198 and 199 )
since one is not obligated to make others happy (argued on
pp. 137-42). As mentioned In the footnote on p. 195» the
major objections to Rescher 's criticisms of utilitarian theo-
ry stem from the fact that he did not consider rights at all
in connection with distributive justice in Mill's utilitari-
an theory. What is being argued, of course, is that, once
the rights which are established by the theory are considered,
the theory is not incompatible with distributive principles
of justice.
193
should, ce tnat only C's happiness he maximized in this case,
rather than that there should he equal concern for the hap-
piness of A, B, and C. Whereas, if we choose Scheme I, and
oo distribute in accordance with their supposed equal rights,
v/e demonstrate equal concern for the happiness of all three.
It is important to note at this point that, if justice
has to do with rights, in the absence of anyone's having a
right to something we possess, we may distribute in any way
ve please or not at all, V/e are to be reminded, once again,
that it is not our duty, as utilitarians, to make other people
happy; vie are only obligated not to violate their rights when-
ever it is possible to do so. That vie are obligated to dis-
tribute only in accordance with rights is noted by Jan Narve-
son in Morality and Utility :
That I have an obligation to give something to Jones
entails that Jones has a right to the thing in ques-
tion, and if the emphasis is on "I" then it entails
that he has the right "against" me in particular....
What common sense tells us, surely, is that we do not
in general have an obligation to distribute things:
What we own is ipso facto
,
what we have a right to
use and hence, normally, to dispose of, as we see
fit. Being what it is for us to have these rights,
and obligations being what we have said in Chapter V,
it quickly becomes evident both that we do not nor-
mally suppose that we have obligations, in general,
to distribute anything, and that there is good utili-
tarian reason for this belief. A fortiori
, we would 0have no obligations in general to distribute equally,-'
Narveson provides an illustration in which he claims
that a millionaire who "takes it into his head to give a
hundred thousand dollars to some beggar he meets on the street
^Marveson, p. 206 .
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one day, but not a single dime to the next one" could not be
guilt/ of an injustice if none of the beggars has a riyht to
the money in the first place. He then concludes that
...there is no sense in discussing the justice of dis-
xribution^ m^a pure vacuum (as is usually done) at
all. It is time to consider some reasonably genuine
situations, of which I submit the above as a good
example. And the lesson thus far is simply that inthe absence of any special obligation, we have nogeneral obligations to distribute anything at all,
and thus no obligation to distribute" it equally. 10
This is obviously in accordance with our previous analy
sis of Mill's theory and means, for the Rescher example, that
in the absence of rights to the item in question there could
be no obligation to distribute in accordance with any schema
of distribution. Consequently, Rescuer's illustration can
make sense to us as utilitarians concerned with adhering to
the dictates of P
2
only if we assume that rights are involved
And if we suppose that each of the individuals being distrib-
uted to has an equal right to the item being distributed,
appeal to our principle of obligation prescribes which schema
should be chosen and, in doing so, avoids any alleged incom-
patibility with intuition.
As a final comment on Rescher' s illustration, it can be
concluded that, contrary to Rescher' s assertion, "the great-
est good of the greatest number" is not a phrase which can be
thought to lead to difficulty for our utilitarian theory so
far as distributive (or any other kind of) justice is con-
1.0Nam/ eson
,
p. 20?.
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cemed. As noted previously, "the greatest good" is to be
oaken as referring to a theory of intrinsic value no more
specific than the one which holds that happiness is intrin-
sically good. And as every legitimate conception of happi-
ness is to be regarded as intrinsically good as any other,
"the greatest number" refers to everyone. The result is
that there is no ambiguity, for both have been referred to
in the process of establishing as universal rights those
conditions which are necessary for the realization and
maximization of everyone's happiness, and for calling an
action just only if it is in accordance with those rights.
Although the phrase may be problematic if one is attempt-
ing to determine v/hat is metaphysically right and so, like
Reseller, attempting to determine v/hat is just according to
utilitarianism without a consideration of rights established
by the theory, this cannot be our concern. From the per-
spective of the principle which is our concern, however,
it poses no problem. With the correct theory in mind, it
looks, at this point, as if Reseller's whole enterorise re-
garding justice and utilitarianism must be judged as en-
tirely misconceived.
The same misunderstanding of utilitarianism is evi-
denced again a few pages later on where Rescher is con-
sidering "one of the standard textbook objections to the
principle :
"
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Scheme I Scheme II
|
(c)
(b)
(a)
Here Scheme II not only yields "the greater good,"
but, works to the advantage of "a greater number "
since two of the three people involved are obviousbeneficiaries of its adoption. But is it reason-
able^ that we should in all such cases be prepared to
sacrifice an "individual interest" in "the generalbenefit," as the principle of utility says we mustdo. The answer to this question cannot be other
than no! We would surely not want to subject oneindividual to unspeakable suffering to give someinsignificantly small benefit to many others (even
^innumerable myriad of them). Actual privation
offends our sense of justice in a more serious way
than do mere inequities.il
Once again, in the absence of special rights which A
and B have to the distributed item that C doesn’t, there is
no reason v/hy we should prefer Scheme II over Scheme I. 12
If these distribution schemes are our only choices and it
is assumed that A, B, and C each have an equal right to the
items being distributed, it is clear that I is preferable
to II on the grounds that II violates C’s right to an equal
distribution, whereas I violates no one 's, However, where
11
Rescher, pp. 28-29.
12
Again, the assumption of equal rights is made on the
grounds that Rescher does not indicate that any of the three
has a special claim (right) to the distributed items. And,
as noted previously, we must be speaking about rights when
referring to justice. See footnote on p. 196-197.
13This assumes, of course, that this is not a situation
of scarcity, in which, for example, the item being distributed
is a subsistence item (i.e., a necessary condition for life,
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neither A, B, nor C have rights to the items being distrib-
uted, whoever is doing the distributing is justified in
distributing in accordance with any scheme he wishes, in-
cluding Scheme II. If, on the other hand, the much more
plausible situation obtains whereby some other distribution
scneme could be opsed for which was preferable to either I
or II (such as, in the last example, dividing a divisible
item or adopting a random selection procedure for an indi-
visible iuem), is would be irrational and contrary to utili-
tarian theory to choose either I or II
.
Of course, Reseller's insistence that the principle of
utility demands that it is "reasonable that we should in all
such cases be prepared to sacrifice an 'individual interest'
in the 'general benefit'" is completely misguided. Because
everyone's happiness is to count as much as any other's; in
the interest of maximizing the general happiness in the
long run, the theory justifies assigning everyone an equal
right to all the necessary conditions for happiness. Con-
trary to Reseller's supposition, the principle of utility
such as food) and the amounts represented by Scheme I are
not sufficient to do either A, B, or C any good (in this
case, to sustain their lives). In such a situation, we would
be aole to justify dividing the item between only two of the
three (probably via a random selection procedure), thus sav-
ing two lives instead of losing three. In this case, how-
ever, we would be choosing the least of two harmful alterna-
tives, thereby acting in accordance with the principle of
obligation. Moreover, it should be noted that, in this
situation, Scheme II would have to be changed so as to
represent only A and B--if they were selected--since C's
life would necessarily be sacrificed.
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does not regard this kind of sacrifice-a sacrifice of rights
--as "reasonable.
. .in all such instances." Although it might
be ohe case that (all or some) sacrifices like this are meta-
physically light, according to the only conditions under
which they can be sanctioned are those specified by the prin-
ciple of obligation and its corollary
.
14
Under these condi-
tions, such sacrifices are justified as productive of the gen-
eral happiness and are not incompatible with intuition.
Once again, to sacrifice anyone's right(s) for the pur-
pose of satisiying others' desires for happiness when those
desires are not directed toward universally necessary condi-
tions for happiness is to erroneously suppose that one's duty
as a utilitarian is to make other people happy. In situations
like the above, in which we are presumable obligated to make
some people happy at the expense of violating the rights of
others, it has previously been concluded that we are not
operating with utilitarianism but rather with some other
ethical theory.
It might be objected that this analysis of Reseller's
Illustration takes no account of degrees of happiness and
that not to do so is contrary to utilitarianism. Thus, in
adapting the illustration somewhat, one might argue as fol-
lows: If we suppose that A, B, and G are the only three
individuals in the world, Scheme I can be taken to represent
14
For an example in which a violation of rights is jus-
tified by the principle of obligation, see the preceding foot-
note
.
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the situation in which all three are equally happy; whereas
Scheme II can he taken to represent the greater degree of
happiness lor A and B if they were to take something of C's
against his will, thereby slightly diminishing C's happiness.
Our criuic would contend, v/ith Rescher, that surely the
utilitarian must justify the action of A and B, since it
would obviously maximize the total amount of happiness (even
in the long run, we might suppose).
In reply, we must recall two prior conclusions: (a)
We do not know what happiness is, in fact. (b) We do not
have knowledge of the nature and/or extent of the conse-
quences of our actions. This means that we cannot know,
for any particular action, whether it is metaphysically
right or obligatory, whether performing it will maximize
the general happiness (as defined for Objective Rightness-^.
Considering the fact that it makes sense to speak and make
judgments about degrees of happiness only if we have this
kind of knowledge, it must be concluded that we cannot make
this kind of judgment; to do so is to assume that we have
more knowledge about happiness than we really have. V/e
must proceed on the basis of the evidence we do have—that
which was used to formulate P^-and, consequently, can only
justify being concerned about the obligation of protecting
rights to the universally necessary conditions for happiness.
In short, any situation can be imagined from a meta-
physical perspective (such as Reseller's illustration); but
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as we have seen, this kind of speculation is not the sort of
thing we can be concerned about as utilitarians interested
in the non-metaphysical agent-oriented aspect of the theory.
As we have previously noted, metaphysical rightness (Objec-
tive Rightness-^) serves only to point out the possible dis-
crepancy between what is metaphysically right and what a
finite moral agent judges to be right using P 9 .
If the objector turns instead to talk of "desires
satisfied," Reseller* s illustration might be adapted as fol-
lows: If A and B took something from an unwilling C, even
though they harm him, more desires would be satisfied than
if they didn't. That is, if we suppose that two desires
are satisfied for each of the three in Scheme I, we might
suppose in Scheme II that only one of C*s desires is satis-
fied, whereas three are satisfied for both A and B. Our
critic would now argue that, even though there is a satis-
faction of illegitimate desires, the general happiness is
maximised by choosing. Scheme II over Scheme I because more
desires are satisfied by doing so.
However, to argue in this way is again to indulge in
metaphysical speculation. For to imagine that we can equate
happiness with the number of satisfied desires is again to
suppose that we know much more about happiness than we do.
Scheme II may represent what is metaphysically right but,
as far as we know, the two satisfied desires gained by A
and B in Scheme II may not be sufficient to compensate for
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C’s loss of one satisfied desire, and so not maximize the
long run general happiness (as defined for Objective Right
-
ness-j^). We cannot with assurance say that, if Jones has
more desires satisfied than Smith, Jones is happier than
Smith. Equating numbers of desires satisfied with happiness
is a simplistic supposition and is something we are in no
pooition to do. Again, operating with Pp, which is formu-
lated on the basis of the evidence we have available with
respect to happiness, we can only justify protecting rights
to the necessary conditions for happiness; but we cannot
justify the assumption that the greater the number of de-
sires satisfied (legitimate or illegitimate) the greater
the degree of happiness produced; operating with Pp, it
makes no sense to speak about degrees of happiness. We
have formulated Pp on the basis of what we know. Op-
erating with it, the general happiness (as defined in ac-
cordance with Objective RightnesSp) is maximized and, as
finite moral agents, maximizing the general happiness in
this sense is all we can plausibly be concerned about.
^
From his illustration, Rescher concludes that "These
considerations suggest adding to the principle of utility
15The really difficult problem arises for Rescher'
s
illustration if we suppose that A and B are able to take ad-
vantage of C without his knowledge. In this case, Scheme II
would represent C's happiness in the same amount as in Schem
I, while A's and B's is significantly increased. This kind
of situation will be dealt with subsequently in Chapter IV.
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another qualifying clause, a ’principle of catastrophe-pre-
vention' stipulating a minimal utility floor for all indi-
viduals below which no one should be pressed." He thinks,
therefore, that we should add to the principle of utility
the proviso, "... provided that nobody rec eives less of 'the
lifan a certain (i.e., some
-plausible) minimum amount . "
For Clearly one of the most basic elements of our concept
justice is to minimize the number of oersons in a state
of genuine deprivation regarding their share in the avail-
able pool of utility."^
If ohe utilities referred to by Rescher are universally
necessary conditions for happiness, then we can agree that,
if at all possible, no one should be placed in a state of
deprivation, for everyone has an equal right to them. In
this case, then, our utilitarian wholeheartedly agrees with
Rescher; but this proviso is, contrary to Rescher 's allega-
tion, already part of his theory. On the other hand, if the
utilities Rescher refers to are not universally necessary
conditions for happiness, then not everyone has a right to
them and no one without a right to them is treated unjustly
if he does not receive a share of them. As utilitarians
we can conclude that a "utility floor " makes sense if we
are speaking of necessary conditions for happiness, but is
senseless if taken to refer to anything else capable of be-
ing distributed. There is no problem here, however, for
^Rescher, p. 29.
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P
2 provides a "utility floor" in the former sense. 17
Rescher does consider rights when, in another major
section of his hook, he discusses legitimate claims but,
again, he fails to note the fact that utilitarian theory ac-
counts for justice in terms of them. His whole enterprise
here he conceives as a more explicit reiteration of "...one
of the standard objections to utilitarianism on the part of
nineteen uA-c en oury critics." He cites a passage from Herbert
Spencer's The Data of Ethics as representative of the posi-
tion he is defending:
"Everyone to count for one, nobody for more than
one." Does this mean that, in respect of whatever
is proportioned out, each is to have the same share
whatever his character, whatever his conduct? Shall
he if passive have as much as if active? Shall he
if useless have as much as if useful? Shall he if
criminal have as much as if virtuous? If the dis-
tribution is to be made without reference to the
natures and deeds of the recipients, then it must
be shown that a system which equalizes, as far as
17That Rescher, in his discussion of a "utility floor ,"
is referring to necessary conditions for happiness is evi-
denced in a footnote in which reference is made to a passage
from John Hospers' book, Human Conduct (pp. 29-30). The pas-
sage is concerned with the problem of having sufficient food
to prevent starvation and it is concluded that it would be
foolish to divide equally in a condition of scarcity when
the. resulting shares would not be sufficient to sustain life.
It is concluded by Hospers that this "...would really be run-
ning the equality principle into the ground." It should be
noted that the utilitarian theory that has been developed
does not condone strict egalitarianism, and that even where
everyone concerned has an equal right to the item in question,
situations like the one described by Hospers constitute ex-
ceptions. This problem will be delved into in greater depth
later on, v/here it will become apparent that a wholly egali-
tarian principle of distribution is not only contrary to in-
tuition but to the principle of utility (P2) as well.
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it can, the treatment of good and bad, will bebeneficial. If the distribution is not to be in-discriminate, then the formula disappears. The some-
bv
1
efnet
S
ri^
1
^
)U
^
ed mUSt be aPPortioned otherwise thanJ 0oal division. There must be adjustment ofamounts to deserts; and we are left in the dark asto tne mode of ad justment--we have to find otherguidance. lb
In light, of the theory that has been developed, we will
only say, at this point, that it is absurd to maintain that
utilitarianism entails that we must distribute equally to
everyone under all conditions, meaning that there is no such
thing in utilitarianism as the forfeiture of a right to a
distribution, and that the principle of utility cannot be
used to make any discriminations whatever on the basis of
merit. Rescher is right in an important sense when he con-
cludes that
• • • decisive and fatal objection to any straight-
forward adoption of the classical principle of utility
as a rule of distribution is this: it leaves wholly
out . of account that essential reference to claims,
merit, and desert without which no theory of dis-
tributive justice fulfills the requisite for seri-
ous consideration.
...
19
That is, insofar as "the classical principle of utility" is
concerned, his judgment is probably correct. His fatal over-
sight, however, is having failed to realize that there is a
utilitarian theory (the basic structure of which is found in
the work of J. S. Mill) which can successfully account for
intuitively acceptable principles of distributive justice,
1
o
Rescher, pp. 42-4-3
^Rescher, p. 48.
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including those which take account of claims, merit, and
desert. We will proceed to consider these issues in the
next section.
Section II
Frankena's Theory of Social Justice
Rather than continue with a detailed analysis of
Rescher s objections to utilitarianism concerning claims,
it is best at this point to take a more general, and what
will prove to be an ultimately more fruitful, approach to
resolution of these so-called difficulties. I wish to
turn attention to a theory of social justice propounded
by a non-utilitarian, William K. Frankena, which I think
can be demonstrated as capable of accounting for many— if
not all-~of our intuitions regarding distributive justice
and which can be shown to be derivable from our utilitarian
theory. Sub-section 1I-A will be concerned with a brief
account of Frankena’s theory, focusing specifically on a
comparison of Frankena's and Ch. Perelman’s views on equality
as the basic concept of justice. Sub-section II-B will at-
tempt to show that, contrary to Frankena's assertion, his
basic theory is derivable from the utilitarian theory that
has been developed and attributed to Mill.
Sub-section Il-A: Frankena and Perelman— equality as
the basic concept of justice
.
Frankena has concluded, after
some preliminary considerations on the topic of "Equality
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and Justice," that "The modem concept of social justice is
complex and includes a meritarian as well as an egalitarian
element. It recognizes the demand to respect differences
between persons as well as the demand to respect person-
ality as such." Strictly egalitarian theories of justice,
which maintain that no inequality is ever justified and that
justice calls for a strict equality in the treatment of all
individuals no matter who they are, regard "every departure
from complete equality
... as beyond the pale of justice, though
not beyond that of the morally right or obligatory." Re-
garding such theories, Frankena concludes that they
are possible and have an apparent simplicity, but
they limit the usual scope of justice. Not every
departure from equality is ordinarily regarded as
a departure from justice, let alone from morality.
For one thing, such departures are allowed on the
ground of differences in ability, merit, or desert.
Certain other departures from a direct or simule
equality, called for by differences in need, or
involved in carrying out agreements, covenants,
contracts, and promises, are also recognized as
just, and not merely as justified or right. 21
It is the purpose of the remainder of his essay to reconcile
these other principles of justice with the concept of equality.
In recognizing the importance of the concept of equality
in all other principles of justice, but in rejecting strictly
egalitarian theories as inadequate, Frankena is not alone.
20 . .William K. Frankena, "The Concept of Social Justice,"
Social Justice
,
ed, Richard B. Brandt (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962 ), p. 127
^‘Frankena, pp. 12-13.
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Ch. Perelman sees the problem in a similar fashion:
10 everyone the idea of justice inevitably suggests
uhe notion of a certain equality. From Plato andi.nsmcle, through St. Thomas Aquinas, down to thejurists j moralists and philosophers of our own day
runs a thread of universal agreement on this point,ine notion of justice consists in a certain applica-
tion oj. the notion of equality. The whole problem
ij, to define this application in such fashion that,
consti outing the element common to the various
conceptions of justice, it leaves scope for their
divergencies
,
In fact, it is Perelman' s contention that the egali-
tarian formula of justice--"To each the same thing"--is
merely another way of framing what he refers to as "formal"
or "abstract" justice. He arrives at the latter by noting
that, despite all their differences, all formulas of justice
"have something in common in their attitude." Those who
require merit to be taken into account want "the same treat-
ment for persons having equal merits." The same is true for
those who want need or social rank or any other character-
istic taken into account. Whatever their disagreement re-
garding characteristics that should be taken account of,
"They are all agreed that to be just is to give the same
treatment to those who are equal from some particular point
of view, who possess one characteristic, the same, and the
22
Ch. Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of
Argument (London: P.outledge and Kegan Paul, 1963)
,
p. 12.
Reseller's demand (noted on p. 209 of this text) that an ade-
quate theory of distributive justice must account for "...
that essential reference to claims, merit, and desert..."
evidences his agreement that a wholly egalitarian theory of
justice is unsatisfactory.
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only one to
of .justice ,
essential
:
yiich regard must be had in the administrati on
Perelman refers to this characteristic as
I-l the possession of any characteristic whatever
makes impossible to group people in a classor category denned hy the fact that its memherspossess the characteristic in question, peoplehaving an essential characteristic in common willlorm part of one and the same category, the same
essential category.
He then defines formal or abstract justice as "a principle
ac 4i°n ia accordance v/ith which beings of one and the
same essential c ategory must be treated in the same way .
"
2 3
ihe egalitarian formula of justice is formulated as an
equivalent second definition of formal justice as follows:
"All that is necessary is to specify that by ’each one’ is
meant the members of the same essential category. Thus we
ye c the formula ’to each member of the same essential cate~
gory, the same thing,’ which is equivalent in every point
to the definition of formal justice...." 2^
Prankena accepts Perelman 's definition of formal jus-
tice but recognizes its limitations in that "This formula
as purely formal. It says only that a society to be just
must have rules and act on them. It does not say what the
rules should be, or how cases of any given sort should be
dealt with." Therefore, although agreeing with Perelman’s
23
'"'Perelman, p. 16.
24
Perelman, p. 18.
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rule o: justice as "a requirement of reason,"
interested in "the content of social justice;
determine what i>he rules should "be and how we
about dealing with specific situations. 2 ^
Frankena is
" he wants to
should go
As his own general position, Frankena asserts that
much more reasonable than a strictly egalitarian conception
of justice, and much closer to ordinary thinking,
...is the conception of social justice as the equal
treatment of all persons, except as inequality is re-
quired by relevant—that is, just-making—considera-
tions or principles. ... It takes equality of treat-
ment to be a basic urima facie requirement of jus-
tice, but that it may on occasion be overruled by
other principles of justice (or by some other kind
of moral principle).
As he is careful to note, however, this view is not neces-
sarily very egalitarian. "It does hold that all men are
to be treated equally and that inequalities must be justi-
fied. But it also allows that inequalities may be justified,
and everything depends on the ease and the kinds of considera
p f.tions by which they may be justified."
In Section VII of his essay, "Basic Theory of Justice,"
Frankena develops his theory of social justice more precisely
After stating once again the need for "a plausible line of
thought that will explain both the role of equality in the
concept of justice and those principles of justice which are
not derivable from the ideal of equality," he proposes to
argue that "The principles of the family of justice, insofar
2 3
^Frankena, pp. 8-9.
2o
Frankena, p. 13
.
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as they go beyond the requirements of equality, direct or
indirect, go beyond them only because they express a cer-
tain limited concern for the good lives of individual per-
sons as such." ? He has thereby opposed the classical
meritarian view of justice, and has accepted as part of his
own view,
...the principle that all men are to be treated as
equals, not because they are equal in any respectbut simply because they are human. They are humanbecause they have emotions and desires, and are able
mo think, and hence are capable of enjoying a good
a sen
? e which other animals are^not. . . .By the
.
good life is meant not so much the morally
good life as the happy or satisfactory life. As I
se« it, it is the fact that all men are similarly
capable of enjoying a good life in this sense thatjustiiies the prima facie requirement that they be
treated as equals . 2b
He describes the just society as one concerned, as
much as possible, with the equal treatment of everyone:
A just society, then, is one which respects the
good lives of its members and respects them equal-
ly. A just society must therefore promote equality;
it may ignore . certain differences and similarities"
but must consider others; and it must avoid unnec-
essary injury, interference, or impoverishment
—
all without reference to beneficience or general
utility. The demand for equality is built into
the very concept of justice. The just society,
then, must consider and protect the good life of
each man equally with that of any other, no matter
how different these men may be, and so it must
allow them equal consideration, equa.l opportunity,
and equality before the law. The equal concern
for the good lives of its members also requires
society to treat them differently, for no matter
how. much one believes in a common human nature,
individual needs and capacities differ, and what
^Frankena, pp. 18-19
.
28n iFrankena, p. 19.
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constitutes the good life fo
not do so for another. It
concern for the good lives
termines which differences
it must respect (and which
A society need not respect
only an ad hoc bearing or none
lives of their possessors--for
have
good
one individual may
is the society's very
of its ^members that de-
and which similarities
are relevant to justice),
those differences which
at all, on the
example, colorof skin. But it must respect differences likepreferring one religion to another, v/hich do have
on the individual good life, 29a bearing
Sub-section II-B: the derivabilitv of Frankena's basic
^theory from utilitarianism
. Frankena denies that the just
society he describes can be justified by utilitarian theory. 30
Although this may be true for any of the classical versions
ox the theory, it is this kind of a society which is sanction-
ed by the formulation of the theory we have been arguing for.
frankena has argued that "The just society.
. .must consider
and protect the good life of each man equally with that of
any other, no matter how different these men may be, and so
it must allow them equal consideration, equal opportunity,
and equality before the law." We have argued that each mem-
ber of any society is to be treated equally on the grounds
that his conception of happiness (his view of the "good life"
Frankena speaks about) is to be regarded as intrinsically
good as any other, with the consequence that each individual
is to be provided, so far as possible, with an equal oppor-
tunity to pursue his own conception of happiness. Frankena
has argued that "A just society... is one which respects the
7Frankena, up. 19-20,
30Frankena, pp. 15-16,
21?
S° 0Cl llv9S 01 1TS members and respects them equally, a just
society must therefore promote equality.” We have argued tha-
once we hold each legitimate conception of happiness of equal
vaiue
,
xhe only way to maximize the general happiness is to
promote equality of opportunity by assuring each of the mem-
bers of society of equal rights to the necessary conditions
-ior happiness. Furthermore, we have argued that the closer
any society approximates the ideal of placing everyone in the
position of having an equal opportunity for the pursuit of
happiness, the more certain will be the possibility that the
general happiness will be maximized. It follows from this
bhat every deviation from the equal treatment of everyone
must be justified on the grounds that it enhances or at
least does not violate equality of opportunity, which is pre-
cisely what Frankena has argued.
Although there is a striking similarity between our
theory ana the description Frankena provides of his, there
31r
. his
.
means
,.
for example, that although giving morefood to. ohe impoverished than to the rich is unequal treat-
ment, it is justified in that it serves to equalize the op-portunity ^to pursue happiness. In addition, this would be
bne justification in a society for taking more tax monev fromthe rich than. the poor, a problem Mill dealt with in the last
chapter. of Utilitarianism," In fact, Rescher seems to agree
with mhis way of justifying unequal treatment when speaking
about ohe nanon of heed," his second "Canon of Distributive
Justice:" "...recognizing that as things stand, men comem oo the world with different possessions and opportunities
as well as differences in natural endowments, the principle
professes to treat them, not equally, but so as to" make
them. as equal as. possible" (p. 75). For a more detailed
utilitarian justification of unequal treatment, see po. 222-
33* especially pp. 228-29.
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is an important difference, and one which constitutes an ad-
vantage i or utilitarianism. Whereas both Frankena and Perel-
man have regarded the egalitatian element in principles of
justice as purely formal or abstract—as "simply a require-
ment of reason"--this aspect of justice is justified by utili-
tarianism because adherence to it as a nrima facie right is
conducive to the maximization of the general happiness. It
is no longer a formal principle but is justified as a basic
right, deviations from which must be justified (as Frankena
agrees) only on the condition that they result in more
equality for everyone— equality of opportunity for the pur-
suit of happiness.
Considering Perelman for a moment, utilitarianism also
represents a signiiicant advantage over his position on
"essential categories." Perelman regards their establishment
as based on an arbitrary selection of values:
If. we regard a rule as unjust because it accords pre-
eminence to a different value, we can only note the
disagreement. No reasoning will be able to show that
either one of the opponents is in the wrong. Be it
noted that while such a state of affairs occurs most
often in discussions of the division of beings into
essential categories, it is possible for questions
of value to arise even when the subject under discus-
sion is the treatment to be provided for the members
of certain categories . 32
There is no objective basis, then, for determining when
a rule or law is just or unjust, for, according to Perelman,
any basis chosen for determining this could only rest on an
32Perelman, p. 53.
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arbitrary selection of values. Although Perelman's conclu-
sions are of no value to us for making such judgments--as we
often mjo
. according to utilitarianism, decisions about the
justness of rules are possible, as they are based on a con-
sideration of the consequences of adhering to them. That is,
if employing a rule results in a greater equality of oppor-
tunity for the pursuit of happiness and consequently results
m a greater possibility that the general happiness will be
maximized, it is just.
In short, utilitarianism means by equality, equality
of opportunity ± or the pursuit of happiness, which means
equal acceso oo uhe conditions universally necessary for
one pursuit ol nappiness. • Therefore, for utilitarianism,
inequalities in distributions are justified as long as they
result in equal access to the necessary conditions for hap-
piness, at least in the long run. And a just society is one
which will do what it can to provide everyone with these
necessary conditions; that is, it will acknowledge every-
one’s equal right to the necessary conditions for happiness
and will do whatever possible to fulfill its obligations
respecting those rights.
Though Frankena does not speak directly of necessary
conditions for the pursuit of happiness, it is apparent he
agrees that providing for them is one of the primary obli-
gations of the just society. First, he maintains:
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a just society must protect each member from bein^xroured or interfered with by others, and h muK*
-.0.., by omission or commission, itself inflict evil
^°Aani h 0f ?hem - deP'rive them of goods' which theyinighu otherwise gam by their own efforts, or re-‘
tuheir liberty— except so _ far as is necessaryfor ohmr protection or the achievement of equality.
Having thereby sanctioned the protective function we have
alremy seen is justified by utilitarianism, he states the
following
:
^though we are
.
speaking of the just society, and not
0 bf ,-~p o
d
society, iLs concern with the goodness oftne lives of its members need not be considered merely
negative and protective. It seems reasonable to assign
to the. just society a more positive interest (though
one which falls short oi beneficience) by saying that
it must, so far as possible, provide equally the con-ditions under which its members can by their own ef-
forts (alone or in voluntary associations) achieve
the best lives of which they are capable. This means
that the society must at least maintain some minimum
standard of living, education, and security for all
its members. 33
In conclusion, although Frankena claims that his theory
of social justice is non-utilitarian, this conclusion is
based on a short-sighted view of the theory. When he argues
that differences in treatment based on considerations of
equality cannot be derived from the principle of utility
3 Q
-tFrankena, p. 21. It should also be noted that he is
in agreement with utilitarianism in maintaining that a so-
ciety is not unjust which is not beneficient. In the same
paragraph he says that to think of a society as just "...
does not involve direct action on the part of society to
promote the good life of its members, whether this be con-
ceived of as pleasure, happiness, self-realization, or some
indefinable quality. Such direct action is beneficience,
not justice." In conjunction with therefore, beneficient
actions are right but not obligatory.
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(because "...the differences in treatment involved are not
justified simply by arguing that they are conducive to the
general good life.,. but by arguing that they are required
for the good lives of the individuals concerned."^), he
has failed to take account of our theory and, consequently,
to note that the general good— "the general happiness"—
can only be maximized when the individuals responsible for
making it up are treated in accordance with the dictates
0“ justice; that this kind of consideration "for the rood
lives of the individuals concerned" is the only way to
maximize the general happiness and to accord thereby with
the principle of utility. Finally, whereas Frankena says
that "Unless we depart from our ordinary understanding of
the term 'justice,' social justice cannot be defined merely
fry saying that a society is just which acts, distributes,
and so on, in accordance with valid moral principles ,
'
we can now disagree by maintaining that "a society is just
which acts, distributes, and so on, in accordance with"
rights established by the valid moral principle which has
been argued for—the principle of utility. Furthermore,
acting in accordance with this principle does not offend our
intuitions regarding justice.
34Frankena, p. 15.
J Frankena, pp. 4-5.
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Section III
ihe Utilitarian Theory of Distributive Justice
--Other Considerations
The utilitarian theory of distributive justice will be
discussed in more detail in three sub-sections. In Sub-
section III -A, it will be argued that Reseller’ s "Canon of
Claims" is consistent with utilitarian theory and is made
far less abstract than Reseller’s conception of it by doina
what we must as utilitarians--subordinating six of Rescher's
seven "Canons of Distributive Justice" to the one which cor-
responds to the principle of utility. Sub-section III-B
will deal specifically with the problem of merit as a dis-
tributive principle of justice, concluding, with Narveson,
that there is no general obligation to distribute accord-
ing to merit; and developing as an implication of the right
to liberty that people should have the freedom to distribute
things in accordance with any criterion of distribution they
wish, so long as doing so is right. Finally, Sub-section
III-C will emphasize that justice can never give way to
other right-making considerations
,
and that Mill agrees.
Sub-section 1II-A: a utilitarian analysis of Rescuer’s
"Canons of Distributive Justice ." The theory of distribu-
tive justice which utilitarianism is committed to can be
made more precise if we turn back, for a moment, to Rescher.
In Chapter IV of Distributive Justice, Rescher begins by
listing seven "Canons" of distributive justice:
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course 01 the long. history of discussions
a.
‘ he subjecx, distributive justice has been held
.0 consist, wholly or primarily, in the treatment
oi all people:
1
)
as
. equals (except possibly in the case of cer-xam negative" distributions such as punish-
ments)
.
2) according to their needs.
3) according to their ability or merit or achieve-
ments
.
4) according to their efforts and sacrifices.
5) according to their actual productive contribu-
tion.
6)
according to the requirements of the common
good, or the public interest, or the welfare
of mankind, or the greater good of a greater
number.
7)
according to a valuation of their socially use-
ful services in terms of their scarcity in the
essentially economic terms of supply and demand.
Correspondingly, seven_ "canons" of distributivejustice result, depending upon which of these
factors is taken as the ultimate or primary de-
terminant of individual claims, namely, the can-
ons, of equality, need, ability, effort, produc-^
tivity, public utility, and supply and demand. 36
Upon concluding that neither of these canons is suf-
ficient by itself to account for distributive justice
("These canons all suffer the aristocratic fault of hyper-
exclusiveness"), Rescher puts forward "...as representing
(in essentials) our own position on the issue of distribu-
tive justice, the CANON OF CLAIMS : Distributive justice
consists in the treatment of people according to their
legitimate claims, nositive and negative
.
^°Rescher, p. 73.
•^Rescher, p. 82.
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Although having previously admitted that "The question of how
claims come about--how merit and desert soring into exist-
ence— seems to me among the most difficult and complex issues
in ethical theory ," 88 it is apparent that what he means gen-
erally by "legitimate claims" is those claims which are mem-
bers of uhe class of claims which accord with intuition.
Bearing in mind Perelman's warning that "...each man
advocates a different system. No system is capable of se-
curing the adherence of all," ^ it would be unrealistic to
expect that the utilitarian theory of distributive justice
developed below will be accepted by everyone. Nevertheless,
it will be maintained that the theory of distributive jus-
tice sanctioned by utilitarianism is largely— if not wholly
--plausible from the perspective of intuition
.
210
88Rescher, p. 6l.
39
^'Perelman, p. 15.
40The question of the reliability of moral intuition
is, of course, highly controversial. It is debatable how
reliable a guide it is in particular situations or to what
extent it should be appealed to for judging the accept-
ability of ethical theories. It is well to remind ourselves,
consequently
,
of the caution with which we should proceed
when appealing to it. For example, Alan Donagan has said,
"It must be confessed that when, as with rule-utilitarian-
ism, moral theory contradicts moral intuition only in a
few farfetched cases, moral intuition is far from a safe
guide." ("Is There a Credible Form of Utilitarianism?"
Contemporary Utilitarianism
,
ed. Michael D. Bayles /Garden^
City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., Anchor Books, I968/7
,
p. 198.) Similarly, Rawls alludes to the difficulty of de-
pending on the illusive nature of intuition in the last sec-
tion of his essay, "Distributive Justice," ( Philosophy ,
Politics and Society /3rd series/7, ed. Peter Laslett and
W. C. Rune iman /London : Billing & Sons, Ltd., 19677. pp.
?9 - 82 . )
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,/e can make sense of Reseller's ’’Canon of Claims" by
considering his "Canons of Distributive Justice" in light
of our utilitarian theory. It is only by doing so that his
notion of "the treatment of people according to their legiti
mate daims " can be removed from the realm of the uselessly
abstract and enabled concrete application in particular situ
ations.
Of the seven canons listed by Rescher, utilitarianism
must, of course, subscribe to the sixth canon, the canon of
public utility. Bearing in mind, however, that so far as
justice is concerned our principle of obligation is formu-
lated with reference to rights, a more precise way of stat-
ing v/hat tnis canon requires is to say that a distribution
is just if it consists in "the treatment of all people ac-
cording to their rights." That is, to say that distributive
justice consists m tne treatment of all peoole "according
to the requirements of the common good" (Canon six) is to
say that it is to treat them "according to the rights they
have to the items of distribution." Moreover, since their
rights have previously been noted as being rights to the
universal conditions necessary for happiness, our reformu-
lation of canon six is, in effect, a particular formula-
tion of canon two, which requires "the treatment of all
_
.
. , 4ipeople according to their needs." Our utilitarian theory,
as
4l
To be
"essential
somewhat more accurate, we might qualify these
needs," since they are needs for which it is
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then, sanctions, as just, those distributions which are
distributions of items in accordance with rights to them;
conversely, distributions of items which violate rights to
them must be judged to be unjust.^2
VlQ Can now state more precisely that a society is to
be characterized as 'socially just' if, and only if, ‘ it
does whatever possible to distribute whatever is necessary
i0r Proviaing its members equally with the necessary con-
ditions for happiness (life and liberty) in accordance with
the principle of obligation and its corollary. As pre _
viously noted in agreement with Frankena, a just society is
obligated to do everything possible to provide for the equal
essential (i.e., necessary) to satisfy in order to enableanyone to pursue happiness.
42^
i a
-nr-i i
S
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E™
’
”0n Ju? tice and Injustice," Mind
^P? 1
.
1
'.,
197 ?'' • 118 discusses distributive justice in~tiFms
of Perelman s concept of "essential categories" and regards
neea as the basic one, by means of which he is able to givean account of two others, "merit" and "worth." See especi-
ally p. 212: "I want to suggest, then, that essential cate-gories are needs or contributions to the satisfaction of
needs;" also p, 213, where he discusses reasons why one
should regard distribution as just: "Reasons of ascertain
sort are needed and I suggest that they are reasons to do
with essential categories, i.e., reasons to do with charac-
teristics re3.ated to needs in the ways described." I am
obviously in agreement with Ewin's basic approach. In the
same paragraph, however, Ewin denies that utilitarianism can
account for distributive justice, as he interprets it.
43 „Oi course, this is meant to include not only material
things like food and sufficient shelter but other necessary
conditions for the preservation of life and liberty, such as
equal treatment before the law, equal police protection, and
so forth.
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opportunity of all its members to pursue happiness by assur-
ing them, so far as possible, of the necessary conditions
for happiness. This means that inequalities of treatment
(e.g., giving more food to the poor than to the wealthy)
are sometimes necessary but can be said to be just only in-
sofar as the ultimate result is more actual equality rela-
tive to the necessary conditions for happiness. What is
noVl "being claimed is that acting in accordance with the prin-
ciple of obligation and its corollary will justify unequal
treatment of the members of society only under these con-
ditions
.
That Doth individuals and societies can be just or
unjust means that everyone has rights against everyone else
and also against society. Some of these rights overlap;
e.g., botn society and every individual, whenever capable
of doing so, are obligated to save lives and protect people
.irom unprovoked bodily injury. However, not all the rights
overlap; e.g., one may have a right against society to "pro-
vide unemployment compensation in the event he is unemployed,
but does not have this right against every individual. In
fact—though it won't be argued for here in detail— this
might serve to point out at. least part of what Mill had in
mind when he distinguished between perfect and imperfect
44
obligations. ' That is, one might be said to have an im-
perfect obligation, as a member of society, to pay his taxes
44 .
Mill, "Utilitarianism," Chapter V, p. 247 .
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to make possible society's fulfilling, for example, its
obligation to provide its members with unemployment compensa-
tion when they need it. This would then, perhaps, constitute
part of what is meant by one's imperfect obligation to be
beneficient ; something which, according to Mill, one is not
obligated to do with reference to any particular person or
obligated to ao on any particular occasion. Thus, we might
plausibly say that some or all of society's so-called per-
fect obligations to its members may also be its members’
imperfect obligations with respect to each other.
We can now deal effectively with Rescher's other
canons of distribution. They can be employed by a just so-
ciety as means for effecting distributions of necessities
in accordance with canon six (as amended and qualified
above). For example, in a society that does not produce
enough subsistence items to assure everyone of life, it
would be just to stimulate their production by rewarding
producers "according to their actual productive contribu-
tion" (canon five) or in accordance with canon seven, three,
or four, or any combination thereof. Similarly, if the
only way to assure adequate protection against crime were
to pay very large salaries to people with the ability to
become good policemen, this would also be justified. Con-
sistent with our acceptance of Frankena's basic theory
above, as long as the eventual result is more overall
equality (or there is good reason to believe that this v/ill
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be the result) in the society for everyone, relative to the
necessary conditions for happiness, inequalities of treatment
resulting from the other canons of distribution are justi-
fied, they are in accord with the principle of utility.
^
Rescher also seems to advocate a justification of un-
equal treatment in terms of its resulting utility:
If we are willing--as I think we must be--to oer-
mit considerations of justice in the narrower*
sense of fairness. to be overshadowed by considera-tions of justice in a wider sense that takes into
account the common good, then we have to be ore-pared to recognize the superiority of "unfair" dis-tributions whose unfairness "pays for itself" bvbringing greater advantage to all. 4
6
Yet, he has claimed, when speaking of "true justice"
in trie paragraph preceding, that "its ultimate arbiter" is
not "the general good alone without reference to claims,
rights and desert: its determination requires the appro-
priate conjoint coordination of these two at-times-divergent
factors." ' And a few pages later, "Our thesis is that jus-
tice (in the narrow sense) and the general good of utilitari-
anism must be coordinated with one another, and that just
45Compare with Rawls' second principle of justice:
"Inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to ex-
pect that they will work out for everyone's advantage and
unless the offices to which they attach, or from which they
may be gained, are open to all" ("Justice as Fairness," pp.
653“654), Though it 'won’t be argued here, there is little
doubt that this principle is roughly equivalent to Frankena’s
position--the one we have been arguing is justified by the
principle of utility.
4 6
Rescher, p. 93-
4 7
'Reseller, p. 92.
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this constitutes justice in the wider sense
,
Su__ ice it to say that "claims, rights and deserts"
are justified by our theory in terms of their productive-
ness of "the general good" (what we refer to as the
-gen-
eral happiness ). Consequently, the coordination Rescher
speaks of between considerations of "fairness" (justice in
the narrow sense) and "the common good" (justice in the
wider sense) is not only uselessly abstract but, for our
theory, completely unnecessary. What is entailed by our
theory is that justice (or fairness) can never give way to
a distinct principle—the principle of utility—or vice-
versa; for what is just is determined to be so by the
principle of utility.^
before concluding our analysis of Rescher, one other
ioSue deserves our attention, in the section, "Special
Problems of an Economy of Abundance," Rescher states:
In an economy of abundance it becomes not only
possible but plausible, and indeed at a certain
point
. imperative
,
to elevate one's conception of
a minimally tolerable share of utility. The fact
that as a utility economy rises from a condition
of scarcity to one of sufficiency to one of
aoundance the elevation of the minimal level in-
evitably becomes warranted, is of crucial import-
ance for the theory of distributive justice. The
Rescher, p. L02.
49Rescher elaborates on this distinction in the sec-
tion "Justice and Inequality" of Distributive Justice
, pp.
101-104, and especially on pp. 102-103. His position here,
however, is no less confusing and unsatisfactory. Most
seriously, how we are to "coordinate" principles is not at
all adequately accounted for.
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minimum is raised from bare survival +.n n + _iorJ o+.
Hoaestly-pleasant survival!^ a inThe tood
scc iety--and the economy that is itsproductive sector—becomes able to "afford" moreand more in the passage from adequacy to abundance,
an elevation in the level of exoectation of itsmembers becomes inevitable, and our levels ofto_erable minimality" are revised drasticaliy
upward.nd
In an economy of abundance, our utilitarian theory may
also require that the members of such a society be appor-
tioned larger shares of its wealth, on the general utili-
tarian ground tnat, in such a society, assuring everyone
of more than merely subsistence items is a necessary con-
dition for assuring everyone, so far as possible, an equal
opportunity for the pursuit of happiness, and so is a nec-
e Soary condition ior maximizing the general happiness. It
would be plausible to argue that, although distributing in
this manner is not a necessary condition for life, it is a
necessary condition in such a society for assuring that
everyone has equal liberty for the pursuit of happiness;
ior it is apparent that this would not be the case for
those who--compared with many others, or the majority--
were assured of only subsistence items. A society, then,
should be considered unjust according to utilitarianism
which does not do everything possible to eliminate such a
disparity of advantage whenever it is clearly possible to
do so and more overall equality of opportunity for the
pursuit of happiness will be produced in the long run.
50Rescher, pp. 98-99.
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As has often occurred in societies with an economy of
abundance
,
n j'-,
•
/
?
r
+ •
i' e
- srence
. . . have undergone aqualitative change, because the economists' con-
°I-
a lr
^
ing v/age " has undergone substantial
s^alation. ror example, their concept now in-etudes not only the minimalities of food, clothe,and shelter--m respect of which there has also "been escala tion--but also entirely new means forprotections against illness and accidents. Theliving at. issue here is no longer to be taken
as mere living, as bare survival, but is to be
construed in terms of some measure of "the good111 e
.
" bJ-
In conclusion, the "Canon of Claims," as Rescher
elaborates on it, remains problematically abstract through-
out his book, and, consequently, does not provide us with
an adequate means for discriminating between legitimate
and illegitimate claims or for adjudicating situations in
which legitimate claims conflict. On the other hand, the
theory of distributive justice sanctioned by our utili-
tarian theory not only accepts the "Canon of Claims," but
interprets it in such a way as to allow us to deal with
tnese problems in an intuitively unob jectionable manner.
For example, in one of his typically abstract passages,
Rescher says,
In espousing the Canon of Claims we may note that
the search for a canon of distributive justice is
carried back to the Roman jurist's view that the
definitive principle of justice is inherent in the
dictum suum cui aue tribuens--"giving each his own."
To the question "What is his own?" we have given
the answer "What he deserves ." That is, a share
31J Rescher, p. 101.
ideally equal— or at
legitimate claims. 52
any rate proportional--to his
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In contrast, the principle of utility provides substantive
concent to rhis passage by interpreting legitimate claims
as rights to the necessities for the pursuit of happiness
and by sanctioning, as just, inequalities of treatment in-
sofar as they serve as the best means of fulfilling the
obligations which are correlative to those rights.
Finally, we find ourselves in the position of affirm-
ing what Rescher has denied— "that considerations of justice
and fairness are of subordinate status to considerations of
utili oy because they can be derived from the principle of
utility." As a result, it is not the case that utilitari-
an theory must be qualified by recognizing them as "needed
supplements drawn from an entirely different set of considera
tions
,
and not as merely subordinate derivatives at all."-^
Sub-section III-B; the problem of merit
. Something
should be said specifically about merit. I think, as utili-
tarians, we must agree with Narveson's observations:
Critics have also complained of the inability of
utilitarianism to account for the principle of dis-
tribution in accordance with "merit." Here, too,
confusion and muddle have obstructed progress. To
begin with, the objection is usually voiced in such
a way as to imply that there is some sort of general
quality called ."merit , " assessable independently of
any considerations of special purposes or activities
...but the briefest inspection shows that such a
52Rescher, p. 83 .
53Rescher, p. 116 ,
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no '-ion is nonsense. There is no such thing asgeneral human
_ merit . » There is moral merit, ath-pianistic merit, ditch-digging merit,
-ach n? Th
and the reasons for "rewarding"
~ n 01 t e se tnings are specifically different ^
As an example, he supposes that a group of people get to-
gether to form an athletic organization, for the purpose of
holding contests to see who can run fastest, jump highest
or farthest, etc. The rules for each contest determine what
"merit" is for the particular case (in a foot race, merit
io proportioned to speed, etc.). Narveson concludes:
lo classify these abilities as "merits" is to saythat these are the activities which the partici-
pants and supporters of the activity are interestedinland which therefore they will he disposed to
praise or otherwise reward. The proposition that
meri u should De rewarded" is, in other words, simplv
analytic. 55 - "
Agreement with Narveson' s remarks has two implications
for our theory. First, distributing in accordance with merit
like any other form of distribution— is obligatory when
doing so will result in more equal access to the necessary
conditions ±or happiness. Second, one of the liberties
54Nam/ e son, p. 216.
55Narveson, pp. 216-217. Prankena says something about
"virtue," one of the traditional concepts of "general human
merit," which is in agreement with the position that we are
under no general obligation to distribute in accordance with
merit.
^
"Social justice then does not, as Ross thinks, con-
sist simply in the apportionment of happiness or good life
in accordance with the recipient's degree of moral goodness.
In fact, society must for the most part allow virtue to be
its own reward, else it is not virtue." (Prankena, p. 21.)
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people should have--one which is compatible with a like
liber oy 102- ail is devising contests and making contracts
(agreements) which are not harmful to others; i.e., which
do not violate their rights. Although a society may be
obligated, on occasion, to employ these as means for acting
in accordance with the rights of its citizens, societies
individuals should be allowed to do so whenever it is
not wrong to do so, whenever it is merely right. In other
words, they should be allowed to distribute in accordance
v/ith merit or any of the other canons of distributive jus-
tice whenever no one's rights are violated. To say that
they shouldn't be allowed to do this would, I think, be
to maintain that everything should be distributed in ac-
cordance with some particular principle or principles of
distribution; which would be to suggest, either that every
distributable item is a universally necessary condition
for happiness or that, as utilitarians, we are obligated
to make other people happy. To the contrary, every dis-
tributable item is not a universally necessary condition
for happiness, and we have concluded that it is merely
right to make ourselves and others happy.
In conclusion, any contest in which a particular merit
is to be rewarded, or any contract made between individuals
in a society or between society and individuals which is
other-regarding but non-harmful, is right, and societies
and individuals should both be granted the liberty to deal
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wi oh each o oher in this way. For in this way many of the
items which make people happy--which satisfy their legiti-
mate desires are produced and, although no one is obligated
to participate for the purpose (direct or indirect) of satis-
fying their legitimate desires, clearly it is within the
bounds of rightness to do so. In other words, this is
merely one of the opportunities for pursuing conceptions
of happiness which people should be allowed--in accordance
with the right to liberty--to take advantage of. In a
society with liberties such as these, people have the
rights necessary for the pursuit of happiness, and actually
are enabled thereby to become happy.
With this in mind, we can agree with Narveson's con-
cluding remards about the above example:
/
^ The problem of breaking contracts (e.g., promises)
without good reason can perhaps be handled by suggesting
that this is not a liberty that would be compatible with a
like liberty for all. Simply, if people were allowed to
break contracts indiscriminately whenever they felt like
it or at the slightest provocation, the consequences for all
of society would be disastrous. It would therefore be cor-
rect to say, as utilitarians, that people do not have a
right to this kind of liberty, but what their right to lib-
erty does entail is that they have a prima facie right to
have the terms of their non-harmful contracts enforced;
i.e., this is an essential aspect of liberty--a liberty
compatible with a like liberty for all--and so is a neces-
sary condition for maximizing the general happiness. In
other words, we can say that one has a orima facie right
against others to keep the promises (comply with the terms
of the contracts) made with them; consequently, breaking a
promise is the violation of a right and therefore a harm
which must be dealt v/ith by the principle of obligation
and its corollary. This problem will be dealt with in more
detail in the next section, on "Fair Procedures."
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ex w lex
^
us point out that people who are unin-terested in. athletics need not bother to come, andti course will not cheer the winners, nor nartici-pa^e m the other rewarding activities for" theseparticular endeavors. All of this is obviously
oanc tioned by utilitarianism! The rewarders aredoing what they want to, the contestants are doing
what they want to, and those who stay home forlack of interest are doing what they want to
Where is the difficulty?57
Sub- section III-C : the preemptive status of .justice
.
iiarly in his essay, "The Concept of Social Justice," Frankena
describes a position on .justice which he later rejects:
Just-making considerations are only one species
of right-maicing considerations. And, theoretically,
at least
,
a consideration of one kind may over—rule
a consideration of the other. In particular, a just-
making consideration may be over-ruled by a right-
making one which is not included under justice. 58
hot only is this clearly not allowed by the theory we have
developed; it also could not have been accepted by Mill,
After a brief summary of the theory's position, we will
argue that Mill was in agreement with it.
The principle of utility of our theory allows us to
distinguish between acts which are merely right and those
which are obligatory, but the corollary to the latter
clearly disallows that a merely right action could ever take
precedence over a right action which is just (and so obli-
gatory). As has been emphasised throughout, to suppose
that this would ever be justified would be to presuppose
that our duty, as utilitarians, is at least sometimes to
37Narveson, p. 217.
38Frankena, p. 3.
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provide zor the happiness of others rather than only to do
whatever possiole to assure them of the rights necessary
for the pursuit of happiness. Accordingly, since justice
can never give way to other considerations, beneficience
,
e uC
•
*
something we can he concerned about only if our
obligations stemming from justice are fulfilled; only if,
in being beneficient, no injustices are done. Once amain,
this means that it would be right to make other people
iiaPPy? and the theory encourages us to do so, but we can-
not
,
as utilitarians, ever regard it as our duty to do so.
Frankena's conclusions in this area state our posi-
tion quite well (bearing in mind, of course, that he re-
gards principles of justice as independent of the principle
of utility--not derivable from it.)
...it will not do to say, as Brandt does, that jus-
tice consists in treating people equally except as
unequal treatment is justified by moral considera-
tions of substantial weight in the circumstances. If
I am right, this description should be revised: jus-
tice is treating persons equally, except as unequal
treatment is required by just-making considerations
(i.e., by principles of justice
,
not merely moral
principles) of substantial weight in the circum-
stances. With this emendation, the description
seems to me to be correct, both in theory and as
a reflection of the ordinary notion of justice. 59
Frankena's position is mrely another way of stating
what has already been established by the corollary to the
principle of obligation.
It has been maintained that Mill regarded as rights
5o
Frankena, p. 10.
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whatever were universally necessary conditions for the pur-
suit oi happiness and thought of acts as just if, and only
il
,
they did not involve violations of those rights. It
is not immediately apparent, however, that he thought that
justice could never give way to other considerations of
social utility (what Frankena has referred to above as
"right-making considerations"). For example, at first
glance, the second to the last paragraph of "Utilitarian-
ism" appears to pose a problem:
It appears from what has been said, that justice
is a name for certain moral requirements, which,
regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale
of social utility, and are therefore of more para-
mount obligation, than any others; though particu-
lar cases may occur in which some other social
duty is so important, as to overrule any one of
the general maxims of justice. Thus, to save a
life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty,
to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or
medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate,
the only qualified medical practitioner. In such
cases, as we do not call anything justice which
is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice
must give way to some other moral principle, but
that what is just in ordinary cases is, by rea-
son of that other principle, not just in the par-
ticular case. By this useful accommodation of
language, the character of indefeasibility attrib-
uted to justice is kept up, and we are saved from
the necessity of maintaining that there can be
laudable injustice.
There are several reasons why this passage should not
be interpreted as sanctioning the overthrow of principles
of justice, on occasion, by other (i.e., merely right-
making) considerations. First, as he is speaking of only
60
Mill, "Utilitarianism," p. 259.
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"general maxims of justice" being overruled, this is not
incompatible witn interpreting this as meaning that "gen-
eral maxims of justice" may sometimes be overruled by "par-
ticular maxims of justice." Thus, although it would gen-
erally De unjust to Steal or take by force" food or medi-
cine, and generally unjust "to kidnap the compel to offi-
ciate the only qualified medical practitioner," it would
sometimes constitute a particular act of justice to do so;
for example, when the preserving of a life requires such
actions. Second, the example provided clearly falls into
the category of a "perfect obligation." If there are any
rights that anyone has against every other individual,
surely the right to life is one, meaning that not to save
a life when one has the opportunity would constitute an
obvious case of injustice. As Mill says regarding every
instance of injustice, "...in each case the supposition
implies two things: a wrong done, and some assignable per-
son who is wronged."^ The example Mill provides clearly
satisfies both conditions. Third, that part of the passage
which says, "...we usually say, not that justice must give
way tc some other moral principle, but that what is just in
ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not
just in the particular case," is unfortunate in that it is
not precisely formulated. Though it appears to refer to
"some other moral principle" than a principle of justice,
6lMill, "Utilitarianism,
"
p. 247-
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I think it would, more correctly be read as follows, and
would thereby be more closely in accord with what the rest
of Chapter V implies about Mill's intentions: "...we usu-
ally say, nob ohat justice must give way to some other moral
principle than a principle of .justice, but that which is just
in ordinary cases is by reason of that other principle of
justice, not just in the particular case." Fourth, to in-
terpret Mill as maintaining that justice can sometimes be
overruled by other moral considerations is inconsistent
with that interpretation of Mill, previously expounded on,
which shown that Mill was concerned that one's only obliga-
tion should be providing people with equal access to the
necessary means for the pursuit of happiness and not with
sacrificing these, on occasion, to satisfy other desires.
Finally, in any ordinary account of the meaning of "inde-
feasibility," to call principles of justice "indefeasible"
is to say that they could not be overruled by other con-
siderations; i.e., no principle of justice could ever be
overruled by some other moral principle which was not
also a principle of justice.
In conclusion, if the passage does not, in a final
analysis, bear this interpretation, suffice it to say that
Mill was unfortunately inconsistent. Having previously
maintained that justice has to do with rights, that rights
are established by utilitarianism as necessary conditions
for the pursuit of happiness, and that adhering to them
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over other considerations is the "best way to maximize the
general happiness, perhaps he has here lapsed into main-
taining that the general happiness can sometimes he maxim-
ized when they are subordinated to other moral considera-
• • 62i°ns * However, that his example could not have been
concerned with conflicting rights (e.g., the right to life)
and could not, thereby, have been regarded by him as one
evidencing conflicting principles of justice, as would
have to be the case with this interpretation, is somewhat
incredible
.
Section IV
Fair Procedures
In Chapter V of Distributive Justice
. Rescher deals
with some problems that are susceptible to solution through
an appeal to "fair procedures," a concept which David Lyons
discusses in the final chapter of his book, Forms and Limits
o f Utilitarianism '-7 However, as Lyons maintains that "fair
i.e., that in cases like this the issue is not
whether justice or injustice is done. "...what is just in
ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, notjust in the particular case." If we interpret "the other
principle" as one other than a principle of justice, the
interpretation that adhering to the other principle in this
case maximizes the general happiness (and has nothing to do
with justice) is the only plausible explanation of its in-
tended meaning. However, as noted in the previous para-
graph, that this is the correct interpretation of the pas-
sage is doubtful.
63
'(London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
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procedures" are something that must he appealed to in addi-
tion oo the principle of utility in order to accommodate
jUo uice
,
^his section will he devoted to the demonstration
of two points in Sud— section IV—A and IV—B, respectively;
(a) Lyons' concept of "fair procedures" is derivative from
our utilitarian theory. (b) Reseller 1 s problems in Chapter V
of Distributive
-Justice
, as well as some other problems
having to do with distributive justice, can be solved by
employing "fair procedures."
Sub-section IV-A; a utilitarian principle of dis -
tributive justice
. Contrary to Lyons' claim that the most
significant result of his book is the establishment of the
64
"equivalence thesis," Richard E. Flathman has pointed
out, in a review of Lyons' book, that it is actually his
final chapter which must be taken as containing his really
decisive arguments against utilitarianism. D Whereas the
"equivalence thesis" is meant to substantiate the claim
Lyons asserts the importance of the "equivalence
thesis" on p. xi of the preface to Forms and Limits of Utili -
tarianism ; "The thesis of extensional equivalence ... seems to
me the main result." On the page preceding, he has summar-
ized briefly what he means by it: "...contrary to widespread
misapprehensions, two formally different kinds of utilitari-
anism, simple and general, and along with the latter one kind
of rule-utilitarianism, are extensionally equivalent; that is,
analogous principles of the various kinds necessarily yield
equivalent judgments in all cases; or, in other words, it
makes no difference in theory whether the simple or gener-
alization test is applied to acts or--within limits--whether
an appeal is made to rules grounded in utility."
^
"Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism," Ethics , 76
(July, 1966 ), pp. 311-312.
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made in the preface that "little is gained by choosing one
-Lorm /oi utilitarianism/rather than another," this conclu-
sion is best regarded as subsidiary to his more general
claim evidenced in the last chapter of the book— that no
pure form of utilitarianism can provide an adequate meta-
ethical or moral theory, because of not being able to ac-
count for fairness and promise-keeping, the two moral prac-
tices Lyons uses to make his point. If this latter claim
is true, the "equivalence thesis" must be regarded as of
only secondary importance, for its result is only to have
demonstrated that several presumed alternatives to act-
utilitarianism (itself, theoretically objectionable) are
either equivalent to or no better than it; so we are left,
in the final analysis, with what we had in the beginnings
a theoretically inadequate ethical theory.
Flatliman provides an adequate summary of Lyons' gen-
eral argument about fairness:
Arguments from fairness are relevant when (1) there
is an existing cooperative practice (2) which actu-
ally achieves and distributes (3) total benefits that
could not be produced without the practice, (4) bene-
fits that outweigh the total burdens imposed by par-
ticipation in the practice, and (5) which could be
produced and distributed despite (partial?) non-co-
operation by some v/ho benefit from the practice.
Parasitic non-cooperation, which the utilitarian
would sometimes have to approve on the grounds that
it maximized utility, is condemned by a non-utili-
tarian argument from fairness. "Under such circum-
stances /the argument from fairness/demands universal
cooperation by enjoyers."0 ^
Flathman, p. 312. For the argument in the detail in
which Lyons presents it, see Forms and Limits of Utilitari -
anism
, pp. 164-16?
.
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rather than argue generally that judgments about fair-
ness are derivative from utilitarian judgments, I wish to
consider
,
opecifically
,
Lyons* notion of "fair orocedures ,
"
which he regards as part oi the solution to the problem as
to whether or not "we want fairness ( just distribution) al-
ways to weigh more heavily than utility." 07 Although his
objective is to demonstrate that "fair procedures" are, in
an important sense, not reducible to utilitarian considera-
tions, it is doubtful that he succeeds.
As an example of a fair procedure, he asks us to
imagine a college of one thousand students with a fifteen-
hundred capacity cafeteria which must operate at a capacity
in order to avoid services being cut or prices raised;
students must invite guests but it is obvious that if all
or no students invited guests, the situation would be less
than satisfactory. Obviously, cautions Lyons, "It would
be absurd to say that no one should have guests (or that
everyone should have guests) because the results of no
one's (everyone's) having guests would not be as bad as the
results of everyone's (no one's) having guests. To argue
this way is to miss the point." And he concludes:
What is required instead is an arrangement whereby
the facilities could most efficiently be used. What
is required is the establishment of a fair procedure
for determining which students at which times may
bring guests, a procedure designed to maximize util-
ity without infringing upon the equal claim with
^Lyons, p. 168 .
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which each student begins The details are notimportant here. What is important is that the pro-
cedure be fair. 68
rirst, it is essential to note that the procedure de-
vised in Lyons example is wholly defensible on utilitarian
grounds. Lyons agrees. As he says about this situation,
Here one does not outweigh the other: fairness is ap-
plied in order to maximize utility, As we have seen in
other situations where everyone has an equal claim (right)
to something, the best way to maximize utility is to devise
some procedure which best acknowledges them as such,^ it
is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine any other pro-
cedure for Lyons' example which would do more to maximize
utility.
Although the ’’fair procedure” is established in this
case for the purpose of maximizing utility, Lyons asserts
that "...after the system has been established, the answer
to the individual student's question, 'Should I invite a
guest?' presupposes considerations of fairness and not just
those of utility."' This is preposterous, however, since
^Lyons, p, 169-70.
(i Q
''Lyons, p. 1?0.
70In fact, if to argue for "fair procedures," is to
argue for the obligation to distribute items in accordance
with legitimate claims (rights) to them--and this seems to be
Lyons' position--this is precisely what our utilitarian theory
requires as essential to the maximisation of the general hap-
piness
.
^Lyons, p. 170
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it is odvious that anyone's deviating from the fair procedure
Lyons describes would result in a decrease in the amount of
resulting utility. One has perfectly good utilitarian grounds
xor acting in accordance with the procedure as it has been set
up. If the argument is that one can also justify not devi-
ating irom the procedure on grounds of fairness, this is
merely to say that this approach to justification is equiva-
lent to the utilitarian. If this is the case, however,
clearly ei uher serves as a sufficient reason for not deviat-
ing from the procedure and an appeal to fairness is not an
additional necessary condition for justifying such a deci-
sion. The distinction Lyons is trying to maintain exists
between fairness and utility is a distinction without a
significant difference, as an appeal to utility justifies
the procedure he describes as v/ell as any appeal to fairness.
Lyons' position here seems to stem from the fact that
he is dissatisfied that we think it sufficient in these
cases that utilitarian theory accord with our intuitions
regarding justice (and fairness). He seems to think that,
irregardless of its accord with intuition, not sanctioning
a separate non-utilitarian criterion of fairness--although
this would be absurd in the circumstances (because unneces-
sary) --is a sufficient basis for judging the theory inade-
quate. In fact, what seems to be held as a necessary con-
dition for the acceptability of any ethical theory, accord-
ing to Lyons, is that it recognize and employ a distinct
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non-utilitarian criterion of fairness. This somewhat in-
credible position is evidence in the following passage:
In general, it is necessary to distinguish between
our reasons for criticizing certain modes of be-
havior, on the one hand, and the consequences of
that behavior, on the other. V/e need not suopose
that uncooperative (or unfair) behavior is not
harmful. It can be disastrous in its long-range
effects. But reasons based uoon utility are only
one relevant kind of reason. 72
In reply, we can only say that if we can accommodate
intuitions by a utilitarian consideration of consequences
alone (as we have above), Lyons' contention that "reasons
based upon utility are only one relevant kind of reason,"
can only sensibly be construed as meaning, in those situa-
tions in v/hich intuition can be appealed to, that an appeal
to intuitions about fairness v/ill yield the same conclu-
sions a.s an appeal to utilitarianism. His thesis • amounts to
saying only that the separate criteria are, in these cases,
equivalent. To this the utilitarian can only reply, "I
72told you so . " J
^ 2Lyons, p. 72.
72 ...Lyons again insists on the necessity of a separate
appeal to fairness in the second of two reasons for reject-
ing any attempt to "reduce" fairness to utility. "...some
of our reactions presuppose considerations of fairness.
For example, one who violated the rules of a fair procedure
and thus failed to cooperate would be subject to criticism
for acting wrongly, not because his act was harmful (for it
need not be), but because it was unfair" (p. 172). Recog-
nizing that he insists on the appeal to fairness even when
the consequences are harmful (v/e might add, no matter how
harmful), v/e can say again that, regardless of the fact that
the basis of some of our reactions may be considerations of
fairness, this is not really significant if an appeal to
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Ljons contention that "reasons based upon utility-
are only one relevant kind of reason" results in his claim
that another basis for the evaluation of acts is motives:
v'/e must consider.
. .motives independently of the
utilities or disutilities connected with them.
It seems clear that in one use of the term "fair,"
an unfair act is primarily one performed by anindividual who tries to get (for himself) something
i or nothing, who tries to avoid contributing whilehe consumes, who tries to take advantage of the
efforts and restraints, sacrifices and burdens,
hardships and inconveniences of others. The ques-
tion relevant to fairness is, then, not whether
one’s act produces good or bad effects, but
whether one acts in the kind of way I have lust
generally described. 74
Without elaborating, I think it is necessary to make
only two comments about this suggested approach to the
judgment of acts. (a) To argue that an action is to be
judged right or wrong (fair or unfair) on the basis of the
motive of the agent is to beg the question against the
utilitarian and, consequently, to ignore the useful dis-
tinction he insists on between the appraisal of the action
and the agent. That is, whereas the agent is deserving of
praise or blame on the basis of his intention (motive) prior
to the act, the action is best considered independently
,
in
terms of its consequences. (b) It is not at all obvious
that categorizing a motive as good or bad is a process in-
dependent of accounting for its consequences. For apart
utilitarianism will also result in intuitively acceptable
conclusions. And this is what we are maintaining.
74Lyons, p. 175*
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from regarding some motives as intrinsically good or bad
(a° leasx a problematic and perhaps an implausible sug-
gestion), judgments concerning motives are at least in some
cases grounded in past experience with the consequences of
acting upon them. Once again, it seems that one is justi-
fied in suspecting that Lyons is not successful in his at-
tempt to demonstrate the independence of factors in the
judgments about actions which are not derivative upon con-
siderations of utility; for the most forceful--if not the
only--reasons to be offered for motives being good or bad
are most probably in terms of their consequences. As
Flathman concludes:
Lyons is right that motives, established procedures
and other formalistic considerations play a role in
morality; but he does not show that their develop-
ment to a place of moral standing can be explained
independently of utilitarian considerations or that
the use we make of them could be defended v/ithout
recourse to utilitarian considerations . 75
Setting up a "fair procedure," as in the cafeteria
example above, can be done on the basis of utilitarian con-
siderations alone, and acting in accordance with such a
procedure can also be justified in this way. Perhaps, how-
ever, as Lyons suggests, the more interesting cases are
those in which there is an existing situation which satis-
fies the conditions for an argument from fairness but in
which there is no fair procedure to appeal to. As Lyons
7 5
-p. 316. Flathman develops some of the points made
in (b) on pp. 31^-316.
.
. . this
says about, the establishment of fair procedures, "
is only a partial answer to the question originally raised,
about utility perhaps outweighing fairness ."'70 For, as he
says further on,
In any
^
actual case an argument from fairness will
most likely occur within a more or less inefficient,
more or less
. inhumane
,
more or less unjust and un-fairly administered set of rules. There is no simple,
readily definable set of calculations through which
we can run in order to determine whether we should
cooperate, instead of doing something else. (The
alternative to cooperation is not simply a failure
to cooperate; many sorts of actions are open in
either case
.
)
And he concludes in the next paragraph that,
Because of such factors, it might be best to say
that one's obligation to cooperate is not perfect
or absolute, but rather prima facie
. For there may
be conditions--not just utilitarian considerations
now—which justify a refusal to cooperate in a
practice which satisfies the conditions, outlined
above, for the application of an argument from
fairness . 77
The crucial question with respect to such situations
is whether or not what utilitarian theory determines as to
when one should or should not cooperate in such practices
is consistent with intuitions about fairness. If so, the
"conditions ... which justify a refusal to cooperate" can be
fully accounted for by utilitarian theory. First of all,
from the perspective of the utilitarian theory being con-
sidered, if an existing situation, practice or procedure
is unfair, this means that rights are being violated and
76
Lyons, p. 170.
"^Lyons, p. 171.
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that what one should do in this case is dependent on the
harms resulting from the alternative actions available
(i.e., one should appeal to the principle of obligation
and its corollary). In some cases, it would be best-
would result in the least amount of harm—not to cooperate
and to work, instead, for the establishment of a better
(fairer) practice or procedure; in others, it would be best
to continue cooperating (e.g., it might be best not to break
a bad law in a generally good system). In any case, as
Lyons has noted above, "The alternative to cooperation is
not simply a failure to cooperate; many sorts of actions
are open in either case."
In snort, Lyons insists that there are other con-
siderations than utilitarian ones which moral agents must
appeal oo in order to determine whether they should con-
tinue to cooperate
cooperating, or do
in an unfair practice, refrain from
something else. However, Lyons has not
oniy not made explicit whatever other criterion (or cri-
teria) one should employ for judging what we ought to do
in such a situation, he has not attempted to show that em-
ployment of the utilitarian criterion is inconsistent with
intuition. We will only say that it has been shown that
establisning a fair procedure and complying v/ith it is
justified by utilitarianism, in addition to being compatible
with intuition; and it is not at all clear that what the
theory prescribes we do in these situations is not also in
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accora wi~h intuition. Granted that the complexity of pos-
sible situations of this kind often militates against simple
solutions, the utilitarian insists that one must always do
his best to choose that action which will result in the least
amount of harm; i.e., one must do his best to act in accord-
ance with the principle of obligation and its corollary. Not
to do so would be irrational, and, I submit, contrary to in-
tuition. ^
—
- —section Iv- B: a solution to some problems of dis -
tributive Rustic
e
. Now that it has been concluded that fair
procedures are justified by utilitarian theory, it is ap-
parent tha b they can be appealed to for the purpose of solv-
ing many otner problems having to do with distributive jus-
tice. For example, prior to his discussion of fair procedures,
Lyons has considered the familiar "lawn-crossing case" and
has concluded that to take advantage of others' cooperative-
ness (i.e., their not crossing the lawn) is to act unfairly,
and that utilitarian considerations play no part in condemn-
ing such actions. It seems apparent, however, that fair
procedures can be successfully employed here as well.
Commenting on the cafeteria example above, Lyons has
said, "...the appeal to utilitarian generalization to
no
See Lyons' example of an unfair tax law, p. 171. A
utilitarian v/ould be obligated to consider the questions
Lyons thinks are important. The major difference between
Lyons' theory and utilitarianism, however, is that the lat-
ter provides a plausible way for deciding what to do, where-
as Lyons' theory does not.
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determine what an individual should do before the fair pro-
cedure is established is inappropriate
. The question is not
should I (or should I not) invite a guest?' but rather 'How
can we set things straight?"’ 79 Now we can sensibly ask why
the same sort of consideration can't apply in the lawn-cros-
sing case (and others like it) as well; viz
. . the proper ques-
tion is not "Should I (or should I not) cross the lawn?" but
rather "How can we set things straight?" For, surely, if
utility is maximised by allowing some people to cross the
lawn (the number depending upon what the lawn will bear
prior to the damage threshold), rather than asking that
everyone refrain, the sensible thing to do might be to es-
tablish a "fair procedure" to maximize utility. Then, be-
cause a fair procedure is designed to maximize utility, the
reasons for acting in accordance with it are utilitarian
also; i.e., any violation of the procedure will damage the
lawn and so result in a loss of utility .® 9
9Q
-Lyons, p. 170.
80
This situation reminds one of a familiar objection
to rule-utilitarian theories; that is, it is contrary to
the . maximization of utility to insist that, because most
actions of a certain category (X) are bad, we should re-
gard them all as governed by the general rule, "Do not do
actions of type X." Here, we see that, in some cases, an
appeal to "fair procedures" is open as an alternative and,
when it is, is more’ productive of utility than would be
everyone's adherence to a prohibitive rule. Narveson does
not employ the term "fair procedures," but evidences a
similar approach for dealing with problems like these on
p. 136 of Morality and Utility
.
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However, although a loss of utility would result if
one violated what might be called a paradigm example of a
fair procedure (one such that any single violation would re-
sult in obvious utility loss), a more interesting problem
arises ii we ask what utilitarian reasons would compel one
to abide by a less-than-perfect fair procedure, in which
•there might be several violations without a noticeable loss
of utility. For example, it might be too much trouble (not
worth the effort) to set up a perfect fair procedure for
lawn-crossing; and so the individuals concerned might all
promise to refrain irom lawn-crossing under normal condi-
tions (e.g., in the absence of emergency situations), even
though the lawn would not be damaged, say, if several
crossed it every week. In such a situation, it might be
argued that a utilitarian could justify crossing the lawn
when he was certain that no one would find out and when
there would consequently be no utility loss in the form of
after-effects, such as distrust among citizens, etc .
^
In reply to this objection, if it is intended to
mean that we are obligated to increase our own hapuiness
in this case, and so increase, thereby, the general hapoi-
ness, we must remind ourselves, first, that no utilitarian
is obligated to make himself or anyone else happy. Though
83 .Note that the kind of situation described in the
footnote on p,206 of this text can be considered as a vari-
ation of this and so can be regarded as being dealt with at
this time also.
256
it is right to do so when no avoidable harm results, the
best way to maximize the general happiness is to regard, as
one's only obligation, respecting others' rights to the
necessary conditions for happiness. Secondly, as there has
presumably been a promise made that one would not lawn-cross
in secret, and we have previously established that those to
whom the promise was made have a prima facie right to expect
compliance, to break the promise is to violate this right and
82
so to harm them. That is, insofar as people can be harmed
without their knowing it (which is surely possible), and in-
sofar as one has no special right to cross the lawn when no
one else will notice, etc,, appeal to the principle of ob-
ligation informs us that many rights are violated if one
crosses the lawn in secret, but no rights are violated if one
doesn't. "" Thirdly, it might be argued that if one knows he
82 .See footnote on p. 236 of this text. This takes care
of the utilitarian justification for keeping promises, and
so accounts for the other moral practice Lyons denies that
the theory can handle. Again, it is most important to note
that under some conditions it would be right (also obliga-
tory) for a utilitarian not to abide by a previous agree-
ment, which accounts for it's being only a prima facie ob-
ligation. For example, he should not abide by its terms
if more harm would result from his doing so. For a rather
detailed defense of promise-keeping as a prima facie ob-
ligation, see Narveson, Morality and Utility
, pp. 189-197.
go
-'Narveson hints that there are at least some circum-
stances in which we should regard satisfying the legitimate
desires of others--even when they can't know about it—as
justified by utilitarian considerations. "We sometimes
have desires which can only be satisfied by the creation
of conditions we will never know about, e.g., for our manu-
scripts to be published posthumously, our roses to be
25 ?
vvill ne’v sr oe found, out, he should cross the lawn anyway—
oven ii rights are violated—because to do so will maximize
the amount of pleasure produced and, consequently, the gen-
eral happiness. In this case, it must be objected that to
argue this way is to once again engage in a bit of meta-
physical speculation. It might be the case that, metaphys-
ically speaking, more general happiness will ultimately be
produced (one can imagine anything he wishes from this per-
spective), but from the evidence we have about hanpiness, we
are not entitled to conclude that if more pleasure is pro-
duced, more overall happiness will result. To do so is auto-
matically to presuppose that 'happiness' is identical with
’pleasure,' a presupposition we have already dispensed with
oh
as being beyond the realm of justification."^ Given the
tended, etc. The satisfaction of these desires cannot, of
course, produce feelings of satisfaction in us; and this
might be a reason for thinking these desires unreasonable.
Nevertheless, it
.
is worth pointing out that if you tend your
friend's roses /in the case where he has died after you have
promised to take care of them after his death/, you are do-
ing it in order to satisfy his desires, and if you default,
you will have left this desire unsatisfied. Such 'satis-
factions' come within the purview of utility as I have
specified it, but surely we all feel that these are pale
ghosts of satisfactions, and not to be counted for very
much." (p. 196.)
84Of course, rejection of this specific presupposition
would also extend t.o other attempts to equate 'happiness'
with any particular 'intrinsic good(s).' Therefore, equat-
ing 'happiness' in this case, for example, with 'taking ad-
vantage of one's neighbors when one has good reason to be-
lieve they will not find out,' must be rejected on the same
grounds. In addition, it should be recalled that we are
prevented from having knowledge of metaphysical rightness
and wrongness, not only because we are not allowed to
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evidence available with respect to the question of happiness,
as utilitarians we can only sanction the establishment of
rights to the necessary conditions for happiness and not
violating them whenever possible. Phrased somewhat differ-
ently, this means that the satisfaction of illegitimate de-
sires is precisely the kind of thing that utilitarianism
cannot sanction, whenever it is possible not to do so.
Returning to Rescher, problems that he deals with in
Chapter V of Distributive Justice are also susceptible to
solution via fair procedures. One of these problems is
discussed in the section, "indivisible goods and 'Equality
of Opportunity,'" which Rescher outlines as follows:
An important facet of the role of distributing
-pro-
cedures comes to the fore whenever in the nature' of
things. a straightforwardly equitable pattern of dis-
tribution is impossible of realization. This occurs
inter-alia whenever the object of the division is an
indivisible (or not a sufficiently divisible) good. 85
This happens, for example, if two individuals have perfectly
equal claims to an item which cannot be divided or shared
in any satisfactory v/ay. As Rescher says about circum-
stances like these:
The interests of "distributive justice" cannot here
--in the very nature of the case--be served by di-
viding the "expected utility," but only by resorting
to. a. stochastic method for dividing the "expected
utility," by equalizing the chances of the equally
presuppose that we know what happiness is, but also because
we do not know what the nature and/or extent of the conse-
quences of our actions are.
O cT
^Rescher, pp. 93-94-.
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matched claimants to carry off the whole of theindivisible prize.
in fact, Rescher claims that this random-distribution
method is the standard procedure in everyday life when such
problems arise.
Recalling the utilitarian justification for providing
everyone, so par as possible, with an equal opportunity for
happiness, it becomes immediately apparent that the random
selection procedure urged by Rescher as the only fair way to
solve the problem is exactly what our theory would prescribe.
In any situation in which there are equal claims to an in-
divisible or unsharable item, the right of each to an equal
opportunity for obtaining the item is respected by adopting
a decision procedure which assures an equal advantage to
each. The only procedure that the theory could sanction is
some kind of random selection procedure, such as the tossing
of a coin.
When Rescher concludes about these situations that
"a distribution that does not g'ive all equally deserving
claimants an equal share must, in the interests of justice,
at least preserve an ’equality of opportunity’ (and, of
course, one of risk also)," we can reply that preserving an
equality of opportunity in these situations is also in the
interests of maximizing utility. We can conclude, in
Rescher, o. 94.
O ry
J
'Rescher, p. 94. That is, we can draw this conclusion
260
other words
,
that utilitarian theory, through the adoption
of lair procedures, is able to handle another so-called
problem of distributive justice.®®
finally, exactly the same kind of procedure can be em-
ployed for resolving the problems of distribution in Reseller's
next section, "Special Problems of an Economy of Scarcity.
Thus, for example, where there is not enough food to eo
around to sustain life for everyone with an equal claim,
some would have to be selected by a random procedure to re-
ceive an amount sufficient to live. It is obvious that this
represents a choice between harms, the least harm resulting
from appealing to a fair procedure which acknowledges every-
one's equal claim to be spared; in other words, to do so
if we interpret, as we have been, 'equal claims' with 'equal
righ us and regard 'rights' as 'necessary conditions for th^pursuit of happiness.'
88Though it won't be argued for, there is good reason
xor supposing that all other problems of justice, which are
usually thought to be distinct from problems of distributivejustice, are
. really distributive in principle. If so, suc-
cess in dealing v/ith problems of distributive justice can
oe extended to deal successfully with these other problems
of justice as well. However, as some of these problems have
already been dealt with (e.g., the right to life and asso-
ciated problems), and as it is not difficult to imagine
how our utilitarian theory could be applied for the resolu-
tion^ of other problems of justice, without having to demon-
strate that they are really instances of distribution, it
does not seem necessary to argue for the hypothesis that all
proolems of justice are derivative upon the concept of dis-
tribution. For allusions to the plausibility of this hypo-
thesis, see the followings Reseller, p. 9; Narveson, p. 155;
Frankena, "The Concept of Social Justice," pp. 4 and 9; and
Ewin, p. 201.
39
Reseller, pp. 95-98.
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would be
tion and
1:0 C='c L ln accordance with the principle of oblira-
its corollary.
ADDENDUM
Something needs to be said about whether the theory
uhat has been discussed is an act- or rule-utilitarian
theory. ^ David Braybrooke has maintained that acceptance
of rule-utilitarianism implies that "Circumstances may ao-
pear in which particular moral rules ought to be upheld,
even though the harm done by single violations, taking them
as single instances, independently of actions done inde-
pendently from them, would be outweighed by the good that
the violations achieve." 91 If this is true, it can safely
90 ..In fact, it should be noted that Frofessor Robert
Ackermann has voiced the suspicion that the utilitarian
theory which I have developed and attributed to Mill is so
radically different from what have traditionally been re-
maided as utilitarian theories that it may be misleading to
regard it as a utilitarian theory at all. I'm not certain-
how to reply to this, except to say that it does seem to be
a unique moral theory and that, whatever it is called, it
clearly seems to be a much better theory than so-called
traditional utilitarian theories (see the discussion of
"classical formulations" of utilitarianism in the first part
of Chapter l). I do not find it problematic to refer to it
as a utilitarian theory, however, and suggest that the dis-
agreement between us could only be resolved by determining
the necessary conditions which must be met by a moral theory
in order for it to be correctly categorized as utilitarian.
91David Braybrooke, "The Choice Between Utilitarian-
isms," American Philosophical Quarterly
, 4, 1 (January, 1967 ),
p. 28. Braybrooke* s assertion is typical of many who have
commented on the implications of accepting rule-utilitari-
anism. For example, see Narveson, Morality and Utility
, p.
128; Jonathan Harrison, "Utilitarianism, Universalism
,
and
Our Duty to be Just," Contemporary Utilitarianism
,
ed.
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be said “hat our theory is not committed to such a position,
and consequently, is not a rule-utilitarian theory. This
can be very simply demonstrated by pointing out that in any
particular moral situation, a moral agent employing the theo-
ry is not limited to an appeal to moral rules justified by
the principle of utility.
According to the theory, in any particular situation
in which a moral agent is trying to decide about the moral
status of particular actions, he is obligated to determine
whether they will result in harm (i.e,, the violation of
rights)
.
Any action which will result in no harm is mor-
ally right; any action which will result in harm, one is
obligated not to perform--unless it is the action which re-
sults in the least amount of harm in a situation where all
the alternatives involve harms. Knowing what harms are
and that some are generally more serious than others (e.g.,
the taking of life as opposed to a deprivation of liberty)
,
no agent is restricted to a list of moral rules--though he
can use them as rules of thumb--but can determine the moral
status of actions by referring only to the principle of
utility. In no case must he resign himself to the produc-
tion of avoidable harm, as seems to be implied by any rule-
Michael D. Bayles (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday & Co.,
Inc., Anchor Books, 1963), p. 32; and from this same an-
thology, -J. J. C. Smart, ’’Extreme and Restricted Utili-
tarianism," p. 107; and H. J. McCloskey, "An Examination
of Restricted Utilitarianism," p. 117.
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utilitarian theory (if Braybrooke's claim is correct).
This does not mean, however, that the theory cannot or
should not be formulated and used as a rule-utilitarian
theory, that it cannot or should not be instituted in a so-
ciety as a form of rule-utilitarianism. That this might
be desirable in some societies has been suggested by Brav-
brooke. Having described the paradigm community ("The
Community-In-Session") in which it would result in maximum
advantage (utility) to the community if everyone functioned
as an act-utilitarian, he turns to a more realistic ap-
praisal of communities. In these communities, the form of
utilitarianism which is preferable is dependent on a num-
ber of factors.
Communities find themselves in distinctive histori-
cal environments. In certain environments, given
certain courses of events, it is possible that a
policy. of giving agents full discretion to act as
act-utilitarians would give better results in the
long run than binding them not to use such dis-
cretion-even if common suspicions about the pro-
portion of agents who would abuse discretion are
fully vindicated. For the aggregate gain in hap-
piness from the cases in which discretion is prop-
erly used may outweigh the aggregate loss from the
cases in which it is not. In this respect also
rule-utilitarianism
,
so far as concerns the obvi-
ous reasons for preferring it... rests on empiri-
cal foundations that are by no means perfectly
settled for all times and places. 9-
After proceeding further to point out that rule-utili-
atrianism does not imply the use of non-changing rules
(since rules originally selected may have defects or become
raybrooke, p. 30 .
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obsolete) ana that in some communities it might maximize
utility ,o have some who are act- and some who are rule-
utilitarians, Braybrooke concludes at the end of his article
that, "Whatever its difficulties, rule-utilitarianism is not
to oe surrendered to act-utilitarianism at all times and all
places. In some circumstances, depending on the state of
the world and on the state of information, act-utilitarian-
ism would displace rule-utilitarianism. In other circum-
stances, a consistent utilitarian will have to stand by
rule-utilitarianism.
It seems to me that Braybrooke' s contention that
rule-utilitarianism would sometimes be more desirable than
act—utilitarianism is substantially correct. However, what
is most significant to realize is that what all of this
means for the long debate between advocates of act- and
rule-utilitarianism is that, since the utilitarian theory
we have developed can function as an act-utilitarian theory
which is not subject to theoretical objection (at least from
the standpoint of justice), the decision to adopt one or
the other is not one that must be made on theoretical
grounds at all, but merely for reasons of expediency. '
'
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' We thus avoid having to reject utilitarianism on
grounds of theoretical objections advanced, for example, by
Richard B, Brandt on pp. 109-110 of his article "Toward a
Credible Form of Utilitarianism," and Alan Donagan on p.
188 of "Is There a Credible Form of Utilitarianism?"
26 5
Depending on the community, one or the other (or a combina-
tion) will work to best advantage.
In conclusion, then, without arguing the point further,
I thinr it can be safely claimed that utilitarianism can be
employed in either an act or rule form, that the decision as
to which is best can be made without having to determine which
form is theoretically least objectionable, i.e., most com-
pa oiole with intuition. In the context of the concern of the
dissertation, either form of utilitarianism is able to account
for intuitively acceptable principles of distributive justice.
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